

Does Community Policing Build Trust in Police and Reduce Crime? Evidence from Six Coordinated Field Experiments in the Global South

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Is it possible for societies to reduce crime without creating or exacerbating adversarial relationships between the police and citizens? Community-oriented policing is a widely celebrated reform that aims to do so, and advocates are calling for its adoption around the world. However, the existing evidence base is limited to a small number of countries, does not generally study the bundle of practices commonly implemented together, and is largely silent on effects on trust. We designed six field experiments with police agencies in the Global South to study locally designed models of community policing, with coordinated measures of crime and the attitudes and behaviors of citizens and police from both surveys and administrative data. In a preregistered meta-analysis, we find that these interventions largely failed to improve citizen-police relations and do not reduce crime. Structural changes to police agencies may be required for incremental reforms such as community policing to succeed.

Introduction

Over the past quarter century, the death toll from war dramatically declined (1). In its place, other forms of violence surged. Today, more than one quarter of the world's population lives in conditions of insecurity due to high levels of crime and violence unrelated to war, especially in the Global South (2). Even where crime rates are falling, including in North America and Europe, crime victimization remains highly unequal, falling disproportionately on marginalized groups (3). Importantly, insecurity is driven not just by criminals, but also by police, who sometimes victimize citizens physically (4–6) and financially (7).

Reducing crime and insecurity now stands at the top of the global policy agenda. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 2015, commit countries to achieve “just, peaceful, and inclusive societies,” with a focus on insecurity due to crime and violence. At the same time, with widespread Black Lives Matter protests against police abuse in the United States and around the world, the issue of how to address inequalities in the criminal justice system and rein in police abuse has never been more salient.

How can societies effectively reduce crime and insecurity? One important answer

to this challenge begins with the police (8,9). Since the origins of modern policing in the early 1800s, societies around the world have relied on a professional, uniformed, and regulated authority to prevent crime and maintain order (10). But the creation of modern policing generated problems of its own: the lack of independence of police from political influence (11,12), the misuse of coercive capability (13,14), and the challenge of maintaining the respect, approval, and cooperation of the public (15–17). These problems underline a central tension in efforts to address widespread crime and insecurity, especially as greater investments are made in police capability. Many policing innovations intended to reduce crime have backfired by eroding citizen trust and cooperation with the police, including stop-and-frisk, zero-tolerance policies, broken windows policing, and militarized policing (18–22).

In recent decades, perhaps the most celebrated reform to address both crime and citizen-police trust has been the introduction of community policing. Broadly, community policing departs from traditional policing by “involv[ing] average citizens directly in the police process” to build channels of dialogue and improve police-citizen collaboration (23). Community policing programs often involve increasing the frequency of beat patrols; decentralized decision-making; community engagement programs, such as town halls; and problem-oriented policing programs to act on information from citizens to prevent crime (24,25). By expanding opportunities for communication and engagement, community policing is designed to generate trust and build more effective police agencies in environments of low trust (23,24,26).

The first compelling evidence on this approach emerged from Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) in the early 1990s. Introduced in stages to facilitate careful study, researchers reported improving conditions in the targeted neighborhoods, better relationships between police and residents, higher levels of community involvement, and greater satisfaction with the police and public services (26). Inspired by these effects, community policing took off in the following years. By the late 1990s, 85 percent

of police departments in the United States had either adopted or were adopting community policing practices (24). In 2015, nearly all large U.S. cities of more than 250,000 people explicitly identified community policing as a core element of their mission (27). Importantly, while this commitment to community policing reflected a shared view that the police and public should be “coproducers of safety” and take a proactive approach to crime prevention, the actual strategies deployed across contexts were highly heterogeneous.

Now, a reform that had its origins in new practices pioneered in the U.S. and United Kingdom is increasingly advanced as a solution to the mistrust that characterizes police-community relations in many countries in the Global South. Community policing has been implemented by police agencies on all seven continents, and is promoted by many international donors including the European Union in police reform efforts across its member states (28), the US in its “train-and-equip” programs that built new police forces after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (29), and the United Nations in training programs in its peacekeeping missions around the world. The UN calls community policing “an essential part of peacebuilding” (30). The International Council of Chiefs of Police encourages police agencies to adopt community policing as “the key operational philosophy in mission statements, strategic plans, and leadership development programs” (31).

In this paper, we ask: can community policing reduce crime *and* build trust in the police in the Global South? The challenge in answering this question is that there is no single model of community policing. Instead, community policing is an *organizational* strategy that involves police and residents working together to set priorities and organize activities. Informed by a commitment to citizen involvement, problem solving, and decentralization, this organizational strategy necessitates localization—with the specific activities, projects, and programs emerging in each context from dialogue and engagement. So investigating the effects of community policing means asking about how police departments operationalize these concepts in different contexts and whether their local-

ized applications have comparable effects. We tackle the challenge of assessing these context-specific effects through a coordinated multi-site randomized trial of community policing practices in six contexts across the Global South.

In doing so, we add to an evidence base on community policing that, despite the great enthusiasm of professionals who are advocating its adoption around the world, is mixed and incomplete. A 2017 review by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences emphasized how difficult it is to generalize about the possible effects of community policing given the highly variable set of activities undertaken by the police in different contexts. Through our own systematic review, we identified 37 randomized trials, the majority of which study two important sub-components of community policing: increasing the presence of police in communities, e.g., more frequent foot patrols (20 studies); and problem-oriented policing (7). The weight of evidence suggests these interventions reduce crime, but a number of studies find mixed or null results especially for community presence interventions. There is little evidence on how these interventions impact perceptions of insecurity or the frequency of police abuse. Moreover, there is little evidence on other common components of community policing including community meetings and tip-lines. Most notably, the studies are nearly all from the U.S., the U.K., and Australia. A very small number come from the Global South (32–38).

To examine the design and impact of community policing interventions across diverse contexts, we partnered with police departments in Santa Catarina State in Brazil; the city of Medellín in Colombia; Liberia’s capital city, Monrovia; Sorsogon Province in the Philippines; in rural areas throughout Uganda; and in two populous districts in Punjab province in Pakistan. In each site, we collaborated directly with the relevant local police agency, which implemented a locally-appropriate community policing intervention. Informed by global best practices, the interventions had a core set of common elements across all six contexts, but also included elements that built on existing approaches in each agency. In addition, the six research teams coordinated on an empirical

strategy and harmonized outcome measures of crime, insecurity, and trust in the police, all of which were pre-registered. In total, community policing interventions were implemented in 516 neighborhoods, districts, and villages reaching approximately nine million people. Across the coordinated studies, we ask whether the implementation of these community policing practices generated changes in the level of trust in the police, observed cooperation by citizens with the police, and the rate of crime, among other outcomes. We measure these outcomes through harmonized surveys of citizens and police officers and with administrative data from the police on crime. 18,382 citizens and 874 police officers were interviewed in our post-intervention surveys.

The main contribution of this study is the systematic evaluation of locally-appropriate community policing practices across a set of highly diverse contexts in the Global South. In doing so, we address four particular shortcomings of the existing evidence base. First, we measure a harmonized and comprehensive set of outcomes including crime rates, citizen perceptions of and cooperation with the police, and police abuse. Without evidence on all of these outcomes from the same studies, it is difficult to determine whether decreases in crime rates (if any) are accompanied by an erosion of trust as in past police reform efforts, or whether community policing improves police-community relations. Second, we examine local programs that strive to adopt multiple practices advanced by advocates of community policing, including police-community forums, increased police presence in communities, and problem-oriented policing. When studied in isolation, the interactive and cumulative effects of these programs, which tend to be implemented together in actual practice, would be missed. Third, these studies were designed jointly, preregistered, and implemented during the same period, thus increasing our confidence in the comparability of the results and avoiding the widespread challenge of publication bias (39). Finally, this project expands the scope of evidence on community policing to the Global South, where these reforms are increasingly deployed and where there is considerable policy momentum to address high levels of crime and police abuse. By

reporting on simultaneous trials in multiple sites, the study provides evidence of the external validity of its findings which is unusual in the social sciences (40–42).

Our preregistered meta-analysis finds that the community policing interventions we studied did not generate greater trust between citizens and the police or reduce crime. We are able to reject even small improvements in our primary outcomes measures. We are also able to reject even small backfire effects. We detected evidence of compliance with the interventions, including stepped up foot patrols and regular community meetings, in all sites except in Brazil.¹ Across the sites, even in those with the highest levels of compliance, community policing practices did not lead to changes in our primary outcomes: crime victimization, perceived future insecurity, perceptions of police, police perceptions of citizens, police abuse, crime reporting, crime tips, or the reporting of police abuse. We do not see reductions in crime whether measured in administrative data from police blotters or in victimization surveys. We see some changes in secondary attitudinal outcomes in terms of perceived police capacity (Colombia) and perceived police intentions toward citizens (Liberia and Pakistan). In sum, however, locally designed increases in community policing did not lead to the expected changes in any of our six sites, in high or low crime communities, or among individuals with high or low baseline levels of trust in the police. Moreover, crime displacement does not appear to explain our results. In short, as implemented in practice, community policing practices do not deliver the benefits claimed by its advocates. In contexts with limited incentives and resources to change, incremental reforms to police practices such as community policing may have to be preceded or complemented by structural reforms in order to be successful.

¹The Brazil study relies on an encouragement design, unlike the other sites which randomize community policing practices directly.

Conceptual framework

The theory we privilege starts from the idea that citizens are a critical source of valuable information about where crime is happening, who is committing it, and the concerns they have about suspicious people or activities. This kind of information, when provided consistently, helps the police allocate their time and attention in ways that will prevent crime and improve public safety (43).

When citizens consider whether to cooperate with the police, they weigh the costs of this cooperation against the expected returns (44). Citizens often face search costs: they may not know how or on what issues to engage the police, may need to travel long distances to reach police stations, or may lack access to telephones to call the police. They may also fear retaliation (and judge the police to be unable to protect them). In terms of benefits, citizens have expectations about their capacity or willingness to act in response to reports. In environments of high corruption, low capacity, or predatory police behavior, citizens may calculate that the costs of engaging the police exceed the benefits. When citizens do not cooperate with police, police may be less effective, which may affect citizen perceptions of police intentions, generating a vicious cycle (31,45)

Community policing aims to break this cycle, by affecting the costs and benefits of cooperation and directly affecting police behaviors. Costs are brought down by significantly increasing the visibility and accessibility of police officers, and creating an environment in which it becomes accepted to engage and work closely with the security forces. Formal meetings and regular lines of communication reinforce this new norm. Expected benefits are increased by changing perceptions about both the intentions and capacity of the police. By increasing interaction with citizens, community policing may also more directly affect police behavior, by increasing the risks to abusing their positions and victimizing citizens or simply by improving intentions toward citizens.

Importantly, community policing is hypothesized to impact community-level outcomes and attitudes, not only the outcomes for individuals who encountered the police

or participated in a community meeting. These knock-on effects may happen through others in the neighborhood learning about community meeting events from participants, from the changes to police behavior, or other general equilibrium effects.

For some practitioners, community policing aims to improve trust between citizens and police, a valuable goal on its own, and not necessarily affect levels of insecurity. In our empirical strategy, we are open to this possibility.

Prior evidence on community policing

To assess the existing literature on community policing, we conducted a systematic review of studies on the effectiveness of the component parts of community policing, such as foot patrols and problem-oriented policing.² The review identified a total of 1,963 studies, of which 177 were deemed relevant. From these studies, 238 estimates of effectiveness were analyzed.³ We classified the type of intervention and the type of outcome each study examines as well as whether results suggested an increase or decrease, were null, or were mixed with some positive, negative, and null. Details on the search protocol, filtering, and coding are in the Supplementary Materials (Section E.).

The 177 studies include 37 randomized trials, whose results we describe in Table 1, as well as 140 observational studies. 22 of the randomized trials are published in peer-reviewed journals. The bulk of experimental evidence comes from three countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (82%). More than two-thirds of observational evidence was also collected in these three countries.

Four findings emerge. Problem-oriented policing likely reduces crime (46). In addition, 10 randomized trials find that community presence reduces crime incidence, but

²We follow the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines for reporting. The review includes English-language studies published in or after 1970. In addition to published articles, unpublished studies are included to reduce the impact of publication bias against null findings. The review also covers articles with a range of methodological approaches from randomized controlled trials to observational analyses and qualitative cases studies.

³Studies with multiple interventions and outcomes are treated as separate estimates to evaluate an intervention's individual effect on each outcome.

four trials find null results and eight yield mixed results (68%). The evidence is not conclusive given the small number of studies, but the balance of evidence suggests increasing community presence does not significantly impact citizen perceptions of safety or their views of the police. It appears, again with limited evidence, that problem-oriented policing may increase perceptions of safety.

More strikingly, the review highlights just how much there is yet to learn about the impacts of community policing, as illustrated by the “evidence gap map” in Table 1. Few studies examine multiple families of outcomes (e.g., crime and perceptions of the police). Though we have collected substantial evidence on how components of community policing affect crime rates, we know little about how perceived insecurity, police abuse, and citizen cooperation with the police are affected.

Perhaps most importantly for this study, the evidence on community policing in the Global South is limited. We identified only five randomized trials, conducted in Colombia, India, and Liberia. Because each study focused on a unique intervention with their own preferred outcome variables — e.g. hot spot policing in Colombia, changes in management practices in India, and increased community patrols in Liberia — comparison is difficult, underscoring the need for a coordinated approach.

Study contexts and interventions

This study examines community policing in six contexts that differ substantially from the Global North countries where it has been tested in prior research. Some of the six are less democratic (indeed, two are autocracies); less wealthy; and most share a recent history of armed conflict. Police share law enforcement responsibility with other formal authorities such as auxiliary police or with vigilante groups in several of our contexts. Moreover, in others, the police compete with armed gangs in providing security. As a result of these differences, the impact of community policing may differ from estimates in past studies.

A wide range of individual programs are labeled community policing, including local beat patrols; townhall meetings between police and citizens; citizen crime reporting hotlines; frequent confidence-building patrols; citizen ombuds-persons; home visits by police; neighborhood watches; and government oversight of non-criminal issues, such as building code enforcement. Yet four principles are common to many programs identified by experts as exemplars: (1) implementation of beat patrols in which officers are assigned to patrol small neighborhoods or villages, (2) decentralization of decision-making authority to those beat officers and their supervisors, (3) community engagement programs to solicit information on community problems from citizens and transmit information about police programs to citizens; and (4) problem-oriented policing programs, in which police address problems identified through community engagement programs directly with dedicated budgets for small projects and/or indirectly with the assistance of other public or private agencies (24,25).

We worked with the police agency in each of the six research sites to identify concrete, locally-appropriate ways they could make a meaningful increase in the strength of community policing, informed by global best practices. In some contexts, this meant building on existing approaches, while in others a community orientation was largely new. The result is a set of interventions with core features in common, and complementary elements that differ across contexts (see Table 3). The variation in the interventions across our sites reflects the diversity of implementation of community policing around the world (28). We interpret our effects as estimates of what happens when a police agency decides to increase its commitment to community policing, tailored based on their existing policing practices and local context.

Santa Catarina State, Brazil

The first study site is a set of urban municipalities in Santa Catarina State in southern Brazil. Santa Catarina is a wealthy part of Brazil, a hub of industry and tourism.

However, it is not immune to either the high crime rates or victimization by a highly-militarized police force. São José, one municipality in the study, has a higher rate of death at the hands of the police than Honduras, the world's most violent country in terms of crime. Organized crime is also present in Santa Catarina, accused of involvement in widespread attacks on buses, public buildings, and security agents.

Community policing is not new in Brazil. Since the end of the military government in 1985, community policing programs have been implemented to address the policing challenges in eight states as well as Brazil's capital (47). The first statewide program took place in the state of São Paulo in 1996 (48), undertaken by the state's military police, the main preventive policing organization in Brazil. Our program is an expansion of an existing community policing effort of the *Polícia Militar de Santa Catarina* known as "*Rede de Vizinhos*," established in early 2016.

Rede de Vizinhos has two components: townhall meetings to encourage the formation of ongoing communication between citizens and the police through new chat groups on the WhatsApp platform. They typically featured a presentation of the general objectives of the program, the role of the police, and the improvement in community-police relations that were sought. At the end of the meeting, the police officer in charge collected a list of names of those who are interested. If the group was established, a second meeting was held. This meeting then establishes specific rules for usage of WhatsApp groups; discusses prevention techniques; lays out norms for detecting and reporting suspicious behaviour. The meetings then address specific policing problems at the community policing group level. The meetings ended with an action plan. The second component is the WhatsApp groups themselves. Suggestions and concerns raised in the groups were collected by the police officers assigned to the groups.

Our research team worked with commanders of the *Polícia Militar de Santa Catarina* to identify physical locations where a meeting could be held to encourage formation of a new community-police group. We labeled the 300-meter circular area around the point

as neighborhood of treatment. Each point was in an urban part of Santa Catarina State, with 445 people per km² density.

Officers were recruited for the study intervention by precinct commanders. In some cases, the officers were dedicated to the intervention and worked with all, or most, of the community policing groups in their precincts. In other cases, officers dedicated a fraction of their time to the program.

City of Medellín, Colombia

In Colombia, we partnered with the metropolitan police in its second-largest city, Medellín, home to three million people. The city, nestled in the Andes mountains in South America, was the home of Pablo Escobar's drug cartel and in the 1980s it was known as the most violent city in the world. The police committed hundreds, if not thousands, of extrajudicial murders annually as recently as the 1990s (49). Since then, there has been a marked decrease in crime victimization and police abuse. However, the police have seen little improvement in citizen trust since that period. In present-day Medellín, the police compete with local gangs, *combos*, to provide public safety (50).

Colombia has a decades-long history with some community policing practices, beginning during an era of police reform in the 1990s that began in response to public outrage over a police killing (51). Local police services centers were implemented in big cities, to bring police closer to citizens; community watch groups were organized; and community policing pilot was implemented in 1999 by the national police in the capital (52,53). In 2010, a major community policing and problem-oriented policing initiative, *Plan Nacional de Vigilancia Comunitaria por Cuadrantes* began (54–56). Cities were divided into *cuadrantes* (beats) and officers were assigned to them for two-year rotations for which they were provided training in “soft skills” for community engagement and during which they implemented proactive problem-oriented policing practices (54).

The metropolitan police of Medellín, *Policía Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá* (MEVAL),

implemented changed community policing practices at the *cuadrante* level across the city for the study. MEVAL is a division of the national police, but with substantial authority for its control delegated to the mayor. The police focused on “prioritized neighborhoods” of approximately equal population at the center of the *cuadrante*. The *cuadrantes* are small (0.44 km²) and highly dense (26,341 people per km²).

Community meetings were the focus of the Medellín intervention. The aim was to hold three meetings per *cuadrante*, one every three months. Citizens were invited to meetings through fliers as well as messages from community leaders. Fliers were also left at community centers by facilitators. The two patrol officers in each beat were asked to attend each meeting, and sometimes higher-ranking officers or other government officials attended as well. An agenda for the meeting was shared with the police and citizens in advance. The police officer shared prepared remarks that outlined the role of the police, provided the mechanisms to report crime and police abuse, and then the remainder of the meeting was to be open discussion with citizens. Most meetings concluded with the signing of a “cooperation agreement.” In these agreements, participants and officers were meant to agree on the three top problems identified during the meeting as well as actions each party would engage in to address these problems.

Station chiefs across the city were recruited to participate. The chiefs selected two patrol officers from each beat to attend community meetings. The officers had other duties, but the meetings were added to their *tablas de acciones mínimas requeridas* (“Tamir”) or daily required activity document. Guides were shared with officers by meeting facilitators, but no other special training was provided.

City of Monrovia, Liberia

Our third site is Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia, a West African country that was plagued by a decade of civil war ending in 2003. Residents are subject to high crime rates and ongoing vigilante violence. According to our data, 24% live in neighborhoods

with an active local security group unaffiliated with the police. Moreover, the limited reach of the state over decades has left many unfamiliar with the laws and how to report violations to the police.

Liberia introduced community policing practices following the end of the Second Liberian Civil War in 2003. Through the creation of community watch groups that worked directly with the police through its watch forum initiative, the aim was to rebuild trust in the police and to provide an alternative to vigilantism that simultaneously complemented low police capacity.

In this study, the Liberian National Police shifted community practices in communities in Monrovia, which are densely-populated small urban neighborhoods (7,811 people per km²). 35 communities were nominated by the police as high-priority areas with high crime; 65 were randomly sampled to supplement this set. The intervention targeted the most central block (a subdivision of the community), plus the two largest adjacent blocks, in each community.

The intervention involved holding townhall meetings, increased foot patrol frequency, and a community watch forum. Bimonthly townhall meetings were planned with the community policing officer and community members. Citizens were informed about the meeting in advance during foot patrols; community leaders further spread the word. Meetings consisted of an introduction by community leaders; 1-2 10 minute lectures by officers about concepts such as reporting crimes, the organization of the police, and the existence of the watch forums; and 30 minutes of open discussion. Foot patrols of 4-6 officers were also to be conducted bimonthly, the week before townhall meetings, for an average of an hour. Officers announced the meeting, handed out pamphlets with information about the local police office, the community watch initiative, and other topics, and talked informally with residents. Finally, townhall meetings were used to encourage communities to form a community watch group. Communities that decided to organize a group were provided lectures in the townhall meeting and in some cases in separate

meetings between the group and the community policing officer. A community policing officer was assigned in each community, with additional help from other available rank-and-file officers. The officers undertook the intervention activities at the expense of regular duties. No special training was provided (community policing officers received adhoc training in the past from international actors such as the United Nations).

Sheikhupura and Nankana Sahib districts, Punjab Province, Pakistan

In Pakistan, we partnered with the police in two mixed urban-rural districts in Sheikhupura Region in Punjab Province near the Indian border. Sheikhupura and Nankana Sahib districts are home to five million people. Sheikhupura has lower crime rates than our other contexts, but the police are among the least trusted institutions in Pakistan. The police are constrained in their ability to investigate crimes: many crimes require magistrate approval for investigation, which makes the process cumbersome, and eyewitness testimony is a de facto requirement for prosecution. Driven by the perception that police effort is tied to political connections, citizen cooperation is extremely low.

A citizen orientation was introduced in Pakistan in 2001 and 2002 in the form of Citizen Police Liaison Committees as well as a Police Complaints Authority, but implementation was uneven and only strong in rich areas (57, 58). Community policing practices have since been piloted in parts of the country in provinces, cities, and local districts, including in Sheikhupura district, one of our study areas (59).

The Punjab Police implemented our intervention in police beats in urban and rural parts of the Sheikhupura and Nankana Sahib districts. Urban beats average 9.5 km² in area and have 5,698 people per km²; rural beats 62 km² and 1,395 people per km².

The study intervention consisted of townhalls, selected increases in foot patrols, encouragement for use of a police hotline, a problem-oriented policing program, and encouragement to form community watch fora. The beat community policing team aimed to organize monthly townhall meetings with local citizens, who were mobilized through

public messaging shared at mosques and by local activists. Foot patrol frequency was increased only as part of problem-oriented policing responses decided on in townhall meetings. During townhall meetings, citizens were encouraged to report complaints and feedback to the Punjab Inspector General of the Police hotline (8787). The problem-oriented policing activity of the intervention was initiated during townhall meetings, during which problems were listed, ranked, and analyzed, and an action plan was formulated to address them. In subsequent meetings, the police and citizens reported on how the outcome of these planned responses. Finally, the watch forum intervention consisted of one of the monthly sessions of the townhall meetings being used to encourage people to form and manage a community watch forum. Officers were selected to participate by each district's police human resources Establishment Branch. Local officers from the treatment beats were given preference, and if selected they added the community policing responsibilities to their existing duties. A five-day training program was implemented in partnership with Pakistan's premier police training college. The sessions covered community policing in general, a refresher on police rules, the scanning-analysis-response-assessment method for problem-oriented policing, and on holding townhall meetings. The last day was a practical module in a non-study community.

Sorsogon Province, Philippines

Sorsogon Province, the southernmost province in the populous island of Luzon, is the site of our partnership in the Philippines. Most of the province is rural, with its largest urban center, Sorsogon City, home to 20% of the Province's 800,000 people. The national police provide security alongside a semi-professional auxiliary police called tanods appointed by local leaders. Tanods deal with minor crimes and disputes and day-to-day tasks such as directing traffic. The police are widely present in urban centers, but less so in rural areas (45% reported to us that they see a police officer once a month or less, but

they report seeing tanods daily). Importantly, though the Philippine National Police are associated with President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs, there is little drug or anti-drug related violence in Sorsogon. However, the reputation of the Philippines police for extrajudicial violence in other provinces erodes the trust of Sorsogon residents. Crime and interpersonal disputes were common at baseline, notably theft. Traffic accidents were also very common. Sorsogon Province is also home to a long-running communist rebellion of the New People’s Army in rural areas.

Community policing principles have long been discussed in the Philippines — influenced in part by American policing philosophies during the colonial period — but not deeply implemented (CITE). The presidential administration of Benigno Aquino III (2010-16) began a more systematic implementation of community policing practices, revising a key police manual on community relations, creating a unified structure for how local police departments should implement community policing, and requiring training for police leadership to community policing and problem-oriented policing practices (60).

In Sorsogon Province, the site of our intervention, community policing practices from the Aquino reforms were limited to small-scale initiatives by dedicated police-community relations officers. Each station had a team of 3-5 officers overseen by provincial police-community relations leaders. In addition to their regular patrol duties, the team conducted occasional area visits, met with citizens during public events, helped create youth organizations and Facebook groups, and led a monthly meeting with the leadership of a handful of *barangays* to discuss their public safety issues. The police told us that most barangays had exposure to these police-community relations teams about once or twice per year on average, though many rural barangays in our sample reported no exposure at all in our surveys. Our intervention builds on a further expansion of community policing practices in the province, labeled the “One Sorsogon” program. As part of this program, officers conducted scheduled visits in communities and held

impromptu townhall meetings and one-on-one discussions. These meetings were used to share information about the police, identify pressing problems in communities, and invite citizens to join a signature drive in solidarity with crime fighting. “One Sorsogon” incorporated many more police officers, not just the dedicated police-community relations officers. The entire force was involved in at least some aspect of community policing and moved towards normalizing it as a main component of policing rather than a side activity of a couple officers.

We partnered with the Philippine National Police in Sorsogon Province to implement increases in community policing practices in selected *barangays* in urban and rural parts of the province. *Barangays* consist of neighborhoods in the cities (average area 2.1 km², population density 4,800 people per km²) and larger districts in rural areas (area 3.3 and 1,125 pop dens).

The intervention consisted of foot patrols (rolled out in the first phase) and a problem-oriented policing program (the second phase). Officers patrolled in groups of 2-5, with each officer expected to take one 2-3 hour patrol per week in a single chosen *barangay*. On patrol, officers were instructed to engage citizens they encountered, make stops at businesses and schools, make home visit, attend *barangay* assembly meetings, and hold informal gatherings with groups of citizens. In some randomly-assigned *barangays*, patrols were conducted jointly with semi-professional auxiliary police known as *tanods* appointed by *barangay* leadership. The problem-oriented policing activity began during monthly citizen-police meetings in each *barangay*, and were run by new problem-oriented policing teams that included the *barangay* captain (mayor), the chief *tanod*, three rank-and-file *tanods*, and the *Kagawad* (elected *barangay* councillor) in charge of peace and order. In a random subset of teams also included two police officers. The first meeting involved reviewing crime information about local problems and the choice of a single issue to focus on. Remaining meetings consisted of updates from *tanods* on addressing major issues in the community and the remainder was a general problem-solving

discussion.

Most officers took part in the first phase. In the second phase, in consultation with the police, the research team randomly selected two officers from each municipality associated with a treatment *barangay* for participation. Training took place in two rounds. First, to prepare for the community-engagement phase, there was a train-the-trainers of chiefs of police and lead police-community relations officers who briefed the activities to officers. For the second phase, problem-oriented policing, a more substantial day-long training was provided to all officers in Sorsogon City, the provincial capital. The training covered the theory behind problem-oriented policing and holding the police-citizen meetings used to implement it. Officers undertook community policing activities in addition to their other duties during the intervention.

Uganda

Finally, we partnered with the national police in rural parts of Uganda in East Africa. Led by longtime President Yoweri Museveni, Uganda is the only country we study that Freedom House ranks as “not free,” though it holds regular elections with some limited competition. As in many authoritarian contexts, the Uganda Police Force serves dual roles: preventing and responding to crime, and maintaining the power of the ruling National Resistance Movement. As a result, levels of trust are low, but rank in the middle of the distribution for African states. Theft, sex-related crimes, financial crimes, and child-related crimes such as neglect are most common. Crime is less common in the rural areas we study than in cities, but is still high.

Community policing was first introduced to Uganda in 1989 in Kampala, the capital, and on paper but not in practice across the country in 1993. The programs involved light training but little else. A pilot study of more intensive community policing practices was piloted in the Muyenga suburb of Kampala beginning in 2010, then expanded to four additional towns in the country. The pilot involved motorcycle and foot patrols,

community watch teams of citizens, and occasional townhall meetings with citizens and local leaders. The pilot ended in 2018.

We worked with the Uganda Police Force to implement community policing practices at rural police stations prioritized by the police for regional balance and crime rates. Some stations had multiple police posts within them, in which case we randomly selected a single post to focus the work in.

The intervention consisted of town hall meetings, door-to-door visits, night patrols, and the formation of neighborhood watch teams. Townhalls were planned for once every two months and coordinated between YIDO and the local government (LC1) chairperson of the treated village. Citizens were invited through word-of-mouth. The officer-in-charge of the station was invited to participate. Foot patrols were planned including door-to-door visits in daytime and night patrols on foot. (However, as we discuss in the results, these happened rarely in practice.) Neighborhood watch teams were formed in each treatment villages, with “cells” formed for different parts of each village.

Officers selected by the police were reassigned from other tasks to participate in community policing activities. Training was conducted by our implementation partner, Youth Integrated Development Outcomes (YIDO). The training covered community policing principles and strategies and the specific components of the intervention. A separate training was conducted for senior police officials and supervising officers, to increase buy-in.

Materials and Methods

Sampling

We study targeted areas where our police partners believed community policing would be most effective. In Brazil, we study large municipalities in Santa Catarina State. In Colombia, we study all populated areas of Medellín. In the Philippines, we study all barangays in Sorsogon Province that were deemed safe from insurgent activity by the

Philippines military. In Pakistan, we draw a random sample of all areas in the two study districts, Nankana and Sheikhpura. In Liberia, we select a set of high-crime areas identified by the police as well as a random sample of other areas. In Uganda, we studied a purposive sample of rural areas across the country identified by the police. Citizens are randomly sampled in study areas to participate in surveys.

Treatment assignment

The studies rely on randomization of police beats, neighborhoods, districts, or police stations to a control condition or the common community policing treatment arm, in some cases blocking on pretreatment covariates measured in baseline surveys and from administrative crime data. In most studies, there was also a third treatment group that per our preregistration we will not analyze here. In the Philippines site, a community engagement program was rolled out first and then a problem-oriented policing program;⁴ in the other five the intervention was rolled out all at once. In Brazil, the treatment is an encouragement to form community-police groups.

By assigning community policing at the beat, station, neighborhood, or district level, and measuring outcomes in those units, we conduct a hard test of the model. There may be large effects on citizens directly exposed to increased officer interaction that are swamped by low effects for others. In our view, this is a virtue of the design: if community policing is to be used cost-effectively, it must reduce crime and increase trust in the community broadly, not only on the relatively small number directly exposed.

Outcome measurement

We collected four sets of outcome measures, harmonized across all sites: crime, citizen attitudes toward the police, citizen cooperation with the police, and police behavior (see Table 4).

⁴We estimate the combined effect of the two components by comparing the common treatment condition to control at endline after both programs have been implemented.

We designed common measures to be used in all six sites, in order to estimate the effects of community policing on common scales. We obtained administrative crime data from each police agency and aggregated them into standardized crime types. We developed shared citizen and police officer survey instruments that were then translated into local languages and adapted to the local context. The face-to-face surveys were implemented by Igarape Institute (Brazil), Invamer (Colombia), Parley (Liberia), Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives (Pakistan), and Innovations for Poverty Action (Philippines and Uganda). We enumerate the small number of cases in which measures differ across sites in Table SM3.

We aimed to measure a comprehensive set of outcomes, all of those community policing is hypothesized by academics and police practitioners to affect. As our systematic review demonstrates, we are one of the very few studies that measures both crime and citizen trust outcomes together. Moreover, very few studies survey officers in addition to citizens, though change in officer behavior is a core part of the theory of change.

First, we measure crime incidence, using police blotter data and crime victimization surveys of citizens, building on past surveys (44,61). We treat the surveys as our primary measure, because police blotter data confounds crime incidence and crime reporting to police. We also measure police abuse incidence using the citizen surveys.

Second, we measure the attitudes, norms, and knowledge of citizens using our citizen surveys. We measure trust in the police, perceptions of police (their intentions, responsiveness, and capacity), perceptions of insecurity, knowledge of criminal justice procedures, norms of cooperation with the police, perceived state legitimacy, and communal trust.

To measure the effects on citizen cooperation in the form of reporting crimes and police abuse, we rely on survey questions that ask, for each crime the respondent was the victim of, whether the crime was reported to the police. To avoid post-treatment bias by analyzing reporting conditional on crime victimization (62), we examine two sets

of average treatment effects in tandem: the effect of treatment on crime victimization rates; and the effect of treatment on a recoded reporting variable where zero represents either not being victimized or being victimized and not reporting and one represents victimization and reporting.

We measure police attitudes and reported behaviors toward citizens with surveys of officers. In Colombia, Pakistan, and Uganda, by virtue of the randomization of neighborhoods and police stations, officers were randomized into treated areas and control areas. In these settings, we estimate the effect of community policing on officer attitudes.

Analysis strategy

To estimate the effects of treatment in each study, we use linear regressions with an indicator for the common treatment arm⁵ controlling, when possible, for baseline outcomes and, if assignment is block-randomized, block fixed effects. We interpret these effects as intent-to-treat effects, given the imperfect compliance with assigned treatment we document. In Brazil, we estimate the complier average causal effect using instrumental variables estimation with block fixed effects and baseline outcomes.⁶ We weight the regressions by the inverse of the product of the probability of inclusion in the sample and assignment to treatment, if either varied across blocks (63). We report robust standard errors clustered at the level of treatment assignment, to account for our cluster-randomized design (64, 65).⁷

We pool the study estimates in a random effects meta-analysis (66) to assess the average effects of community policing and how effects vary across contexts.

We take two steps to address the risk of false discovery from multiple comparisons

⁵In the Philippines study, we include treatment indicators for crossed treatment conditions due to its factorial design.

⁶We elected to combine estimates of complier effects in Brazil with intent-to-treat effects in other studies due to the nature of the treatment. The randomized encouragement consisted of a single meeting with a police commander in which residents were provided information about how to form a community forum. The endogenous treatment is the forum being formed, which is similar to treatment in the other sites in which watch forums were created and community meetings held throughout the treatment period.

⁷The results do not change if the data are analyzed at the cluster level.

by constructing eight indices representing our main hypotheses and then following the Benjamini-Hochberg (67) adjustment to p-values. Together, the eight represent a test of the grand hypothesis that community policing is effective.⁸

Ethics

The experiments described in this paper raise an important and unique set of ethical considerations (see SM Section C. for a longer discussion of ethical issues). Each experiment was motivated by high levels of citizen mistrust in the police, as well as concerns about police behavior including corruption and abuse of power. Yet all of the experiments involved direct collaboration between research teams and these same police agencies. Although in each case we had a shared goal of understanding how potential reforms to police practices might change police behavior and police-citizen interactions, we were also highly attentive to concerns that these partnerships might implicate us as researchers in actions that might cause harm to individuals. For this reason, the research teams went beyond the traditional standards imposed by Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and national laws. As part of this joint project, each site's team weighed seriously the costs and benefits of partnering with each police agency, focused on how to minimize the risk of any potential harm from the intervention, and sought to provide transparency and informed consent to all participants in the research.

A number of best practices emerged in the process. First, the appropriateness of the local context was carefully considered in the design of each field experiment. For example, with obvious concerns about police complicity in the abusive war on drugs in the Philippines, the research team focused their collaboration with the police in Sorsogon, a province in which drug trafficking is not a salient issue. More broadly, teams engaged in significant pre-vetting of both police units and areas to ensure the work was being done in places where risks to citizens were relatively low. Second, significant care was taken

⁸We adjust with the same procedure each set of p-values within the hypothesis, for example all of the outcomes representing H1 and, separately, all of the outcomes representing H4c.

to provide comprehensive training for local police partners as part of the intervention. This went beyond securing the high-level buy-in of police authorities. The focus was on developing meaningful training practices that could influence how police officers think about their relationship to citizens and carry out community policing activities. Third, and perhaps most importantly, each team developed an extensive risk mitigation plan. The teams often deployed monitors on-the-ground to observe police activities, and each team developed clear redlines that would guide decisions about whether to end participation in the experiment/partnership as a function of concerns about public safety and police behavior. Finally, teams were fully committed to transparency about the research and the protection of confidentiality for research subjects. Given the sensitivity of survey responses about police behavior and abuse, it was important that the information we collected be fully anonymized and presented only in the aggregate to our police partners.

Importantly, although we worked in partnership with the police, we did not see this as transferring our ethical responsibilities to the third party. Throughout, we were careful to evaluate the risks associated with these partnerships, the potential of the research to improve police practices for the better, and the ways in which we could identify and mitigate potential harms throughout the research process.

Results

The police complied with the assigned community policing practices, but unevenly. In each study, our index measure of citizen awareness of community meetings and police patrol frequency increased (Figure 1). In Liberia, there was a 1.7 standard deviation increase ($p = 0.000$) in the compliance index; in the other cases the increases were smaller, between 0.16 and 0.45 s.d. (all statistically distinguishable from no effect at the 0.05 level). However, our measures of compliance are imperfect. Several sites did not aim to increase foot or vehicle patrol frequency (for example, in Colombia, where frequent

foot patrols were already in place). Compliance in several dimensions of treatment, including problem-oriented policing work and watch fora, are not measured. We estimate large changes in awareness of community meetings, but we cannot distinguish them from no effect (estimate = 0.99 s.d., $p = 0.1$). The police held many meetings as part of the treatment, between 109 in Brazil and over 800 in the Philippines and Pakistan (see Table SM1). Average attendance ranged between 10 in the Philippines to 51 in Uganda. Many meetings were attended by hundreds of citizens. These figures are evidence both of compliance by the police in holding meetings, which were a key aspect of treatment, and demand for community policing from citizens.

Our six sites compare favorably to recent tests of increased citizen-police contact in the Global South. However, the frequency of contact in meetings and foot patrols was less frequent than in prominent success stories in the U.S. (26). Recent studies in the Global South focused on 20-30 minute face-to-face visits with 25 households over single 1-3 day visits to rural villages in Liberia (38) and town hall meetings with citizens 4-5 times over 14 months lasting 1.5 to 3 hours in rural Liberia (35). In our sites, town hall meetings were held semi-annually (Brazil), bimonthly (Colombia, Liberia, and Uganda), or monthly (Pakistan). In the Philippines, the community engagement treatment was not community meetings, but more intensive interactions in small groups during foot patrols. Additional meetings as part of community watch forums were held in Liberia and Uganda.

Sizable proportions of citizens in treatment areas reported hearing about police-community meetings in most but not all sites (Colombia: 38%; Liberia: 41%; Pakistan: 4%; Philippines: 19%; Uganda: 45%). These proportions are somewhat but not dramatically lower than the proportion of Chicagoans who had heard about that city's canonical community policing program five years into its implementation, 60% (26). In two of the four sites for which we can estimate meeting attendance as a proportion of the population — Colombia and Liberia — meetings were attended by 4.8% and between 2 and 4%

of citizens, respectively; these proportions are roughly comparable to the annual reach of the Chicago meetings. In the Pakistan and Philippines, only about 0.3% of the target population attended a meeting.⁹

We estimate small increases that are not statistically distinguishable from no change in foot patrol (est. = 0.064, $p = 0.239$) and vehicle patrol frequency (est. = 0.091, $p = 0.064$). The police in our sites appear to patrol on foot less intensely at baseline and in treatment areas than prominent past studies in the U.S. In the Philadelphia Foot Patrol experiment, for example, officers patrolled 16 hours a day five days a week in treatment areas (68). We do not have direct measures of foot patrol frequency, but we surveyed citizens about how frequently they see officers patrolling on foot. At the low end, 25% of citizens in the Philippines report seeing officers daily. The rest range from 63% (Colombia) to 83% (Uganda). There was not a large increase in foot patrol frequency.

In Brazil, our encouragement design did not translate into higher take-up of the community policing program. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero effects in the first stage (see Table SM9). One explanation is that the Rede de Vizinhos program had expanded substantially when our study began, compared to when we planned our encouragement. In addition, there was noncompliance in the administration of the encouragement: the police did not hold meetings in eleven locations where they were randomly assigned to hold meetings. We present the meta-analysis results including Brazil as we preregistered, but they are essentially unchanged with Brazil excluded given the low precision of the estimates.

Community policing generated none of the main effects we hypothesized. In the meta-analysis, we find no effects of community policing practices on any of our primary outcomes: crime victimization, perceptions of insecurity, citizen perceptions of police, police abuse, or citizen cooperation with police (Figure 2 top panel).¹⁰ Community

⁹We do not have precise measures of population per study unit for Brazil or Uganda.

¹⁰In the Supplementary Materials, we present tables of estimated effects, standard errors, confidence intervals, raw p-values, and adjusted p-values.

policing also does not appear to backfire.

We are able to rule out even very small effects in a positive or negative direction for most outcomes.¹¹ The meta-analysis confidence intervals rule out reductions in crime larger than -0.071 standard deviations (and increases larger than 0.04) as measured in surveys. We also see no reduction in crime when measured through police administrative data ($p = 0.11$); indeed the estimated effect is positive. In terms of overall perceptions of police, there was a 0.053 standard deviation increase ($p = 0.065$). In terms of minimum detectable effect sizes, the standard posthoc rule of thumb of 2.8 times the standard error suggests we can rule out improvements (or backlash) of more than 0.081 standard deviations in crime victimization and 0.109 standard deviations in police perceptions. However, we note that in several cases for the crime outcomes in particular, such large reductions in crime are unlikely simply due to low base rates (e.g., in Brazil and the Philippines, see Table 2). For other outcomes and for crime outcomes in studies with higher crime base rates such as in Pakistan and Uganda, given the narrow confidence intervals and small minimum detectable effects, if there are effects of community policing that we failed to detect, they are likely to be very small. We do not find the large effects observed in contexts in the Global North or the effects expected by practitioners who advocate community policing in the Global South.

The null effects do not hide heterogeneity across sites: community policing did not lead to the expected changes across our eight hypotheses in any of the six sites (Figure 3). We see no effects distinguishable from zero in our eight primary outcomes in any of the six sites. We do, however, find effects on secondary measures of citizen attitudes toward the police in three sites. In Liberia and Pakistan, we find sizable shifts in our measure of perceived police intentions (Liberia: 0.760 s.d., $p = 0.001$; Pakistan: 1.323 s.d., $p = 0.000$). In Colombia, perceptions of police capacity increase (0.115 s.d.; $p = 0.006$). We note that in Brazil, we are not able to rule out large changes from community policing for any

¹¹The meta-analysis results include the Brazil site, but note that we cannot rule out even large effects for that site due to low compliance.

outcome, due to the low compliance rate which leads to very wide estimated confidence intervals. In terms of crime, in our secondary measure using administrative data, we see a *positive* shift in crime in one site, Uganda. Data on crime from police blotters conflate crime incidence and crime reporting to police. We suspect this finding reflects increases in reporting not incidence.

Within each site, the null effects do not reflect cross-cutting effects in opposing directions: we do not find heterogeneous effects by baseline crime rate, trust in police, community trust, or perceived state legitimacy in any of our primary outcomes. Moreover, we find no evidence of heterogeneous effects across any factor in tests of equal variances across treatment and control groups in any site (SM Section I.1).

Our results also do not hide heterogeneity in index components: there are no effects of community policing on any index item in the eight primary indices (Figure 3). In addition, there are no effects on any of the intermediate outcomes we hypothesized as mechanisms for improving citizen trust and effectiveness of the police (Figure 2 middle panel). Community policing did not increase citizen perceptions of police intentions, knowledge of criminal justice procedures, norms of cooperation with police, perceptions of police capacity, or perceptions of the responsiveness of police. Community policing also did not affect trust in the state or communal trust, our secondary outcomes (Figure 2 bottom panel).

Why did community policing fail to increase cooperation and reduce crime victimization? We can rule out several explanations we preregistered. We do not see evidence that citizens refused to cooperate with police because of a mismatch between raised citizen expectations and the police's inability to deliver on promised changes in practice: there was no change, positive or negative, in citizen perceptions of police capacity or intentions ($p = 0.332$; $p = 0.136$). We also see no evidence that community policing, by increasing contact between police who may engage in abuse or extortion and citizens, crowded out positive changes: the rate of police abuse did not change ($p = 0.882$). Crime

displacement also does not appear to drive our results. If community policing reduced crime by pushing criminal activity out to other places, we would expect to see reductions in treated areas between baseline and endline and increases in control areas. We do not observe this pattern in crime victimization measured in citizen surveys or police data in any site. We fail to reject the null of no difference at the $\alpha = 0.05$ level. However, this is not a direct test of the presence of spillover effects, and other patterns of interference that do not conform to police beats remain possible (36).

Our treatment might have had large effects on those directly affected (e.g., community meeting participants) but none on the broader study community. Our surveys measured outcomes for all residents in treated and control areas, not only meeting attendees. If this is the case, we would expect to see null effects overall, because our sample of meeting participants is (intentionally) small. We leave this question to further research. But we note that this is not the theory of change proposed by advocates of community policing, who argue that community policing practices lead to changes in citizen cooperation, police attitudes toward citizens, and crime that reinforce one another (23, 24, 26). Our results, at a minimum, suggest that the effects of community policing on communities as a whole will be small.

Our interventions were shorter than some prominent examples of community policing in the U.S., such as in Chicago (26), which lasted years. Our community policing intervention lasted between 6 months (Pakistan) and 17 months (Philippines). Given that some advocates of community policing describe successful implementations as organization-wide movements or cultural shifts, the effects may simply take longer.

We designed our outcome measurement to capture the impact of community policing broadly, whether or not our theory of citizen-police relations underlies its effects. We obtained extraordinary access to the police's internal data to measure crime, citizen cooperation, and police behaviors. We conducted surveys of both citizens and the police, including a gold-standard crime victimization survey. We measured the five families

of outcomes our systematic review identified from past studies as well as many not measured in past work. Thus, our null results imply that if increases to community policing practices did lead to changes, it is in peripheral outcomes not identified by scholars as of central importance.

Discussion

We studied the effects of locally-appropriate increases in community policing practices in six varied contexts. We found that the police did not implement the intensive changes adopted by agencies lauded for community policing successes, and that the changes that were made did not lead to a virtuous cycle of citizen cooperation with police efforts to fight crime in any of the six sites. Why did community policing fail to deliver?

We designed and carried out structured qualitative data collection to surface constraints the police faced that could have led to weak implementation and null effects on crime, trust in police, and other outcomes. We asked each study teams to fill out a questionnaire about their experiences working with the police to develop and implement the project, each team recontacted their research staff to collect qualitative information about implementation, we reviewed written transcripts our teams collected at community meetings, and we interviewed the police and government partners about the study.

From these materials, we identified three structural constraints that may have prevented substantive change: a lack of prioritization of community policing by police leadership; the rotation of community policing officers and of the police leaders championing the reform; and limited resources to follow-up on concerns identified by citizens.

The first problem was prioritizing community policing among the other responsibilities of the police. Police agencies that chose to partner with us were interested in implementing community policing reforms and also interested in learning whether community policing was an effective tool. At the outset, we believed these partnerships represented a best-case in terms of police buy-in, and that compliance would if any-

thing be higher than in typical practice. Instead, in our observations and interviews with citizens and the police, it was clear in several sites that this was not the case. In Uganda, senior leadership in the Uganda Police Force did not ultimately commit substantial political capital to the project, and in general have limited ability (and will) to supervise station-level officers. As a result, station leadership could safely not prioritize community policing responsibilities.

Prioritizing tasks not traditionally within the police remit was a particular problem. In community meetings, citizens often raised local issues distinct from the major crimes that often occupied police effort. Though sharing concerns that reflect underlying causes of insecurity is a core component of community policing, there were formal and informal barriers to spending time on them. In the Philippines, officers received the message from commanders that “major” crimes related to murder, drugs, and a local insurgency were higher priority than the “local” issues often raised by citizens. In Pakistan, the barriers are institutional: police could not by law respond to many of the problems consistently identified by the community during their forum discussions because they involved non-cognizable crimes such as domestic abuse, harassment, and financial malfeasance. As one community policing officer put it, “We take these problems to our [station lead officer] and instead of helping us implement the agreed actions, he ignores them and gives us other tasks to do.”¹² Similarly, officers in the Philippines often referred issues not in the remit of the police to other government agencies, but it was common knowledge that these other agencies had low capacity for addressing the referrals.

The regular rotation of police leadership in several contexts also interrupted initially strong interest. In Pakistan, regional and district level leaders were transferred multiple times during the study period, which led to further changes at the station house level and transfers of community police officers. In the Philippines, our primary partner in the Sorsogon provincial police was promoted out of the province weeks into the

¹²Administrative records of community meetings in the Pakistan site confirm this pattern: less than 25 percent of the problems selected by the forums were followed up.

implementation of the study, reducing buy-in for the intervention. Municipal police leaders were also rotated out.

Rotation was even more frequent for local station chiefs and rank-and-file officers in many sites. We depended on local leaders to align incentives and provide resources for rank-and-file officers in their stations to carry out community policing tasks. Turnover in officers assigned to carry out community policing tasks may be a problem for two reasons: (1) a lack of training for officers who join the program after its inception; and (2) difficulty establishing rapport with citizens and local leaders during short assignments.¹³ In Uganda, officers rotate between police posts on average every 17 months, in Colombia every 15 months, and in Pakistan every month. There, the police did not have resources to train up new officers rotated into treated posts, so many did not receive direct training in community policing practices. In the Philippines, we estimate that only 25% of officers in our study area at midline were still in the same post at endline, just 11 months later.

Effects may be also muted due to capacity constraints. Officers in some cases reported that they were asked to carry out additional duties related to community policing, such as investigating concerns raised by citizens in community fora, but not provided additional resources to do so. In others, the resource constraint was already binding in terms of salary, transportation, or materials for investigation. In Pakistan, an officer told us:

“Yesterday, I was on beat patrolling all night that was unconnected to the program. Today I was asked by the [station house officer] to travel to Lahore on my own expense to appear in court in connection with a case that is unconnected to the program. I haven’t eaten anything since the morning, it is unfair to expect me to be punctual and behave well in community meetings with such a tough work routine.”

If the police cannot investigate crimes and concerns raised by citizens, community policing is unlikely to lead either to reductions in crime or to build citizen trust. In Liberia, Pakistan, and Uganda, a lack of funds for investigations and even for travel appear to

¹³Rotation could theoretically have opposing effects, by exposing citizens to a larger number of community policing officers, increasing perceptions of officer intentions.

have been binding constraints. In Liberia, for example, after taking into account salaries, funds for all non-salary expenses such as fuel amount to just US \$4 million for the entire country.¹⁴ In Uganda, only 10% of police stations in urban areas receive a monthly fuel allowance; none of the posts in rural areas do. The average Ugandan police station has a single motorbike for transportation and rural posts less than one.

The three issues also interact: some argue successful community policing requires partnership between the police and other municipal agencies to enable non-policing responses to concerns raised by citizens (CITE). The lack of ongoing buy-in that resulted in some cities from rotation of station leaders and our research partners likely further undermined the possibility for inter-agency cooperation in problem-oriented policing.

At a time when police departments in the United States and around the world are considering reforms efforts to foster greater trust between citizens and the police, it is more important than ever to ask hard questions about the evidence base for some of the most popular reform proposals.

The evidence from our experiments suggests caution is warranted when considering whether to implement community policing. Future research should identify whether community policing is effective when implemented alongside changes such as prioritizing openness to citizen input, incentivizing unit commanders and rank-and-file officers to change how they engage with the community, and providing officers with the resources they need to respond to concerns raised by citizens. It is possible that the beneficial effects of community policing that have been observed in some settings in advanced economies reflect not only effects of the intervention itself, but also these important background conditions. However, the structural constraints we identify are not unique to contexts in the Global South. These are shared with some places where police reforms such as community policing are being proposed, including in the U.S. and other countries in the Global North.

¹⁴Government of the Republic of Liberia Draft National Budget FY 2017-18.

The bottom line is that individual reforms are implemented in complex institutional environments. It is those environments that foster, or hinder, the efficacy of community policing: whether officers comply with community policing protocols and whether they respond to concerns raised by the community. Our results sound a note of caution for community policing advocates around the world. The challenge going forward is to identify which structural conditions are needed for incremental reforms such as community policing to matter, or to refocus attention on the major structural changes in police departments that may be needed.

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Figures and tables

Table 1: Systematic Evidence Review on Community Policing

<i>Intervention</i> Effect direction	<i>Outcome measure</i>				
	Crime incidence	Perceptions of safety	Perceptions of police	Police accountability	Citizen reporting
<i>Community Fora</i>					
Increase	–	–	1	–	–
Null	–	1	–	–	–
<i>Community Presence</i>					
Increase	–	2	2	1	1
Null	4	3	4	–	1
Decrease	10	–	–	–	–
Mixed	8 (7 -/o; 1 -/+)	1 (+/o)	1 (+/o)	1 (+/o)	–
<i>Citizen Feedback</i>					
Null	–	–	1	–	–
Mixed	–	–	1 (+/o)	–	–
<i>Problem-Oriented Policing</i>					
Increase	–	2	1	–	–
Null	1	1	1	–	–
Decrease	6	–	–	–	–

We present the results of a systematic review of 37 randomized-control trials on the effectiveness of components of community policing. The count of estimates with a given effect direction (rows) on a given outcome (column) are presented for four sets of community policing interventions (row groups in italics). The “mixed” effect direction indicates that the study provided mixed evidence of the effect direction for a given outcome. In mixed cases, the number of estimates is indicated first and then in parentheses a count of the mixed effects that were found (i.e., - / o indicates that both negative and null effects were found). A study may provide more than one number in the table if effects of an intervention are estimated for multiple outcomes or if multiple interventions are tested or both.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Study Sites

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Political freedoms ^a	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Not free
Regime type ^b	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Democracy	Electoral Autocracy	Electoral Autocracy	Electoral Autocracy
Corruption score ^c	45 / 100	39	32	31	46	26
Criminal justice score ^d	34 / 100	34	31	35	31	31
Income category ^e	Upper mid.	Upper mid.	Low	Lower mid.	Lower mid.	Low
Inequality (Gini coef.) ^f	54	50	35	33	44	42
Study site	Santa Caterina	Medellín	Monrovia	Punjab Province	Sorsogon Province	–
Type	State	Large city	Large city	Two districts	Province	Country
Rate of crime victimization (pct.) ^g						
Simple assault	1	5	6	5	3	6
Burglary	4	15	17	16	2	19
Armed robbery	0	6	3	10	0	2
Murder	1	9	7	–	1	9
Trust in police (pct.) ^h	79	47	46	23	86	62
Citizen cooperation (pct.) ⁱ	1	5	–	2	1	5
Police capacity indicators ^j						
Vehicle	✓					
Motorbike	✓	✓			✓	✓
Gun	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Radio	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Computer	✓	✓			✓	
Printer	✓	✓			✓	
Camera	✓	✓			✓	
Officers per capita	1:473	1:333	1:950	1:560 ^k	1:991 ^m	1:910 ^o
Budget per officer	\$56,000	\$18,000	\$3,642	\$3,400 ^k	\$18,000	–
Citizens per station	–	143,000 ^l	21,428	500,000 ^m	44,444	–
Officer rotation rate	–	15 months	–	1 month	2.75 months ^p	17 months

We present descriptive statistics for study sites for the six studies. We present political and economic characteristics of the countries; the name and geographic extent of the study site within that country; crime rates at baseline for each study site; measures of citizen attitudes and behaviors at baseline from our citizen surveys; measures of police capacity from study team observations; information on the budget and density of officers in each study site from police agency data and other sources; and the estimated rate of officer turnover, calculated from our officer survey data. Sources: ^aFreedom in the World 2020, Freedom House; ^bVarieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Version 10, “Regimes of the World” indicator for year 2019; ^cWorld Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2020, “Absence of Corruption” item; ^dIbid, “Criminal Justice” item; ^eWorld Bank lending groups as of August 2020; ^fMost recent Gini coefficient (varying years), World Bank Open Data portal, August 2020; ^gCitizen survey question: were you or a member of your household have a victim of the crime at least once. From baseline data except for Philippines and Brazil (control data at endline is used instead); ^hCitizen survey question: do you agree or disagree with the following statement “I generally trust the police.” Proportion who agree with the statement. From baseline data for all studies except Philippines and Brazil (control data at endline is used instead); ⁱRespondents who were victimized for each crime were asked whether they reported these crimes to the police. We report here the proportion who were victimized (personal or family) and reported that crime from baseline data except Philippines and Brazil (control data at endline is used instead); ^jStudy team observations during implementation; ^kCensus 2017 and Punjab Police Statuary Annual Report 2018-19; ^lIn Medellín, there are seventeen stations and 2.47 million residents (1:143,000). There are many more small Centros de Atención Integral, where residents can speak with police. There are about 47 of these, or one per 52,000 residents; ^mCensus 2017 and Pakistan Bureau of Statistics; ⁿCensus 2015; ^oWorld Internal Security and Police Index Report 2016; ^pOnly 25% of officers in the Philippines’ study area at midline were still in the same post at endline, 11 months later.

Table 3: Community Policing Policies by Experimental Condition

	Brazil		Colombia		Liberia		Pakistan		Philippines		Uganda	
Study units	Neighborhoods		Beats		Communities		Beats		Barangays ^a		Police stations	
People per km ²	445		26,341		7,811		338		529		–	
Special training	No		No		No		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Dedicated officers	Yes		No		Yes		Yes		Yes		No	
Duration of program	7 months		12 months		11 months		6 months		17 months		13 months	
Community policing practices by treatment condition (elements of study intervention highlighted in gray)												
	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>
Town hall meetings	Never	Semi-annual	None	Bi-monthly	Occasional	Bi-monthly	No	Monthly	No	No	No	Bi-monthly
Watch forum	No	No	No	No	Some	Yes	No	Yes	No	No	Some	Yes
Foot patrols	Occasional	Occasional	Daily	Daily	Occasional	Bi-monthly	Occasional	Occasional ^a	Occasional	Weekly	Occasional	Occasional
Citizen feedback	No	WhatsApp	Hotline; Mobile application	Hotline; Mobile application	No	No	Hotline	Hotline (use encouraged)	No	Hotline ^b	No	No
Problem-oriented policing	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	No

For each of the six study sites, we outline the presence (or absence) of six elements of policing practices in the experimental control group (with no changes from status quo policing practices) and in the experimental treatment group (with locally appropriate increases in community policing practices) as part of the planned interventions. In some sites, *town hall meetings* were held between local police officers and citizens; in some the frequency of *foot patrols* by officers was increased; in several a *problem-oriented policing* intervention was implemented to provide resources for the police to address underlying causes of crime; some initiated new modes for *citizen feedback*; and in several a new *watch forum* was started to formalize oversight of community watch groups. In all sites, officers were recruited to participate in these special duties from among the existing officer corps, and were provided community policing training before starting these duties.

^a In Pakistan, increased frequency of foot patrols was not a planned part of the intervention. However, foot patrol increased from occasional to frequent in response to requests from citizens in townhall meetings in treated areas.

^b In the Philippines, a hotline was advertised to half of treated units.

Table 4: Outcome Measures and Data Sources

Hyp.	Outcome index	Index components	Data source
Primary outcomes			
1a.	Crime victimization index ^a	Violent crime (personal); Nonviolent crime (personal); Violent crime (community); Non-violent crime (community)	Citizen survey
1a. (alt.)	Crime victimization index (Administrative) ^a	Violent crime; Nonviolent crime	Police blotters
1b.	Perceived future insecurity index	Feared violent crime; Feared walking	Citizen survey
2.	Overall perceptions of police index	Trust in police; Trust in service of police	Citizen survey
3a.	Police perceptions of citizens index ^b	Abuse index; Accountability index; Corruption index; Empathy index	Officer survey
3b.	Police abuse	Abuse (binary); Bribe amount; Bribe frequency	Citizen survey
4a.	Crime reporting index	Violent crime (personal); Violent crime (community); Nonviolent crime reporting (community); Nonviolent crime reporting (personal); Resolution of crime index	Citizen survey
4b.	Crime tips index	Crime tips index	Citizen survey
4c.	Police abuse reporting index	Beating community member; Verbal abuse	Citizen survey
Mechanism outcomes			
M1a.	Perceived police intentions index	Corruption; Treat fairly; Treat seriously	Citizen survey
M1b.	Knowledge of criminal justice ^c	Legal knowledge; Knowledge of how to report crimes	Citizen survey
M1c.	Cooperation norms index	Reporting norm (theft); Reporting norm (domestic abuse); Obey police norm	Citizen survey
M2a.	Perceived police capacity index	Police timeliness; Police investigation capacity	Citizen survey
M2b.	Perceived police responsiveness		Citizen survey
Secondary outcomes			
S1.	Perceived state legitimacy ^d		Citizen survey
S2.	Community trust		Citizen survey
C.	Compliance index	Foot patrol frequency; Vehicle patrol frequency; Community meeting awareness	Citizen survey

We preregistered four sets of outcomes: our eight primary outcomes; five outcomes that we would use to interpret the causal mechanisms of any main effects; two secondary outcomes; and a measure of compliance with treatment. We also preregistered that we would examine an alternative measure of crime rates from administrative data (1a alt.). We specify the name of the outcome index for each of the outcomes, the main component items of each index, and the data source. We report meta-analysis effect estimates on compliance with treatment in Figure 1, on outcome indices in Figure 2, and finally effects on index component items in Figure 4. In Figure 3, we present outcome index effects by site.

^a Colombia estimates not included in meta-estimate, due to a difference in measurement. A common measure of crime victimization with all estimates is included in the Supplementary Materials.

^b Brazil, Liberia, and Philippines sites not included in meta-analysis, because officers were not randomized into participation in community policing or control due to the organizational structure of the police agency.

^c Philippines' estimates not included due to a difference in measurement.

^d Uganda and Pakistan sites not included in the meta-analysis; state legitimacy was not measured in these two cases.




Figure 1: Compliance with treatment. We report the meta-analytic estimate and country estimates of the average compliance rates, measured using three variables measuring the frequency of patrols, frequency of encounters with police, and citizen knowledge of community engagement community meetings with police along with 95% confidence intervals. The x-axis is restricted for readability due to the wide confidence intervals for Brazil.




Figure 2: Community policing does not improve (or harm) crime victimization, citizen perceptions of the police, police perceptions of citizens, or citizen-police cooperation. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for each of the primary outcomes, mechanism outcomes we use to evaluate the channel of effects, and secondary outcomes along with 95% confidence intervals. We present the estimate, standard error, p-value, and for the primary outcomes a p-value adjusted for multiple testing.




Figure 3: Null average effects do not hide substantial variation across sites. We report the country-level estimates of average treatment effects for each main effect estimate presented in Figure 2 along with 95% confidence intervals. We see evidence of effects on citizen perceptions of police (Pakistan), citizen perceptions of police intentions toward citizens (Liberia and Pakistan), and citizen perceptions of police capacity (Colombia), but no other effects in any site. We present the estimate, standard error, p-value, and for the primary outcomes a p-value adjusted for multiple testing within site. The x-axis is restricted for readability due to the wide confidence intervals for Brazil.




Figure 4: Null average effects do not hide variation across index components. We report meta-analytic estimates of average treatment effects pooling across contexts for the constituent items of the main outcome indices along with 95% confidence intervals. We present the estimate, standard error, p-value, and for the primary outcomes a p-value adjusted for multiple testing.

Supplementary Materials for

Community Policing Does Not Build Trust or Reduce Crime: Evidence from Six Coordinated Field Experiments

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A. Community policing interventions

Table SM1: Implementation Details by Site

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Average meetings per study unit	1	3	5	11	11	10
Total meetings	109	456	221	412	808	352
Average meeting attendance	30	18	25	11	10	51

In this table, we present three data on implementation of the town hall meeting component of the intervention.

A.1 Brazil

Officer recruitment and training. This process is determined at the local level and varies from precinct to precinct. In some cases, the police officers were dedicated to Rede de Vizinhos (RdV) and work with all, or most, RdV groups in their precincts. In other cases, police officers dedicate a fraction of their time to the programme, and otherwise operate on regular duties and patrols. There is no centralized information regarding the allocation of human resources at the precinct level. In several cases, however, we learned that participation in the community-policing program was a voluntary activity for the police officers, and thus certain types of officers may have selected into the program.

Townhall meetings. In the encouragement phase, exactly one meeting per centroid was held. Confirmation of attendance to the Facebook events was, on average, 85 individuals by event. An attendance sheet was in most cases circulated in the meetings themselves, but were not shared with the research team due to privacy concerns. The police reported to us that meetings averaged 30 to 35 individuals, with some reaching substantially higher numbers, depending on factors including population density. The meetings had a standard structure at the police precinct level. They typically featured a presentation of the general objectives of the program, the role of the police and the improvement in community-police relations that were sought, and the specific mechanisms through which Rede de Vizinhos would operate. At the end of the meeting, the police officer in charge collected a list of names and signatures of those who are interested in participating. The outcome of this process may or may not seed creation of a new group, depending on the level of engagement, the definition of specific geographic boundaries, and the choice of participants and group leader.

If the group is established, a second meeting is held exclusively with the selected participants. All adult individuals are eligible to participate, as long as they have a clean criminal record. This meeting then establishes specific rules for usage of WhatsApp groups; discusses prevention techniques; lays out norms for detecting and reporting

suspicious behaviour. The meetings then address specific policing problems at the community policing group level. The topics are brought forth by the members, and a specific plan of action is drafted. The police officers then collaborate with citizens to identify the root cause of the problem, and develop a tangible solution. In some cases, the police officer may direct the citizens to other government branches – e.g., when lighting needs fixing or improving, or other aspects of the urban infrastructure. From this meeting onwards, frequent communications are held via WhatsApp groups. In-person meetings are repeated every six months, during which the problems and solutions raised in the previous meetings are discussed and reviewed; and new issues might be brought forward and the cycle repeats itself.

Problem-oriented policing. There is no centralized system to collect the responses across places, nor whether other government units were involved in the process of problem-solving. Typically, the police officers would not involve themselves as an active participant in the process of solving the problem; but rather would act as a catalyst to organize and systematize the problems, work together with the participants to find a solution and ultimately make them responsible for acting on those solutions (if no direct police involvement is necessary or required) or liaise with other police officers where police involvement was called for.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. Chat groups on WhatsApp, a free instant chat application for mobile phones, were the main medium of communication between police officers and citizens. Suggestions and concerns raised in the groups were collected by the police officers assigned to the groups, who constantly monitored them.

A.2 Colombia

Officer recruitment and training. Station chiefs were recruited into the study through outreach from the research team and local support from Estrategia y Territorio and individuals within MEVAL, the metropolitan police branch. Station chiefs agreed to send two patrol officers to meetings and added the meetings to the TAMIR, a document that outlines station chiefs' expectations for each patrol officer on each day. Patrol officers received no specialized training but were given guides for community meetings by meeting facilitators.

Townhall meetings. Town hall meetings were organized by research assistants using the affiliation of Estrategia y Territorio.

The aim was to hold three meetings in each beat, approximately once every three months. Citizens were invited to meetings through fliers as well as messages from community leaders. Fliers were also left at community centers by facilitators. In total 80,873 fliers were handed out and 66,434 left at doors during the intervention.

Two patrol officers were requested to attend the meetings, though higher-ranking officers and representatives of other state institutions were sometimes present. An agenda was set out beforehand.

The police officer shared pre-prepared remarks that outlined the role of the police, provided the mechanisms to report crime and police abuse, and then the remainder of the meeting was to be open discussion with citizens. Most meetings concluded with the signing of a Cooperation Agreement. In these agreements participants and officers agreed on the three top problems identified during the meeting as well as actions each party would engage in to address these problems.

These documents could be used in the following meeting to evaluate if the police complied with expectations set out in the agreement. However, because most participants did not attend more than one meeting and different police officers were sent to first, second, and third meetings in practice it was difficult to assess officers' compliance.

Our initial goal was to organize 522 meetings (173 quadrantes x 3 meetings per quadrant). However, due to lack of participation in some meetings and security concerns in others we canceled 66 of these meetings. In total, we organized 456 meetings over an average of 3 months (range: two months to five months). Average attendance was 17.9 citizens per meeting, or 53.2 citizens per neighborhood over two or three meetings. The minimum cumulative (over meetings) attendance was two, and the maximum was 118. Because meetings were organized throughout the city in lower, middle, and upper-class neighborhoods class composition varied across meetings. For example, descriptions of meetings in the El Poblado commune – with some of the most affluent neighborhoods in the city – indicated that participants were middle and upper class. In contrast descriptions in other communes suggested participants belonged to the working or managerial classes. Local community leaders were often present at meetings, including priests and heads of neighborhood organizations.

A.3 Liberia

Officer recruitment and training. The community policing activities were led by the community policing officer with support from rank-and-file officers available on the scheduled day of activities. Community policing officers attend occasional trainings, usually organized by international NGOs such as the United Nations. Accurate data on the frequency and intensity of these trainings is not available. No special training was provided for officers involved in the intervention. Participation came at the expense of their regular tasks and duties.

Townhall meetings. Townhall meetings were organized by the CPO in partnership with the research team. The aim was to hold meetings on a bimonthly basis for a period of 10 to 12 months. Meetings were hosted by communities at the main meeting spot for community meetings, usually a Gazebo at the center of town, or a school or church. Meetings were held on the weekends. Citizens were informed about the meetings by police officers during a foot patrol carried out the week preceding each meeting. Community leaders also helped inform members about the meeting. There was no set agenda for the meetings, but they all followed the same format: an introduction by community leaders, one to two 10 minute lectures by police officers, and about 30 minutes of discussion and Q&A. Topics covered during the lectures included: basic guidelines for

reporting crimes, the 'concept' of community policing and the importance of police/-community partnerships, explanation of the LNP's various units, including the women and child protection unit; the Professional Standards Division of the LNP and its role in handling incidents of police misconduct; introduction to the watch forum initiative, and warnings against mob violence and domestic abuse.

Commitments for follow-up action were usually related to next steps in the process of vetting and certifying community watch forums, and providing t-shirts and ID cards. Communities, for their part, committed to organizing watch forums and submitting the list of proposed members to the police. While many communities submitted lists to the police, the police seldom followed through on vetting members (a central database of convicted criminals does not exist, but they may have run their names past officers familiar with the community, to make sure no one was a known criminal). The police also did not follow through on providing ID cards or t-shirts.

Attendance at the meetings ranged from as little as 10 to as many as 60, but most meetings were attended by between 20 and 30 residents.

Foot patrols. Teams of 4-6 police officers conducted foot patrols before each community meeting, usually during the week. The patrols lasted about an hour. During that time, officers raised awareness of the upcoming meeting, handed out pamphlets and talked informally with residents. They seldom conducted searches or arrests. Data on the precise number of face to face engagements is not available. Pamphlets contained information about how to contact the local police department, the community watch forum initiative, sensitization against mob violence, and information about the police's women and child protection units.

Problem-oriented policing. As far as the research team is aware, no problem-oriented policing activities took place.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. No feedback mechanisms were created or provided besides the townhall meetings.

Community watch forum . The CPOs use the townhall meetings as a forum through which to engage in problem-oriented policing around the central challenge facing most communities: lack of police capacity and presence. The CPOs seek to address this challenge by (re)introducing communities to the police's Watch Forum initiative. They explain that watch forums are composed of groups of concerned citizens who support the police to address security problems in their communities. Exactly which functions the watch forums perform depend on the particular problems faced by the communities they serve, but common activities include sharing information about security threats; meeting regularly with the police to design proactive, collaborative strategies to combat crime; educating fellow community members of police services and how to access them; facilitating police investigations in their communities; and conducting nighttime security patrols during periods of peak crime.

For communities that elected to form a group, there was only one group per community. Some communities had a group or remnants of a group prior to the start of the intervention. In these cases, the intervention served to reenergize group activities. In practice, vetting was the responsibility of the Town Chairman/woman and whomever s/he assigned to lead the watch forum. In many communities, members were drawn from pre-existing security groups that had been operating independently of the police. Training was minimal, and consisted mainly of lectures delivered either as part of the intervention or through separate security meetings organized between CPOs and Forum leaders.

A.4 Pakistan

Officer recruitment and training. While a selection criteria for officers was provided as part of the program that advised the induction of one officer of the rank of ASI or SI and one officer of the rank Constable or Head Constable, the actual selection of officers in a particular beat was entirely determined by each District Police's Establishment (OSI) Branch. The selection process, in effect, gave preference to those ASI/SIs who were already assigned to the treatment beats. The responsibilities given as part of the community policing program were additional responsibilities that added to their existing tasks.

The community policing training program was developed by a team consisting of an experienced officer of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP, an officer of the rank district police head) who had trained in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Chief Law Instructor of the Police Training College at Chung and a set of master trainers from the training college¹⁵ The training manual consisted of the following modules:

- Introduction of community policing and its relationship with problem-oriented policing
- Differences between reactive policing and community policing
- Introduction to the SARA model and the problem-solving approach in policing
- Detailed overview of the SARA model and its practical applications

In order to develop problem solving capacity of the officers, three caselets were developed in close coordination with Chief Law Instructor and the Master Trainer of the Police Training College at Chung, a highly reputable officer who has served as the Police Station Head in high crime police stations in the Metropolitan City of Lahore, which lies within a thirty minute distance of the two districts where the community policing program was being implemented. All training materials were translated into the local language and a copy of all documents was supplied to the trainers and trainees.

¹⁵Police Training College Lahore is one of the oldest police training institute in the country. It's the premier training college in Punjab Police providing training to field officers and senior police leadership in various aspects of policing in Punjab.

The training consisted of two components Component 1 consisted of a four-day (8 hours per day) long in-house training session that included the following sessions:

- Day 1 Introduction to community policing and the difference between community policing and reactive policing
- Day 2 Refresher around existing police rules
- Day 3 Introduction to SARA and problem solving in policing. This module used caselets to teach problem solving techniques and drew on the refresher on police rules to discuss how problem-oriented actions can be implemented within the existing set of rules
- Day 4 Step by step training of operationalizing community policing forums at the beat level

Component 2 (Day-5) was a practical module where officers were instructed to go to a pilot beat in their district that did not fall within the experimental beats and implement what they had learnt. This consisted of conducting a community policing forum, formulating a community policing plan and devising response strategies in collaboration with the community. Following this, officers were required to attend a debrief session where officers engaged in a moderated discussion, led by the trainers, on the effectiveness of the strategies used to engage and mobilize the community and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their proposed response plans.

The content and format of the training was piloted in the district of Kasur which is the third district in the same policing range that was not a part of the community policing program. Following the pilot training, feedback was incorporated from field officers of Kasur district and the first two days of training were merged into one to make the training program into a 3 day (8 hours per day) long in-class module and 1 day field practical module. In the study districts, training for DBU officers assigned to treatment beats was conducted at the district level in classes of 20 trainees that were taught by a team of two instructors from the Police Training College in Chung.

After every training session, the trainers assessed the training cohort using a feedback form that trainers had to fill. Those individuals who lacked problem solving capacity were identified and excluded from the program.

Townhall meetings. Community police forums (town hall meetings) were organized by the DBU team in partnership with the local residents of villages and urban neighborhoods in the treatment beats. The community policing program required each DBU to hold monthly beat meetings at randomly drawn villages and urban neighborhoods within beats. However, monthly meetings were cancelled during periods of public religious events (Eid and Moharram) and during periods of political and civil unrest when community police officers were reallocated to security duties. During the period of February 2019 till February 2020, a total of 808 meetings took place, an average of 0.85 per beat (range: 0 to 1.4). Attendance averaged 10 people (range: 5 to 40). Meetings

were held within villages and urban neighborhoods in a diverse set of locations including local markets, private house of local community members and the local village or neighborhood council office. The mobilization of residents to attend the meetings involved public messaging through mosques and information shared through residents involved in community activities in the area. One beat meeting per month was held in CPOP beats and in the alternative arm (CPop-G) separate monthly meetings were conducted in each village and neighborhood for men by the male members of the DBU team and for women by the female constable.

Foot patrols. Foot patrols were not a mandatory component of the community policing program in Pakistan. They were introduced if they were considered an effective response to the problems identified in the community policing forums.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. During the forums, citizens were encouraged to report the complaints and feedback on the IG Punjab 8787 police complaints hotline.

Problem-oriented policing. The beat meeting involved an open discussion of problems (where a problem was defined as “Any condition that alarms, harms, threatens, causes fear, or has potential for disorder in the community, particularly incidents that may appear as isolated, but share certain characteristics such as common pattern, victim or geographic location and/or impose a disproportionate social, economic or psychological burden on members of the community.”). This was followed by a discussion around prioritization and potential responses that were documented as a mutually agreed community policing plan. The meetings followed the structure below:

1. The first step involved discussion to identify and list the problems faced by the community.
2. The second step involved ranking problems based on severity and selecting the top three problems that fell within the domain of the police as the focus of the community policing plans.
3. The third step involved the analysis of the underlying causes of the priority problems using the SARA approach. This involved a detailed discussion about challenges related to place, time, repeat offenders, repeat victimization and the absence of guardianship.
4. The fourth step involved formulating the action plan where the roles and responsibilities of the police and the community in mitigating these problems was agreed and documented. For problems that lay outside the ambit of the police (like sewerage and municipal issues) general guidance was provided by the community policing officers about which office to approach and the most effective way to escalate the problem. In cases where these issues were salient for the community the police enabled access to relevant municipal officers to enable a response strategy.

5. The attendance and proceedings of these meetings were documented by the DBU and they were required to fill two forms: Form 1 or an attendance roster that documented the basic demographics of forum attendees and Form II or the community policing plan document.
6. After the end of the meeting, police officers decided the time and date of the next meeting in consultation with the community members. The next meeting in the same location was designed to be a follow-up meeting where police officers debriefed the forum about the steps that the police had taken in terms of the community policing plan and discussed their efficacy in terms of solving the identified problems. The community members also discussed steps they took to solve the problems and if any change were needed to the previous action plan. The details of these meetings were recorded in the Community Policing Form III.

The field officers who conducted the meeting were instructed to submit the hard copies of the form at the front desk of each police station. The officers were also instructed to append each forum in a separate file so that in case of transfers, the incoming officer can be debriefed on the progress of these forums. The front desk officers were tasked to scan the forms and stored it on a dedicated folder on Google Drive, which was shared with the SDPO, DPO, and the research team. Random audits of these forums were conducted by members of the research team who acted as third-party monitors in this capacity.

The schedule of beat-level forums with dates and times was decided in a meeting by the Sub-District Police Officer (SDPO) of the rank Assistant Superintendent (ASP) or Deputy Superintendent (DSP) of Police along with the DSP legal. During the meeting field officers of the relevant circle were invited to finalize the community policing forum schedule of the coming month keeping in view that the routine policing activities are not affected. The presence of the research team during these meetings ensured compliance with research designs in terms of police officers not scheduling a forum in control beats. The agreed schedule was notified in the form of an official schedule that was authorized by the District Police officer and the relevant SDPO and circulated to each police station registrar who ensured that the forums were held as per schedule.

Community watch forum. During the officer training, one session was dedicated to the usefulness of watch forums. The treatment required community police officers to use this training to educate the community about the effectiveness of watch forums and to encourage communities to create and manage watch forums where they were not functional.

A.5 Philippines

Officer recruitment and training. The first stage of our intervention (CEP) originated with the provincial police chief, therefore the intervention became part of officers' normal duties. The overwhelming majority of officers participated in this stage of the intervention, which involved generated tens of thousands of informal contacts with citizens

and distributing 110,000 stickers. The operations staff at each MPS were given lists of which barangays should receive the treatment and were told to schedule “One Sorsogon Patrols” in treatment barangays. For these patrols, the barangay leadership was contacted ahead of time and then groups of officers visited the barangay, passed out stickers, engaged in one-on-one conversations, attended meetings with barangay leadership, and held impromptu meetings with groups of citizens. A police-community relations (PCR) officer attended each barangay visit and tracked officer attendance and activities. Because CEP was largely a police initiative, ranking officers in the province gave a directive for patrol officers to implement the intervention we describe and passed the directive through standard channels (daily briefings, written directives, etc.). Before the rollout of the intervention, the PNP organized a training session for all municipal chiefs of police and lead municipal PCR officers so that they could explain the activities to officers.

For the second (POP) stage, the PNP provided a list of all officers assigned to the province. We randomly selected two officers from the MPS associated with each treatment barangay and requested their participation. We proceeded to select randomly from the list of remaining officers as replacements were needed. Officers participated in the POP meetings and implemented solutions during their off-duty time, and received a stipend to compensate for their extra time. POP meetings involving PNP officers took place at the MPS, and the operations staff at each MPS generally tried to schedule meetings during times when the officer was already scheduled to be at the station. They were encouraged to conduct additional patrols in their assigned barangay on-duty whenever possible, and to maintain extra contact with their assigned barangay’s leadership. However, our observation was that few officers changed their behavior beyond attending the assigned meetings.

Officials from the local government unit (LGU) opted into the intervention, within our guidelines: we requested the participation of the chief tanod (head of the community security officers appointed by the barangay kapitan, the highest elected official in the barangay), the kagawad (elected official) in charge of peace and order, and up to 5 additional barangay tanods (most participating barangays had 10-15 tanods). These officials participated as part of their normal duties, and received a small stipend from the research team for their participation. Because the POP intervention aligned so well with the tanods’ and kagawad’s normal duties, we found that they were enthusiastic about participating. Those whose teams included PNP officers were also appreciative of the PNP’s enhanced attention to their barangay. In contrast, since PNP officers are assigned to municipalities, many (but not all) participating officers found the intervention in specific barangays to be a distraction from their normal duties, especially those assigned to more remote barangays that they would not otherwise have visited.

Before the problem-oriented policing stage described below, all PNP officers assigned to POP teams and one representative from the (LGU) from each participating barangay attended a day-long training workshop in Sorsogon City. The training allowed participating PNP officers to meet an LGU representative from their assigned barangay, explained the theory of change behind Problem Oriented Policing, and provided an overview of the POP meetings in which officers and LGU representatives would participate over the subsequent six months. The PIs developed the training materials along

with PNP leadership, and a Manila-based consultant who specializes in team-building and other group-oriented training led the training sessions.

Foot patrols. In the Philippines, activities during the foot patrols were designed to match the community engagement components of the other six contexts. In each beat, foot patrols were conducted by approximately 800 officers of 9 ranks. On average, officers conducted approximately 14 barangay visits over the 14-week period of CEP (some of which were re-visits). This averages out to one CEP patrol per officer per week. While we do not have official data on the duration of these CEP patrols, we believe they lasted approximately 2-3 hours. After arriving at the barangay via police vehicle or public transportation, the officers patrolled on foot. Officers generally patrolled in groups of 2-5, though some officers patrolled on their own. We estimate that total of 28,000 officer hours were spent patrolling during the intervention (35 hours per officer for 800 officers). This comes out to about 8,000 total officer hours per month and 10 hours/month for each officer. The vast majority of officers assigned to patrols had other duties, though PCR officers likely spent more than 25% of their time on One Sorsogon over the period of the intervention. On patrol, officers were instructed to engage citizens they encountered, make stops at businesses and schools, make home visit, attend barangay assembly meetings, and hold informal gatherings with groups of citizens. While the exact nature of these visits was left up to the discretion of the One Sorsogon patrol team, on average each officer attended 3 barangay assemblies per month, visited 10 businesses or schools per month, and recorded speaking with 57 citizens per month. Reports and information gathered during patrols were reported to the municipal police station at the discretion of the officers. No formal procedures were put in place for taking action on information learned during patrols.

The impetus for our CEP program originated with then- PNP Provincial Police Director in charge of Sorsogon Province, Ronaldo Cabral, in early 2016. As part of the “One Sorsogon” program, the PNP directed officers to engage with citizens in non-emergency settings in order to relay information about ongoing PNP crime-reduction efforts, gather information about the most pressing problems in the community, and invite citizens to participate in a signature drive to indicate their solidarity with the fight against crime in Sorsogon. This program was a PNP initiative utilizing on-duty officers, and so participating officers were not compensated beyond their normal salaries. During barangay visits that were scheduled as part of the intervention, many officers chose to hold impromptu “town-hall” style meetings with small or medium-sized groups in the community, but the majority of interactions were one-on-one discussions with available citizens. The community engagement program occurred over the course of two months in early 2017, during which time PNP officers engaged more than 138,000 citizens through visits to homes and schools, barangay assemblies, and dialogues with individuals passing through public locations.

Problem-oriented policing. Monthly POP meetings were organized by the operations staff at each MPS, in collaboration with members of our research team. In LGU-only POP meetings were organized by the barangay captain, in collaboration with members

of our research team. The aim was to hold 6 meetings for each barangay (plus a culminating activity held at the barangay hall), approximately once a month. Meetings were held at the MPS for PNP+LGU teams and at the barangay hall for LGU-only teams. LGU leaders (including the barangay captain, kagawad, and tanods) were invited to meetings through SMS messages and phone calls to the barangay captain or kagawad in charge; 198 invitations were sent out (1 to each barangay captain) for each of the six POP meetings (1,188 total). For the culminating activity, ordinary citizens were invited to the meeting via announcements posted around the barangay and through informal networks of the barangay leadership. Two police officers were assigned to attend the meeting, where possible one senior police officer (SPO₁ – SPO₄) and one junior police officer (PO₁ – PO₃) (in some cases availability dictated that both officers come from lower ranks). An agenda was set out beforehand with specific topics and time allocations.

At POP meetings, the LGU leaders began with updates on progress towards resolving the barangay-specific issues and the remainder of the meeting was dedicated to discussion about how to further resolve the issue. At the culminating activity, the police officers (or barangay leaders in LGU-only barangays) shared preprepared remarks that outlined the role of the police, provided the mechanisms to report crime and police abuse, and then the remainder of the meeting was to be open discussion with citizens. At the POP meetings involving PNP officers, plans were sometimes discussed that involved specific actions that were to be undertaken by the PNP, though at other meetings the planned actions only involved the LGU leadership. There were no formal mechanisms in place to ensure that the PNP actually took action, aside from the fact that the barangay leadership might lodge a complaint with PNP leadership if action was not taken. For the LGU-only POP meetings, the planned responses most commonly involved actions by tanods, who are accountable to the barangay captain (who has the power to dismiss them from their jobs).

1,386 meetings took place (including the culminating activities), an average of 73 per municipal police station (range: 35 to 161). Attendance at POP meetings averaged 6.5 people (range: 3 to 20). Attendance at culminating activities averaged 80 people (range: 14 to 276). The five most common issues discussed in meetings were 1) juvenile delinquency, 2) traffic accidents, 3) public intoxication, 4) theft, and 5) family feuds and neighbor disputes, with a roughly even number of barangays choosing to focus on these five issues. Of the PNP officers, approximately 72% were men, which is approximately the same gender composition as LGU officials who attended the meetings. Nearly 100% were roman catholic or some other Christian denomination (there are no major identity-based cleavages in Sorsogon).

On average, meetings lasted 2 hours. This means that just over 2,000 PNP officer hours (99 barangays, 1.5 officers/meeting, 7 meetings) were dedicated to POP meetings over the course of 6 months, or approximately 340 officer-hours per month. We do not have a credible way of tracking the number of officer hours spent addressing the issues raised during POP. Tanods (barangay-level security personnel) dedicated approximately 11,000 hours to the program over the course of the POP intervention (198 barangays, 4 tanods/meeting, 7 meetings), or approximately 1,500 tanod-hours per month. We have strong reason to believe that tanods also spent a large portion of their on-duty time addressing issues raised during POP, given that their main duty involves addressing the

types of issues raised at POP meetings.

Our POP intervention centered around the creation of problem oriented policing teams in each treatment barangay. We randomly varied the composition of the teams as one of our study's cross-randomized alternative arms. All teams included the Barangay Captain, the Chief Tanod, three regular tanods, and the Kagawad (elected barangay councilor) in charge of peace and order. A random subset of POP teams also included two randomly selected PNP officers from the Barangay's municipality. We provided participating local officials and police officers with a small stipend to offset the time they devoted to each meeting. Thus, all teams had local knowledge, and some had additional resources and expertise of the PNP. Preexisting channels of communication between the tanods and the PNP remained open and available to all POP teams.

We implemented the POP treatment from December 2017 through May 2018. Each POP team involving the PNP met once per month at the MPS. Each LGU-only POP team met once per month in a suitable location within the barangay, usually the barangay hall. A member of the research staff attended and monitored each meeting but did not participate in it. Teams used Meeting 1 to review information about problems in the barangay and identify a relevant issue that the team would focus on over the course of the intervention. We provided each team with aggregate statistics from our midline survey and from police blotters detailing the types of crime that citizens in their barangay experienced most often and the issues they said were most important to them. We also provided anonymized logs of any SMS tips sent to the PNP during the preceding months that referenced their barangay, though these were unavailable in the majority of barangays because so few messages included the sender's barangay. The team reviewed this information during the meeting and was tasked with interviewing citizens in their barangay about public safety before the start of Meeting 2. At Meeting 2, teams decided on which issue they would focus and began crafting a strategy to address the issue. By the end of Meeting 3, teams provided our research staff with a proposed budget of up to 5,000 pesos (approximately \$100 US) for implementing their strategy. The PIs reviewed the budgets to ensure compliance with funder regulations.

Many teams focused on stepping up foot patrols in problematic areas, and spent their budgets on basic equipment like flashlights, whistles, and rain ponchos that would allow tanods to conduct more extensive patrols. A few barangays created minor infrastructure improvements. For instance, to discourage vagrancy and combat public intoxication, several barangays erected street lights in strategic locations. Cabigaan, Bulusan built fences on either side of the main highway to prevent stray dogs from wandering into the road and causing vehicle accidents, a problem which they identified as particularly severe. Several barangays also installed road safety signage. Finally, many POP teams addressed problems like juvenile delinquency and public intoxication by creating activities in which at-risk individuals could participate. The POP team in Cogon, Gubat purchased sports equipment that school-age children could loan from the barangay hall after school. Pamurayan, Sorsogon used their funds to create a community garden tended to by at-risk youth.

Teams spent months 4, 5, and 6 of the intervention implementing their strategies. They met monthly to report on progress and discuss any issues. At the end of the six-month intervention, each participating barangay held a culminating event to reinforce

public knowledge of their activities and discuss ways to continue activities that would improve public safety in the future.

Citizen feedback mechanisms. Our harmonized intervention did not include any new feedback mechanisms, though citizens may have taken the opportunity of increased police presence and informal contacts to report information. However, we implemented a massive advertisement campaign around a little-used provincial voice and sms hotline as an alternative treatment arm. Phone calls and sms messages only cost citizens the amount of “load” or “minutes” required to make the call. Reports to the provincial police office via the hotline are received by a dedicated officer at the provincial police station and then shared with the operations office at the municipal police station. Municipal police stations also have their own hotlines, which are more commonly used than the provincial police hotline, though we were unable to collect reliable data on the number of messages to the MPS.

A.6 Uganda

Officer recruitment and training. Officers were reassigned from other tasks in order to participate in community policing activities. Training was conducted by our implementing partner, YIDO. YIDO trained a total of 122 officers on community policing principles and strategies, and on the various components of the intervention (town hall meetings, door-to-door visits, night patrols, and formation of neighborhood watch teams). YIDO also instructed officers in data collection and management for tracking their activities during the intervention. Participating officers generally included the District Police Commanders (DPC), District Community Liaisons Officers (DCLO), District Child and Family Protection Officers (CFPU), Officers in Charge (O/C) of each treatment police post, and Community Liaisons Officers (CLO) from each treatment police post. In most cases LC1 chairpersons and Community Development Officers also participated in these trainings. Each training lasted two days. All trainings were conducted between July and September, 2018. Most trainings were held at a police post, a youth center, a hotel, or a district or subcounty hall. The number of officers trained in each district ranged from five to 25.

YIDO also organized two higher level meetings for senior officials and supervising officers, including the RPC, RCLO, DPC, and DCLO from each district and regional police headquarters. The goal of these trainings was to increase buy-in for the intervention and encourage senior officials to instruct the officers under their command to participate more actively in community policing activities. These meetings were held in May 2019.

Townhall meetings. Town hall meetings were organized by police officers in coordination with YIDO and the LC1 chairperson of each treatment village. The aim was to hold four meetings in each village over the duration of the study, approximately once every two months. Meetings were held in the village. Citizens were invited to meetings through word of mouth; to the best of our knowledge, LC1 chairpersons did not

issue formal / written invitations. In general, the Officer-in-Charge (O/C) of the police station or post with jurisdiction over the village was invited to participate. If the O/C was unavailable, another officer from the same police station or post was invited to participate instead. In many cases, however, communities organized their own town hall meetings, especially to discuss formation, recruitment, and standard operating procedures for neighborhood watch teams. In many cases the police did not attend these meetings. Our best estimate is that police were physically present at roughly two-thirds of all meetings.

Topics of discussion ranged widely. The most common topics related to the formation and functioning of neighborhood watch teams. According to qualitative field reports compiled by our implementing partners, this topic was discussed in over half of all meetings. But other topics were variable, and sometimes only indirectly related to issues of conflict, crime, and violence: truancy and the need to educate local youths (roughly one-third of all meetings); drug and alcohol abuse (roughly one-quarter of all meetings); health and sanitation (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); domestic abuse and sexual and gender-based violence (roughly one-fifth of all meetings); gambling (roughly one-seventh of all meetings); and a variety of other topics from traffic accidents to savings groups to stray dogs.

A total of 353 town hall meetings were held as part of the intervention between June 2, 2018 and November 17, 2019. The number of attendees ranged widely, from a low of five to a high of 224. Men tended to outnumber women, with a male-to-female ratio greater than 1 in roughly 75% of all meetings. The LC1 chairperson was present at roughly 93% of all meetings; women's group and youth group representatives were present at 41% and 25% of all meetings, respectively.

Foot patrols. While the intervention was designed to include door-to-door visits and night patrols, to the best of our knowledge, these occurred only very sporadically. We are aware of 26 occasions on which officers conducted door-to-door visits in treatment communities, all early in the intervention. In some cases, it appears that these visits were conducted in response to citizens call for service. In most cases visits were conducted by a single officer. The number of households visited ranged widely, from one to 15. The ranks of the officers varied as well, though most are from junior management. From bottom to top of the police hierarchy, ranks of the officers involved in door-to-door visits included PC, CPL, SGT, AIP, IP, and CP.

The officers conducted these visits on foot. We do not know how long each visit lasted. After each visit, officers were instructed to complete a form documenting the location and time of the visit, the names and ranks of the participating officers, the names of the residents with whom the officers interacted, comments about the visits, and recommendations. (We have 26 of these forms. It is possible that other visits occurred without the officers completing a form.) In almost all cases, the comments merely refer to the reception that the officers received. In most cases they described the reception as welcoming; in four of the 26 reports, however, the officer also mentions fear among residents who were unaccustomed to police presence in their communities.

We are also aware of 11 occasions on which officers conducted night patrols, all early

in the intervention. Between one and four officers participated in each patrol. All patrols were conducted on foot. Officers reported interacting with between six and 20 residents per patrol. In at least one case it appears that the officers asked members of the NWT to join them on patrol; on at least two other occasions the NWT conducted a night patrol without police accompaniment. (We believe NWT night patrols likely occurred more frequently than this.) We are unaware of any case in which a night patrol yielded information that the patrolling officers reported up the chain of command.

Community watch forum. All treatment villages should have created a neighborhood watch team (NWT) as part of the primary treatment arm. Half of all villages assigned to the primary treatment were also randomly assigned to our secondary treatment arm, which involved additional training and logistical support for NWTs. In principle, each village should be divided into “cells,” and each cell should have its own NWT with a chairperson, a secretary, a defense mobilizer/coordinator, and seven members selected from among the households in the cell. In practice, the number of members varied somewhat across cells and villages. On December 7, 2018, we recorded that 114 of 144 treatment villages were confirmed to have NWTs. In eight of the remaining villages, the community rejected the proposal to form a NWT. In one other village, the community claimed the police discouraged them from forming a NWT. (We are unable to confirm this claim, though it is inconsistent with the goals of the intervention.) We do not know how many hours members spend on NWT-related activities each week.

B. Study experimental designs

We provide declarations of the experimental design for each of the six sites in words and in code using `DeclareDesign` (*SM1*). This code is also included in the replication materials.

B.1 Brazil

Sample frame. The sample frame is a set of 196 physical locations, and the 300 meter circles surrounding them, selected by commanders in 24 participating municipalities in Santa Catarina State in Brazil.

Sampling. The study is conducted in all of the 196 locations. A random walk pattern is used to select 68 households for locations in the treatment group and 34 households in locations the control group (an average of 43 and 33 were found in the study).¹⁶ Whenever there were not a sufficient number of households found through the random walk pattern at a location, all households were interviewed. When that was insufficient, we expanded the radius to 350m or 400m. If a sufficient number of households was still not found, no further interviews were conducted at the location.

¹⁶The aim of oversampling households in treatment locations was to increase the likelihood of capturing households that eventually will participate in Rede de Vizinhos groups.

Table SM2: Study Site Experimental Designs

	Brazil	Colombia	Liberia	Pakistan	Philippines	Uganda
Random assignment strategy	Two-arm (control, CP ^b)	Factorial (control, CP, alt.; CP + alt.)	Two-arm (control, CP)	Three-arm (control, CP, alt. ^d)	Two-arm (control, CP) with addl. cross-randomizations ^e	Three arm (Control, CP, CP+alt. ^f)
Blocking variables ^g	Municipality	Police station	Police zone	Police station	Municipality, baseline crime rate	Baseline covariates
Number of study units	196	347	100	108	298	72
Officers randomized ^h	X	✓	X	✓	X	✓
Citizen survey design	Panel	Panel	Cross-section	Panel	Cross-section	Panel
Officer survey design	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Cross-section	Panel

We summarize the experimental designs for the six sites, including details of the random assignment procedure, the duration of treatment, and details of our three measurement strategies.

^a Barangays are the lowest level of the police hierarchy, equivalent to rural villages and urban neighborhoods.

^b Harmonized common community policing treatment.

^c In Colombia, an additional treatment arm involved distributing flyers about (i) resources for victims of domestic violence; (b) Colombia's new Police Code; (c) community-level crime trends; and (d) information on crime reporting. We do not analyze the effects of this treatment following our pre-analysis plan.

^d In Pakistan, an additional treatment group involved the harmonized common community policing treatment but involved additional training provided to citizens to address gender-related and family crimes. These sessions involved a female police officer who regularly interacted with female members of the community by engaging female union councilors, female school teachers and lady health worker alongside.

^e In Philippines, the study teams included multiple alternate treatment arms, all of which involved the harmonized common community policing treatment along with the creation of problem oriented policing teams which identified and addressed the most pressing issues in each treated barangay. In the first alternative arm, officers are supplied with promotional stickers to pass out during their engagement that include the new PNP provincial hotline number, along with a call for citizens to text/call in reports, complaints, or suggestions. In the second alternative arm, officers are told that they will be evaluated based on their performance during the community engagement program, and that the top performers will be recognized at a public ceremony. In the third and fourth alternative arms, the policing teams are either composed of local government members or local government members and police officers. In the fifth alternative arm, the teams are told that they are being evaluated by one of two political principals, the Mayor's Office of the corresponding municipality and the Department of Interior and Local Government.

^f In Uganda, we implement the harmonized common community policing treatment with follow-up meetings focused on reiteration of the earlier meeting and addressing any follow-up questions/concerns that citizens would have.

^g Variables used to group units into similar blocks, within which treatment is assigned.

^h In three sites, by virtue of the randomization scheme police officers (or their organization unit, such as a station) were randomly assigned into treatment or control. We only provide estimates of the effects of community policing on officer-level outcomes for these three sites. In the others, officers were assigned to units that spanned multiple study units and so were not necessarily in a single treatment condition.

Four locations were replaced by the police with new locations far from the original after being assigned to treatment (two were treated and two were controls). Unfortunately, data was not collected in the original locations (data was instead collected in the replacement points). We exclude the outcome data from the new points, as they were not part of our original experimental sample. The fact that we do not have data from the four points in the original sample may result in bias due to differential attrition (one control was dropped in Joinville municipality; in Florianopolis, two treated units were dropped and one control).

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys and at endline in officer surveys. Police crime data was provided at a point level and spatially matched to points, and collapsed into preintervention (Jan 2017 to May 2018) and postintervention (Jun 2018 to Feb 2019) periods.

Citizen surveys were conducted as a panel, but with a replacement protocol. Interviewers attempted to find the exact person over multiple attempts (25% succeeded). When that person could not be interviewed, another person within the household (50%), another person from another household in the same structure (10%), or a neighbor (15%) were substituted.

At the start of the baseline survey, it became clear that it was not possible to obtain a reach sample size targets in the short time between agreement by the police to hold a meeting and the meeting itself. As a result, we randomly sampled a subset of locations in which to conduct baseline and endline data collection. We report results for survey outcomes only for this subset of randomly sampled locations.

Treatment assignment. We randomly assigned the 196 locations with equal probability to the encouragement treatment (hold meeting and advertise on Facebook) or control (no meeting or advertisement) via block randomization within participating municipalities.

Due to a transcription error during implementation, four units received a different treatment status than the one they were assigned (two are untreated treatment units and two are treated controls). Two are in Balneario Camboriu and two in Rio do Sul municipalities. We analyze the data using the assigned treatment status, meaning that this is an additional source of noncompliance. (This issue only affects administrative data outcomes; these four units were not selected in the random sample of units for survey measurement.)

Estimation. We fit a two-stage least squares instrumental variables model with the endogenous variable being whether a group formed in the location and the exogenous variable the randomized treatment indicator. We control for baseline outcomes when available and include municipality fixed effects. In citizen survey outcomes, we weight by the citizen probability of inclusion and cluster by location.

B.2 Colombia

Sample frame. We study the 413 *cuadrantes* (police beats) in the city of Medellin. We defined a “prioritized neighborhood” around each beat as the set of inhabited, contiguous city blocks closest to the centroid of the police beat. Each prioritized neighborhood comprised about four blocks, depending on the residential density, so as to ensure similar populations. When the centroid of the police beat fell in (for example) a park, we began the prioritized neighborhood at the inhabited block closest to the centroid. There are 413 *cuadrantes* in the city; 66 were excluded that were (a) located in remote areas of the city, or (b) non-residential (e.g., the local airport).

Sampling. The study is conducted in all 347 selected *cuadrantes*. We surveyed 15 respondents per prioritized neighborhood. Households are surveyed randomly within each neighborhood through a random walk method, with a random starting point. At endline, we found a low recontact rate for baseline survey respondents. 620 respondents were recontacted and 298 new interviewees were found.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys (as noted, 298 endline respondent do not have baseline outcomes recorded) and at endline in officer surveys. Police crime data was provided a point level and spatially matched to *cuadrantes*, and collapsed into preintervention and postintervention periods.

Treatment assignment. We randomly assigned the 387 *cuadrantes* with equal probability into one of four groups in a factorial design: (1) control, with no changes to status quo policing; (2) the harmonized community policing treatment; (3) informational flyers; and (4) both harmonized community policing and informational flyers.

Estimation. We fit an OLS model and include an indicator for the common treatment arm and one for the alternative treatment arm, baseline outcomes (if available), and block fixed effects. For administrative data, we analyze the data at the level of *cuadrantes*. For citizen survey data, we analyze data at the level of citizens, weight by estimated inverse inclusion probabilities, and report robust standard errors clustered at the level of *cuadrantes*.

Due to implementation constraints, we do not control for outcomes at baseline in the officer survey. In addition, we are only able to control for some baseline outcomes from the citizen survey.¹⁷

B.3 Liberia

Sample frame. Monrovia is divided into ten administrative police zones, which are akin to police precincts in major U.S. cities and typically composed of between 15 and 40 communities or neighborhoods. Communities are subdivided into anywhere from three to six blocks, which are akin to small neighborhoods or street blocks in the United States. The intervention targeted the most central block in each community plus the largest two adjacent blocks.

Sampling. Within each zone, local research assistants worked with the police to identify any “high priority” communities to be nominated for the intervention based on assessments of crime rates, police-community relations, or other factors. This process

¹⁷Outcomes for which we are unable to control for at baseline include: `know_idx_common`, `know_idx`, `know_idx_listwise`, `know_law_idx`, `know_report_idx`, `know_law_suspect_std`, `know_law_lawyer_std`, `know_law_fees_std`, `know_report_followup`, `know_report_station`, `know_law_idx_listwise`, `know_report_idx_listwise`, `satis_general_std`, `bribe_freq_std`, `bribe_amt_std`, `polcasefair_std`, `obeynorm_std`. All other outcomes are controlled for at baseline.

identified 35 high priority communities. Because this sample size was smaller than anticipated and would have resulted in an underpowered study, an additional 65 communities were randomly sampled from the remaining population of communities for a total of 100 communities. During the baseline survey and before treatment assignment, two communities were found to be duplicates of other communities and were dropped. During implementation, staffing constraints within the research team required that the smallest police zone (Zone 6) be dropped. Within each community, 20 respondents for the survey were randomly sampled from the selected blocks following a random walk procedure.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen surveys. Officer surveys were not conducted. Police crime data was provided at the community level and collapsed into preintervention (August 2016 to January 2017) and postintervention (January 2018 to July 2018) periods.

Treatment assignment. Half of the communities within each zone were randomly assigned to treatment via block randomization.¹⁸

Estimation. We fit an OLS model and include an indicator for the common treatment arm, baseline outcome recoded to zero if missing as well as when relevant an indicator for whether that outcome is missing, and police zone fixed effects. For administrative data, we analyze the data at the level of communities and weight by the inverse probability of community inclusion in the sample. For citizen survey data, we analyze data at the level of citizens, weight by the inverse of the product of community and citizen inclusion probabilities, and report robust standard errors clustered at the level of communities.

B.4 Pakistan

Sample frame. We study community policing in Sheikhpura and Nankana districts in Sheikhpura Region of Pakistan’s Punjab Province. Sheikhpura and Nankana districts have a combined population size of 4.6 million people. These two districts consist of 27 police stations and 151 beats consisting of 1053 villages and 516 urban neighborhoods. Sheikhpura and Nankana have roughly 340 police officers at the Sub-Inspector (SI) and Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) rank.

Sampling. We draw two independent samples of beats and combine them. First, within each of the 27 police stations we randomly sample three beats for a total of 81 sampled beats. Second, excluding those 81 beats we conduct a probability-proportional-to-size sample of 27 additional beats across all stations in Sheikhpura and Nankana districts,

¹⁸In zones with an odd number of communities, $(N_b - 1)/2$ communities were assigned to treatment, where N_b denotes the number of communities in block b , resulting in a slightly less or slightly higher than $1/2$ probability of assignment to treatment, depending on rounding. We account for this in the analysis by weighting observations by the inverse of the probability of assignment.

based on AsiaPop grid-cell data on population. (The sampling takes place as part of the random assignment of beats, described below.)

We draw a random sample of 3,456 individuals in the 108 sampled beats, stratified by beat with 32 sampled per beat. We then independently draw an additional sample of 864 respondents (8 per beat) with the same beat-stratified method. We use probability-proportional-to-size sampling for sampling respondents within beats. We take the AsiaPop 100-meter grid cell population data, aggregate to 500x500 meter grid cells, and draw a population-proportional-to-size sample of four grid cells within each beat. We then choose a random starting point within each sampled grid, and then use a left-hand rule from the starting point for eight houses. This yields a sample of 3,456 individuals in the 108 sampled beats. We repeat this exercise, sampling one grid cell within each beat and eight households within each cell, to draw an additional sample of 864 respondents to be used as replacements.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen and officer surveys. Police crime data was provided at the beat level, and collapsed into preintervention (January 2017 to March 2019) and postintervention (March to November 2019) periods.

Random assignment. We randomly assign beats through two independent randomizations. First, we randomly assign the stratified sample of three beats per station using randomization blocked on stations: one beat assigned to control, one to the common arm, and one to the alternative arm. We then randomize the sample of 27 additional beats into the three conditions using complete random assignment with nine beats assigned to each condition. Note that the assignment process includes the sampling process. The treatment variable then is calculated by combining the two indicators: if the beat is not assigned to a treatment in the first stage, it is available in the second stage; if it selected in neither, it is not sampled.

Estimation. We fit an OLS model and include an indicator for the common treatment arm and the alternative treatment arm, the baseline outcome recoded to zero if missing as well as when relevant an indicator for whether that outcome is missing, and police station fixed effects. For administrative data, we analyze the data at the level of beats and weight by the inverse probability of treatment assignment. For citizen survey data and officer survey data, we analyze data at the level of citizens, weight by the inverse of the product of treatment assignment and sample inclusion probabilities, and report robust standard errors clustered at the level of beats.

B.5 Philippines

Sample frame. We study policing in the 541 barangays (neighborhoods or villages) in Sorsogon Province in the Philippines. The Philippines National Police is organized in three hierarchical levels: Provincial, Municipal, and Barangay. The Provincial office includes the police chief, administrative staff, and special duty officers. The 15 Municipal

offices include all rank-and-file officers along with a Municipal Police Chief and administrative staff. In Sorsogon City (the provincial capital), there are three district offices that serve similar functions to the municipal office.

Sampling. The Armed Forces of the Philippines 9th Infantry Division declared 298 barangays in Sorsogon Province to be safe enough for our enumerators to operate. We conduct our evaluation in all 298 of these barangays. Within each barangay, citizens were randomly sampled from the full roster of certified voters at midline and form a panel for the midline and endline survey. For the midline survey, we randomly selected 10 respondents per barangay. (A small baseline survey was conducted in a subsample of areas; this baseline is not analyzed in the study.) If the selected individual's household could not be located, the enumerator moved on to the next randomly-selected name. If the enumerator located the selected individual's household, but the respondent was unavailable and not expected to return in the same day (or was unwilling to participate), the enumerator interviewed an available adult member of the same household. For the endline, we first attempted to re-contact the individuals surveyed at midline. Enumerators succeeded in interviewing 63.9% of midline respondents. We then randomly selected additional respondents in each barangay from the list of registered voters and contacted them using the same procedures as used during midline until we had achieved 15 responses per barangay.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured in citizen surveys at midline (after implementing the community engagement program) and endline (after implementing the problem-oriented policing program). Following the preanalysis plan, we do not analyze the midline data, which is reported on separately. Officer surveys were conducted at endline, but are only analyzed descriptively here as officers were not randomized into the common treatment in this site. Police crime data was provided at the barangay level, and collapsed into preintervention (August 2016 to February 2017) and postintervention (January to July 2018) periods.

Random assignment. We use a factorial experimental design implemented in two phases: a CEP phase and a POP phase. In the first phase (CEP), barangays are randomly assigned to 1) a control condition, 2) a treatment condition in which CEP is implemented along with an encouragement to use the SMS tip line, and 3) a treatment condition in which CEP is implemented without an encouragement to use the SMS tip line. In addition, CEP-treated barangays are assigned to either A) a control condition, or B) a treatment condition in which police officers have a chance to be given a certificate of recognition conditional on performance.

In the second phase (POP), CEP-treated barangays are randomly assigned to 1) a treatment condition in which POP is implemented by Barangay Council and Tanods alone, and 2) a treatment condition in which POP is implemented by PNP and Barangay Council and Tanods in coordination with each other. The pure control group is common across CEP and POP phases. In addition, villages treated with POP are assigned to either A) a control condition or B) a treatment condition in which POP teams receive top-down

accountability from the Mayor’s office, or C) a treatment condition in which POP teams receive top-down accountability from the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Provincial Office.

The procedure for this initial randomization unintentionally led to two deviations from the planned design. In particular, most units were put into a single large block due to the way the Stata *randtreat* command treats missing values and several units were put into blocks of size 1. As a result, we do not include blocked fixed effects. We estimated the probabilities of assignment through simulation and found they varied across blocks only within a very narrow range (very close to 0.33), so we do not reweight our estimates based on the assignment probabilities. (This plan was registered in a PAP amendment before analysis.)

Estimation. We fit an OLS model and include an indicator for the common treatment arm and three cross-randomized treatments. For administrative data, we analyze the data at the level of *barangays*. For citizen survey data, we analyze data at the level of citizens and report robust standard errors clustered at the level of *barangays*.

B.6 Uganda

Sample frame. We study the 380 police units of the Uganda Police Force (UPF), which are a mixture of stations (124) and sub-station posts (256). The UPF is organized with district level central police stations; each district has one. Central police stations supervise sub-county level stations. Some sub-county level stations supervise police posts covering a few parishes; some have no posts under them. Posts are analogous to beats in the US, with 2-4 police officers deployed to each post.

Sampling. We purposively selected 72 police stations. Out of the 134 districts of Uganda, UPF selected 13 for the study. UPF applied two inclusion criteria in selecting these districts: equal representation of Uganda’s four regions (North, Central, East, and West), and, within each region, relatively high crime rate based on the 2014 UPF national crime report. Of the 23 highest-crime districts in the country, two were excluded because they were too close to Kampala and thus peri-urban;¹⁹ six were excluded because they were located in regions that were over-represented in the sample;²⁰ and two were excluded due to high levels of insecurity, and correspondingly high military presence.²¹ UPF determined that community policing would not be an appropriate strategy in these districts.

We listed all police stations in the 13 districts and non-randomly selected 72, dropping the most urban ones. Where available, we selected one post under the jurisdiction of each station. For stations that do not have a post under them, we used the station itself. We sampled a total of 72 units (44 posts and 28 stations). We focus the study on the parish

¹⁹Luwero and Mpigi.

²⁰Masindi, Mubende, Kamwenge (Central Region), Soroti, Palissa (Eastern Region), and Amuru (Northern Region).

²¹Masaka and Kasese.

where the unit is physically located. Out of all the villages in the selected parish, we randomly select four to participate. In each village, we randomly sampled six men and six women during the baseline survey. The endline survey was a panel in which we re-interviewed these same 12 respondents in each village. We were unable to recontact some respondents and sampled 500 replacements from the same villages.

In each of the 72 police stations and posts, we interviewed the Officer in Charge (OC) and, whenever possible, the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) and the Child and Family Protection Unit (CFPU) officer. Then among all the more junior officers, we randomly selected as many as needed to reach 5 officers. (53 of the 72 stations and posts have five or fewer officers. We survey all officers in these cases.) We interviewed the same officers during the endline survey. Among the 198 officers we interviewed at endline, only 44 were also interviewed at baseline (for an attrition rate of 80%); the rest were randomly-selected replacement officers.

Outcome measurement. Outcomes are measured at baseline and endline in citizen and officer surveys. Police crime data was provided at the police station level, and collapsed into preintervention and postintervention periods.

Random assignment. A two-stage randomization procedure was used. Police stations were formed into blocks of four within regions, based on baseline covariates.²² Half of each block was assigned to control and half to treatment. We then randomized assignment to the secondary treatment arm, additional training for community watch teams, at the village level. Within each of the 36 police stations that were assigned to the primary treatment arm, we assigned two of the four study villages to receive our secondary treatment arm.

Estimation. We fit an OLS model and include an indicator for the common treatment arm, the baseline outcome recoded to zero if missing as well as when relevant an indicator for whether that outcome is missing,²³ and block fixed effects. For administrative data, we analyze the data at the level of police stations. For citizen survey data and for officer survey data, we analyze data at the level of citizens and report robust standard errors clustered at the level of police stations.

²²Stations were blocked on the number of police posts, parishes, villages, and officers under the jurisdiction of the station, as well as a set of demographic indicators from the 2014 Census including population size, percent male, average age, percent literate, mean household size, mean years of education, mean number of meals eaten per day, percent involved in an occupation other than subsistence agriculture, a standardized household asset index, a standardized household quality index, and a standardized index of social services available.

²³Four variables we use as outcomes were not included in the baseline: *sexual_num_std*, *cland_any_std*, *cdomestic_verbal_num_std*, *domestic_verbal_num_std*, and *apolotm_station_std*. We exclude them from the regression in these cases.

C. Ethics

As with any field experiment, the consideration of ethics was key in both the design and implementation of this effort. From the start, our teams worked carefully to ensure the alignment of our police partnerships with the Belmont principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. This required that we first assess whether a partnership with a particular police agency had the potential to yield appropriate and meaningful benefits for treated communities. Police-researcher partnerships have increasingly been the subject of scholarly attention. Importantly, recent scholarship has found that working with the local police can help to broker healthier exchanges between police departments and community members, which can result in greater trust in these localities (SM2).

In addition, we carefully considered the burdens that the police would shoulder in carrying out community policing, as well as practices that would minimize risk to both police officers and citizens. We developed protocols for informed consent of research subjects, and obtained approval for our protocols from the universities where our participating scholars are affiliated. We also developed a set of best practices to address and mitigate potential harms. These included:

- **Careful Consideration of Local Context.** The aim of any field experiment is for researchers and police departments to “share skills and experiences, trade information, and produce answers that can inform sustainable policies that make safety and legitimacy that much more possible (SM3, SM4). Therefore, it was important for each of our teams to tailor their program directly to the context faced by each country’s police agencies. In Pakistan, for example, researchers conducted focus groups in the study districts to generate qualitative evidence to frame the appropriate design within the local context. Additionally, in Colombia, the research team altered police-community meetings by including local beat cops, rather than only police leadership, to facilitate opportunities for neighborhood-level conversations that citizens had been lacking. While the teams standardized many of their procedures, these tailored components ensured that we were increasing the likelihood that the treatment would be beneficial in each context.
- **Training for Local Police Partners.** Working with any police agency requires buy-in at the highest level. But this does not always mean that local officers will follow orders and accommodate any kind of policy change. Therefore, our research teams worked to provide comprehensive training to local officers. In designing the Ugandan intervention, for example, the researchers helped facilitate a working group that included police officers from the CP department and from the Research and Planning directorate, as well their partner NGO. That working group sought to codify what constitutes community policing in Uganda by writing up a set standard operating procedures. Similarly, in Pakistan we worked with the Premier Training College of the Police in designing a substantial officer training program on community policing. In the Philippines, field officers received extensive training in detecting and reporting anything that might have been indicative of abuses being associated with activities related to the intervention.

- **Extensive Risk Mitigation Plan.** It is critically important that police researchers should not be seen as “ethnographic referees” who constantly are stepping in to modify police behavior (SM5). That being said, our teams also recognized that they needed to take steps to protect citizens from harm by clearly delineating the point at which they would have stopped the experiment. All teams created detailed plans for ending their partnership in case of any kind of police violence or risk to public safety. Additionally, each team deployed researchers to monitor the intervention over time. In Liberia, for example, members of the research team embedded within the LNP for the duration of the study, to both observe the intervention and to establish independent communication with community leaders, in case of misconduct.
- **Sensitive Handling of Administrative Data.** In designing and implementing baseline, midline, and endline surveys, our teams prioritized the protection of administrative data and confidentiality for data collected from citizens. For example, in Pakistan, the research team worked with the officer heading the IT department for the province to develop protocols for data sharing. The protocol included receiving vehicle logs data at the office of the Inspector General, where a member of the research team would conduct proposed analyses and retrieve only analysis results, leaving the raw data safely at the main office.

In addition to these steps taken across our intervention sites, the research teams were careful to address ethical considerations specific to each of their countries. For example, as we mentioned, the team in the Philippines recognized that their most important ethical concern was to find an appropriate way to engage with the police during President Duterte’s War on Drugs. After carefully selecting Sorsogon as an appropriate setting for the intervention, the research team also ensured that a field officer was also present at each police meeting in the Philippines study. They also conducted spot checks during implementation.

In Uganda too, the police have often been seen as an instrument to advance the President’s political agenda. Therefore, the research team was careful to avoid asking questions that were too politically sensitive and sought to draw distinctions between local officers and political operatives. Additionally, the team prioritized working in rural areas, which are both underserved and where police officers are seen to be less politicized, and carried out the intervention in between elections.

Colombia faced a similar challenge, given citizen distrust of the police. As recently as the early 1990s, the Colombian police committed hundreds, if not thousands, of extrajudicial murders every year. While today they rank as one of the least violent in Latin America, the research team recognized that they needed to look at more micro-relationships within neighborhoods, rather than across localities. These smaller interventions ensured the researchers could better monitor the behavior of individual officers and quickly surface any citizen concerns.

While all field experiments present ethical challenges, our partnerships with the police demanded special attention to these issues. Each of our teams carefully weighed the issues at stake, while setting in place protocols to ensure the safety and well-being of

subjects. By working with police directly, our goal was to develop and test a community policing strategy that could generate sustainable improvements in citizen security.

In the course of the study, two incidents occurred in which we considered whether and how to continue the studies. First, in the Brazil site, our police partner informed us that one of our survey enumerators had a criminal background. The research team decided to fire the enumerator. Second, in Colombia, our research team noticed people taking photographs outside one of the community meetings that was taking place as part of the intervention. The incident was immediately reported to the police partner and also the research manager. The possibility of suspending the intervention was discussed, but the police partner recommended temporarily suspending community meetings in the neighborhood where the incident occurred. (As it turned out, there were no meeting scheduled.) The research team decided to implement stricter safety protocols, including reporting concerning activity to supervisors immediately; taking taxis to neighborhoods with security concerns; and coordinating with a member of the local neighborhood council to walk to and from meetings. No further issues occurred.

D. Measurement coordination

Table SM3: Measurement differences across sites

Outcome	Country	Difference
TBD		

E. Systematic review details

To conduct the review, we implemented the method laid out in the PRISMA guidelines, which call for transparency and comprehensiveness in the review process (69). This transparency allows for consumers of the review to replicate it and judge its quality. We discuss the criteria for inclusion in the studies, the search strategies used to identify studies, and the coding of study characteristics.

E.1 Criteria for Inclusion

To be included in the review, a study must have evaluated at least one of the six interventions that make up components of the common treatment arm of our field experiments. The study also must have evaluated an intervention's effect on one of the eight outcomes of interest tested by our six field experiments. Those outcomes include: (1) incidence of crime, (2) citizen perceptions of safety, (3) citizen perceptions of the police, (4) officer perceptions of police empathy, accountability, and abuse, (5) officer reporting of misconduct, (6) citizen reporting of crime victimization, (7) citizen reporting of crime prevention tips, and (8) citizen reporting of victimization by the police.

The review includes English-language studies only published between January 1970 and June 2019. The 1970s was selected as a starting point given that seminal policing experiments took place during this decade including the Kansas City preventive patrol experiment (70) and the Cincinnati team policing experiment (71). The limitations of English sources is primarily justified by the reality that much of the scholarship on policing, especially experimental work, is published in English.

We reviewed peer-reviewed scholarship including prior systematic reviews, journal articles, and books. Inclusion was not restricted to any given methodological approach. Thus, the review includes studies with methodological approaches ranging from randomized controlled trials to observational analyses and qualitative cases studies.

In addition to peer-reviewed scholarship, we also evaluated unpublished scholarship such as working papers and dissertations as well as policy-oriented studies. Including works that either were rejected during the peer-review process or were never subjected to peer-review is crucial for systematic reviews of this nature in order to reduce publication bias. It is widely believed that null findings are more difficult to publish in peer-review outlets than those that do find an effect in one direction or the other. Thus, including these works in our systematic review helps protect against overstating the effectiveness of interventions due to the publication bias.

Some works identified for the review include multiple interventions and/or multiple outcomes. In such cases, each intervention-outcome combination was treated as a separate study in order to tease out an intervention's effect on each of the relevant outcomes. For instance, one journal article tests the impact of foot patrols on both incidence of crime and citizen perceptions of the police (72). We treated this study, accordingly, as two: one study which evaluates the effect of foot patrols on incidence of crime and one study which evaluates the effect of foot patrols on citizen perceptions of the police.

E.2 Search strategies

The review identifies studies using three methods.

First, we compiled a list of relevant studies. The studies included both experimental and observational works that were identified based on our prior knowledge, discovered during the course of the research process, or written by the authors themselves.

Second, we conducted a manual review of repositories for criminal justice evaluations. Searching criminal justice repositories is useful for identifying stand-alone studies from the organizations as well as meta-analyses and systematic reviews.

Repositories based in the United States include the Center for Evidence-based Crime Policy, the Center for Problem-oriented Policing, the University of Chicago Crime Lab, the RAND Justice Policy Program, the Urban Institute Justice Policy Center, the IACP Institute of Police-Community Relations, the Police Foundation, the Police Executive Research Forum, the Vera Institute of Justice, and Jennifer Doleac's online crime papers spreadsheet. We also search selected repositories outside the United States including The Police Foundation (United Kingdom), the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy (India), the Igrapé Institute (Brazil), the CLEEN Foundation (Nigeria), and the Institute for Security Studies (South Africa).

Third, we searched academic databases. For journal articles, we conducted searches in EBSCOhost and for journal articles and books we search Google Scholar.²⁴ For working papers, we searched the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). And, finally for dissertations, we searched the ProQuest Dissertation database.

E.3 Coding study characteristics

After identifying the studies, the next task involved coding the study characteristics in preparation for the analysis. We coded each study based on whether or not it underwent peer-review, the type of research design (e.g., if it is an observational or an RCT), the context of the study (e.g., the country or countries where it was conducted), and the intervention and outcome category, among other data.

E.4 Identified studies

The initial unit of analysis for the the collection of studies are "records" which includes journal articles, books, reports generally written by think-tanks and civil society organizations, or other types of media discussed below. Within these records, we identify studies, which are a combination of a community policing intervention and an outcome of interest. The number of studies a record contains depends on the number of interventions and outcomes the authors present in the record.

Selecting the studies for the review involved three stages. First, as indicated in Figure SM5, 144 records were identified by the researchers, 223 records were identified from criminal justice repositories, and 1,732 records were identified from academic database

²⁴Google Scholar also indexes the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS).




Figure SM5: PRISMA Diagram

searches. In total, this process identified 1,963 studies not including duplicates. The second stage of the process involved screening the records. Given that the records identified by the researchers and pulled from criminal justice repositories were manually reviewed as part of the identification stage, the screening process did not result in the exclusion of records.


In the third stage, and perhaps most importantly, studies were assessed to determine if they met the eligibility criteria required to be included in the narrative synthesis of the results. The eligibility criterion is that the study evaluates one of the six interventions and one of the eight outcomes of interest. The 1,963 studies that passed the screening process were assessed for eligibility by reviewing their titles and abstracts or executive summaries. From the 1,963 records, 177 unique records were identified to contain at least one eligible study. Within these 177 records, 238 studies were identified for the review.

Supplementary Materials References

- SM1. G. Blair, J. Cooper, A. Coppock, M. Humphreys, *American Political Science Review* **113**, 838 (2019).
- SM2. G. P. Alpert, J. Rojek, , J. A. Hansen, *US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC* (2013).
- SM3. E. M. Kerrison, P. A. Goff, C. Burbank, , J. M. Hyatt, *Police Practice and Research* **20** (2019).
- SM4. J. R. Greene, *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* **8**, 379 (2014).
- SM5. L. Westmarland, *British journal of criminology* **41**, 523 (2001). National Institute of Justice Research in Brief.
- SM6. A. S. Gerber, D. P. Green, *Field experiments: Design, analysis, and interpretation* (W.W. Norton, 2012).

F. Balance

Figure SM6: Balance on pretreatment covariates by study. We report an omnibus two-sided p-value based on randomization inference from an F-test of the null hypothesis of equal means across treatment groups.



G. Meta-analysis results

G.1 Compliance results

Table SM4: Compliance results

Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Compliance	0.571	0.256	(0.069, 1.074)	0.026
Vehicle patrol frequency	0.091	0.049	(-0.005, 0.187)	0.064
Foot patrol frequency	0.059	0.053	(-0.044, 0.162)	0.259
Community meeting awareness	0.996	0.605	(-0.190, 2.181)	0.100

G.2 Primary hypotheses

Table SM5: Primary hypotheses results

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value	Tau ²	Tau ² S.E.
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.016	0.028	(-0.071, 0.040)	0.581	0.882	0.001	0.003
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.019	0.040	(-0.058, 0.097)	0.624	0.882	0.003	0.005
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.051	0.029	(-0.005, 0.107)	0.075	0.301	0.000	0.003
3a	Police perceptions of citizens idx.	-0.161	0.155	(-0.464, 0.142)	0.297	0.792	0.052	0.072
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.010	0.040	(-0.088, 0.068)	0.806	0.882	0.004	0.005
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.005	0.031	(-0.057, 0.066)	0.882	0.882	0.001	0.003
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.043	0.023	(-0.089, 0.003)	0.066	0.301	0.001	0.002
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.008	0.022	(-0.035, 0.051)	0.725	0.882	0.000	0.002
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.403	0.270	(-0.126, 0.933)	0.136		0.352	0.258
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.049	0.033	(-0.016, 0.113)	0.138		0.000	0.003
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	-0.010	0.023	(-0.054, 0.035)	0.674		0.000	0.002
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.042	0.043	(-0.042, 0.126)	0.325		0.005	0.006
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.032	0.030	(-0.028, 0.091)	0.297		0.000	0.003
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.044	0.034	(-0.022, 0.111)	0.193		0.000	0.004
S2	Community trust	0.028	0.025	(-0.020, 0.076)	0.258		0.000	0.002

G.3 Secondary hypotheses

Table SM6: Secondary hypotheses results

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Tau ²	Tau ² S.E.
1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.166	0.103	(-0.037, 0.369)	0.109	0.037	0.038
1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.035	0.126	(-0.282, 0.211)	0.778	0.017	0.086
1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.022	0.025	(-0.071, 0.027)	0.382	0.001	0.002

G.4 Primary hypotheses by item

Table SM7: All components

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Brazil	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	1.225	7.714	(-14.558, 17.007)	0.875	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.009	0.042	(-0.075, 0.092)	0.838	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.594	0.613	(-0.632, 1.820)	0.337	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.005	0.051	(-0.145, 0.155)	0.931	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	-0.001	0.035	(-0.070, 0.069)	0.986	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Violent crimes (personal)	0.012	0.022	(-0.032, 0.056)	0.599	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	1.640	8.883	(-16.531, 19.811)	0.855	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.165	0.470	(-0.775, 1.105)	0.727	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.041	0.052	(-0.112, 0.195)	0.480	0.006	0.695
Philippines	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	-0.029	0.027	(-0.083, 0.024)	0.281	0.000	0.317
Uganda	1a	Armed robbery (personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Simple assault (personal)	-1.459	7.572	(-16.949, 14.031)	0.849	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.745	0.761	(-0.775, 2.264)	0.331	0.001	0.313
Pakistan	1a	Simple assault (personal)	-0.091	0.059	(-0.265, 0.083)	0.210	0.013	0.937
Philippines	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.082	0.068	(-0.052, 0.217)	0.229	0.001	0.038
Uganda	1a	Simple assault (personal)	0.000	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.096	0.550	(-1.030, 1.221)	0.863	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.390, 0.243)	0.644	0.003	0.209
Pakistan	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.079	0.056	(-0.086, 0.243)	0.240	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Other violent crimes (personal)	0.019	0.033	(-0.047, 0.085)	0.574	0.000	0.322
Brazil	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.679	5.695	(-12.330, 10.973)	0.906	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.021	0.049	(-0.077, 0.118)	0.675	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	2.032	2.013	(-1.988, 6.052)	0.317	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.024	0.045	(-0.157, 0.109)	0.626	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.096, 0.029)	0.288	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Non-violent crimes (personal)	0.002	0.021	(-0.039, 0.043)	0.920	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.627	4.794	(-10.434, 9.180)	0.897	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Burglary (personal)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Burglary (personal)	1.854	1.918	(-1.973, 5.682)	0.337	0.002	0.829
Pakistan	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.047	0.041	(-0.168, 0.075)	0.330	0.009	0.302
Philippines	1a	Burglary (personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.094, 0.029)	0.298	0.000	0.640
Uganda	1a	Burglary (personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.040)	0.868	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.067	0.000	(-0.067, -0.067)	0.000	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076	0.003	0.103
Pakistan	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.010	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.850	0.000	0.186
Uganda	1a	Other non-violent crimes (personal)	-0.028	0.040	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.488	0.000	0.321
Brazil	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.228	2.634	(-5.161, 5.617)	0.932	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.037	0.044	(-0.050, 0.123)	0.401	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.682	0.904	(-1.125, 2.488)	0.454	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Violent crimes (community)	-0.062	0.112	(-0.389, 0.265)	0.611	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Violent crimes (community)	-0.027	0.058	(-0.143, 0.088)	0.642	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Violent crimes (community)	0.004	0.063	(-0.122, 0.131)	0.945	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-7.119	39.761	(-88.456, 74.217)	0.859	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.040	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-0.012	0.242	(-0.496, 0.473)	0.961	0.002	0.625
Pakistan	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.007	0.090	(-0.255, 0.269)	0.944	0.005	0.814
Philippines	1a	Armed robbery (community)	-0.015	0.041	(-0.095, 0.065)	0.710	0.001	0.362
Uganda	1a	Armed robbery (community)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434	0.001	1.000
Liberia	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.721	1.236	(-1.753, 3.196)	0.562	0.002	0.776
Pakistan	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	-5.650	5.213	(-21.121, 9.821)	0.349	0.017	0.415

Table SM7: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Philippines	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	-0.019	0.041	(-0.099, 0.062)	0.642	0.001	0.361
Uganda	1a	Aggravated assault (community)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528	0.001	0.564
Brazil	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.091	0.767	(-1.477, 1.660)	0.906	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.012	0.040	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Simple assault (community)	1.522	1.623	(-1.716, 4.760)	0.352	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.055	0.071	(-0.155, 0.265)	0.489	0.012	0.677
Philippines	1a	Simple assault (community)	-0.064	0.048	(-0.158, 0.030)	0.180	0.005	0.890
Uganda	1a	Simple assault (community)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476	0.002	0.243
Brazil	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.067	0.418	(-0.922, 0.788)	0.874	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.150	0.267	(-0.683, 0.384)	0.577	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.001	0.031	(-0.095, 0.093)	0.979	0.027	0.297
Philippines	1a	Sexual assault (community)	-0.001	0.064	(-0.128, 0.125)	0.984	0.003	0.418
Uganda	1a	Sexual assault (community)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705	0.001	0.179
Brazil	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	12.101	67.854	(-126.713, 150.915)	0.860	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.022	0.041	(-0.060, 0.104)	0.589	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	1.029	1.749	(-2.461, 4.519)	0.558	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	-0.112	0.234	(-0.808, 0.585)	0.661	0.029	0.398
Philippines	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	0.000	0.040	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997	0.002	0.738
Uganda	1a	Domestic abuse (community)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.159, 0.117)	0.766	0.005	0.188
Brazil	1a	Murder (community)	2.478	13.513	(-25.167, 30.122)	0.856	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Murder (community)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Murder (community)	0.135	0.138	(-0.140, 0.410)	0.331	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Murder (community)	-0.033	0.042	(-0.157, 0.090)	0.476	0.019	0.441
Philippines	1a	Murder (community)	0.074	0.111	(-0.147, 0.294)	0.510	0.002	0.041
Uganda	1a	Murder (community)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645	0.001	0.645
Brazil	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.023	0.164	(-0.314, 0.359)	0.892	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792	0.001	0.654
Pakistan	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.325	0.413	(-0.905, 1.554)	0.483	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.210)	0.370	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Other violent crimes (community)	-0.013	0.018	(-0.049, 0.024)	0.488	0.004	0.807
Brazil	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-2.272	12.628	(-28.110, 23.565)	0.858	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	0.049	0.057	(-0.065, 0.162)	0.394	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	0.621	0.749	(-0.877, 2.119)	0.410	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.043	0.052	(-0.192, 0.106)	0.459	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.097	0.046	(-0.189, -0.006)	0.037	0.000	–
Uganda	1a	Non-violent crimes (community)	-0.059	0.047	(-0.154, 0.035)	0.212	0.000	–
Brazil	1a	Burglary (community)	-1.772	9.474	(-21.154, 17.610)	0.853	0.000	–
Colombia	1a	Burglary (community)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Burglary (community)	0.640	0.795	(-0.951, 2.231)	0.424	0.000	–
Pakistan	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.078	0.059	(-0.244, 0.089)	0.262	0.014	0.965
Philippines	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.101	0.047	(-0.193, -0.009)	0.032	0.004	0.815
Uganda	1a	Burglary (community)	-0.060	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195	0.001	0.160
Brazil	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	4.220	22.144	(-41.080, 49.519)	0.850	0.000	–
Liberia	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.590	0.001	0.641
Pakistan	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.042	0.505	(-1.462, 1.545)	0.939	0.000	–
Philippines	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816	0.001	0.054
Uganda	1a	Other non-violent crimes (community)	0.058	0.040	(-0.023, 0.139)	0.157	0.004	0.836
Brazil	1b	Feared violent crime	0.050	2.634	(-5.338, 5.437)	0.985	0.003	0.208
Colombia	1b	Feared violent crime	0.044	0.041	(-0.038, 0.126)	0.286	0.013	0.103
Liberia	1b	Feared violent crime	-0.051	0.188	(-0.426, 0.324)	0.787	0.001	0.325
Pakistan	1b	Feared violent crime	0.032	0.063	(-0.149, 0.213)	0.638	0.000	–
Philippines	1b	Feared violent crime	0.058	0.064	(-0.070, 0.185)	0.371	0.015	0.977
Uganda	1b	Feared violent crime	0.046	0.051	(-0.056, 0.148)	0.373	0.005	0.004
Brazil	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.458	4.567	(-9.798, 8.882)	0.921	0.004	0.082
Liberia	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.084	0.210	(-0.504, 0.336)	0.691	0.001	0.326
Pakistan	1b	Fear non-violent crime	-0.426	0.062	(-0.604, -0.248)	0.003	0.000	–

Table SM7: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Philippines	1b	Fear non-violent crime	0.071	0.062	(-0.052, 0.194)	0.254	0.013	0.672
Uganda	1b	Fear non-violent crime	0.070	0.056	(-0.042, 0.182)	0.213	0.005	0.022
Brazil	1b	Feared walking	0.844	5.525	(-10.458, 12.145)	0.880	0.004	0.156
Colombia	1b	Feared walking	0.087	0.042	(0.003, 0.171)	0.043	0.009	0.679
Liberia	1b	Feared walking	0.124	0.243	(-0.362, 0.611)	0.611	0.001	0.395
Pakistan	1b	Feared walking	-0.249	0.053	(-0.406, -0.092)	0.013	0.014	0.218
Philippines	1b	Feared walking	0.001	0.053	(-0.103, 0.105)	0.986	0.014	0.878
Uganda	1b	Feared walking	0.012	0.037	(-0.062, 0.086)	0.745	0.000	—
Brazil	2	Trust in police	-4.831	30.639	(-67.516, 57.854)	0.876	0.005	0.116
Colombia	2	Trust in police	0.045	0.051	(-0.056, 0.146)	0.376	0.004	0.535
Liberia	2	Trust in police	0.082	0.247	(-0.410, 0.575)	0.740	0.005	0.182
Pakistan	2	Trust in police	0.425	0.148	(-0.001, 0.852)	0.050	0.008	0.713
Philippines	2	Trust in police	0.007	0.066	(-0.125, 0.138)	0.921	0.010	0.240
Uganda	2	Trust in police	0.025	0.050	(-0.075, 0.124)	0.623	0.001	0.938
Brazil	2	Trust in service of police	-3.680	22.605	(-49.932, 42.571)	0.872	0.007	0.060
Colombia	2	Trust in service of police	0.086	0.045	(-0.005, 0.176)	0.062	0.007	0.041
Liberia	2	Trust in service of police	0.235	0.213	(-0.191, 0.661)	0.275	0.004	0.721
Pakistan	2	Trust in service of police	0.451	0.158	(0.009, 0.892)	0.047	0.011	0.861
Philippines	2	Trust in service of police	0.031	0.059	(-0.086, 0.148)	0.600	0.021	0.630
Uganda	2	Trust in service of police	-0.008	0.051	(-0.110, 0.095)	0.879	0.001	0.654
Colombia	3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.008	0.155	(-0.300, 0.316)	0.961	0.398	0.502
Pakistan	3a	Empathy (complaints)	-0.028	0.159	(-0.347, 0.291)	0.861	0.193	0.001
Uganda	3a	Empathy (complaints)	0.166	0.194	(-0.224, 0.556)	0.396	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.162	0.206	(-0.572, 0.248)	0.433	0.393	0.500
Pakistan	3a	Empathy (reports)	0.238	0.168	(-0.100, 0.575)	0.163	0.193	0.000
Uganda	3a	Empathy (reports)	-0.338	0.206	(-0.754, 0.078)	0.108	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.061	0.163	(-0.386, 0.264)	0.711	0.391	0.401
Pakistan	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.716	0.197	0.278
Uganda	3a	Police takes complaints seriously	-0.276	0.149	(-0.576, 0.025)	0.071	0.005	0.347
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.167	0.126	(-0.418, 0.084)	0.189	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.241	0.222	(-0.688, 0.205)	0.282	0.209	0.734
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: disciplinary punishment	-0.064	0.150	(-0.366, 0.237)	0.669	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.047	0.121	(-0.289, 0.194)	0.697	0.400	0.278
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.075	0.126	(-0.328, 0.177)	0.552	0.201	0.067
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: report fellow officer	-0.208	0.184	(-0.579, 0.162)	0.263	0.005	0.347
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	0.004	0.127	(-0.247, 0.256)	0.972	0.398	0.342
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	0.000	0.157	(-0.316, 0.317)	0.998	0.236	0.304
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: reports by other officers	-0.153	0.159	(-0.473, 0.168)	0.342	0.005	0.343
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: disciplinary punishment	-0.210	0.116	(-0.442, 0.021)	0.074	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: disciplinary punishment	-0.070	0.154	(-0.379, 0.239)	0.650	0.217	0.155
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: disciplinary punishment	-0.067	0.095	(-0.260, 0.125)	0.484	0.010	0.737
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.297	0.156	(-0.608, 0.014)	0.061	0.398	0.211
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	0.118	0.129	(-0.141, 0.378)	0.364	0.213	0.560
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: report fellow officer	-0.242	0.165	(-0.574, 0.090)	0.149	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.145	0.151	(-0.446, 0.157)	0.342	0.398	0.233
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	0.072	0.165	(-0.260, 0.403)	0.666	0.220	0.814
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: reports by other officers	-0.133	0.204	(-0.544, 0.279)	0.519	0.010	0.722
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	0.042	0.135	(-0.226, 0.310)	0.756	0.384	0.447
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	-0.046	0.156	(-0.360, 0.269)	0.771	0.189	
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: disciplinary punishment	-0.060	0.135	(-0.333, 0.213)	0.659	0.010	0.744
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.029	0.132	(-0.235, 0.293)	0.825	0.393	0.235
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.083	0.125	(-0.167, 0.334)	0.507	0.197	0.127
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: report fellow officer	0.003	0.219	(-0.439, 0.445)	0.991	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.022	0.142	(-0.261, 0.305)	0.878	0.391	0.286
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	0.070	0.137	(-0.205, 0.345)	0.610	0.213	0.001
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: reports by other officers	-0.045	0.160	(-0.367, 0.277)	0.778	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	-0.135	0.157	(-0.447, 0.177)	0.392	0.391	0.286
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	0.013	0.118	(-0.224, 0.250)	0.912	0.205	0.589

Table SM7: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: own misconduct	-0.095	0.137	(-0.372, 0.182)	0.494	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	-0.169	0.133	(-0.434, 0.096)	0.207	0.393	0.265
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	-0.031	0.112	(-0.257, 0.195)	0.783	0.228	0.000
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 5: others' misconduct	0.018	0.197	(-0.378, 0.415)	0.926	0.005	0.345
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.123	0.110	(-0.341, 0.095)	0.266	0.400	0.336
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	0.022	0.115	(-0.208, 0.253)	0.847	0.189	
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.108	0.163	(-0.437, 0.221)	0.511	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.890	0.234	(-1.356, -0.425)	0.000	0.398	0.439
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.098	0.120	(-0.339, 0.143)	0.419	0.217	0.041
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 2: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.132	0.195	(-0.526, 0.261)	0.501	0.005	0.348
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.149	0.160	(-0.467, 0.169)	0.352	0.396	0.189
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	0.107	0.123	(-0.139, 0.354)	0.385	0.244	0.811
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: own misconduct (corruption)	-0.296	0.136	(-0.570, -0.023)	0.035	0.005	0.346
Colombia	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.572	0.213	(-0.995, -0.148)	0.009	0.393	0.232
Pakistan	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.016	0.152	(-0.321, 0.290)	0.919	0.268	0.590
Uganda	3a	Hypothetical 3: others' misconduct (corruption)	-0.206	0.135	(-0.477, 0.066)	0.134	0.005	0.347
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	-0.067	0.336	(-0.755, 0.621)	0.843	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.009	0.037	(-0.065, 0.083)	0.801	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.033	0.034	(-0.100, 0.035)	0.340	0.001	0.326
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.289	0.143	(-0.711, 0.133)	0.124	0.037	0.742
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.035	0.043	(-0.121, 0.050)	0.416	0.000	–
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.015	0.041	(-0.068, 0.098)	0.723	0.000	0.322
Brazil	3b	Police abuse	-0.067	0.336	(-0.755, 0.621)	0.843	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Police abuse	-0.055	0.047	(-0.150, 0.039)	0.248	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.147	0.074	(-0.366, 0.072)	0.129	0.000	–
Philippines	3b	Police abuse	-0.015	0.039	(-0.091, 0.062)	0.701	0.000	–
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.018	0.019	(-0.021, 0.057)	0.349	0.000	–
Brazil	3b	Bribe frequency	1.348	7.262	(-13.508, 16.203)	0.854	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Bribe frequency	-0.008	0.049	(-0.105, 0.089)	0.870	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Bribe frequency	0.082	0.317	(-0.550, 0.714)	0.797	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Bribe frequency	-0.027	0.066	(-0.216, 0.162)	0.709	0.021	0.505
Philippines	3b	Bribe frequency	0.003	0.046	(-0.088, 0.093)	0.955	0.001	0.673
Uganda	3b	Bribe frequency	0.083	0.041	(0.002, 0.165)	0.045	0.000	0.322
Brazil	3b	Bribe amount	0.012	0.063	(-0.117, 0.141)	0.855	0.000	–
Colombia	3b	Bribe amount	-0.088	0.084	(-0.255, 0.078)	0.294	0.000	–
Liberia	3b	Bribe amount	0.005	0.020	(-0.035, 0.046)	0.792	0.000	–
Pakistan	3b	Bribe amount	-0.009	0.009	(-0.036, 0.018)	0.391	0.021	0.589
Philippines	3b	Bribe amount	-0.040	0.026	(-0.092, 0.012)	0.131	0.002	0.785
Uganda	3b	Bribe amount	0.121	0.080	(-0.040, 0.282)	0.137	0.000	0.322
Brazil	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	1.832	11.022	(-20.720, 24.383)	0.869	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.037	0.048	(-0.058, 0.132)	0.437	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.005	0.006	(-0.017, 0.006)	0.371	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.228	0.218	(-0.418, 0.874)	0.364	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	0.012	0.047	(-0.081, 0.105)	0.798	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.003	0.038	(-0.080, 0.074)	0.936	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.036	0.040	(-0.043, 0.115)	0.367	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	-0.005	0.009	(-0.022, 0.013)	0.582	0.007	0.555
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery reported (personal)	0.000	0.039	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997	0.003	0.598
Colombia	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.002	0.050	(-0.101, 0.097)	0.969	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.001	0.004	(-0.009, 0.007)	0.818	0.025	0.712
Uganda	4a	Simple assault reported (personal)	-0.003	0.028	(-0.060, 0.054)	0.915	0.018	0.416
Uganda	4a	Other violent crimes reported (personal)	0.000	0.037	(-0.073, 0.073)	0.996	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-1.703	9.972	(-22.107, 18.702)	0.866	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.033	0.045	(-0.057, 0.123)	0.470	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.007	0.019	(-0.044, 0.030)	0.716	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.006	0.046	(-0.086, 0.097)	0.905	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Non-violent crimes reported (personal)	0.066	0.042	(-0.019, 0.151)	0.123	0.000	–

Table SM7: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Colombia	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.027	0.037	(-0.047, 0.102)	0.466	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	-0.007	0.019	(-0.046, 0.031)	0.711	0.037	0.293
Uganda	4a	Burglary reported (personal)	0.083	0.041	(0.001, 0.166)	0.047	0.052	0.714
Uganda	4a	Other non-violent crimes reported (personal)	-0.043	0.030	(-0.103, 0.018)	0.161	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	1.209	8.272	(-15.715, 18.132)	0.885	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	-0.003	0.041	(-0.084, 0.078)	0.940	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	-0.003	0.019	(-0.041, 0.034)	0.862	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.037	0.099	(-0.257, 0.331)	0.730	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.074	0.099	(-0.121, 0.270)	0.453	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Violent crimes reported (community)	0.021	0.068	(-0.117, 0.158)	0.764	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.301	0.332	0.947
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	-0.028	0.036	(-0.100, 0.043)	0.434	0.022	0.756
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery reported (community)	0.039	0.052	(-0.065, 0.144)	0.453	0.010	0.371
Liberia	4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.030, 0.042)	0.737	0.021	0.146
Uganda	4a	Aggravated assault reported (community)	0.011	0.037	(-0.063, 0.086)	0.765	0.009	0.367
Colombia	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.018	0.039	(-0.095, 0.058)	0.636	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	-0.001	0.011	(-0.023, 0.022)	0.947	0.042	0.321
Uganda	4a	Simple assault reported (community)	0.013	0.036	(-0.058, 0.084)	0.718	0.038	0.110
Colombia	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.010	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.782	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	-0.007	0.011	(-0.030, 0.016)	0.552	0.009	0.686
Uganda	4a	Sexual assault reported (community)	0.061	0.068	(-0.076, 0.198)	0.374	0.010	0.889
Colombia	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.006	0.041	(-0.074, 0.087)	0.876	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	0.004	0.004	(-0.003, 0.012)	0.246	0.057	0.888
Uganda	4a	Domestic physical abuse reported (community)	-0.017	0.044	(-0.105, 0.072)	0.707	0.070	0.666
Uganda	4a	Other violent crime reported (community)	0.006	0.018	(-0.029, 0.042)	0.718	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-1.699	9.326	(-20.775, 17.377)	0.857	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	0.095	0.080	(-0.064, 0.255)	0.239	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.015	0.024	(-0.063, 0.033)	0.525	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	-0.081	0.044	(-0.167, 0.005)	0.066	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Non-violent crime reported (community)	0.004	0.052	(-0.100, 0.108)	0.938	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Burglary reported (community)	0.078	0.066	(-0.053, 0.209)	0.241	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.017	0.025	(-0.066, 0.033)	0.506	0.045	0.704
Uganda	4a	Burglary reported (community)	-0.013	0.053	(-0.119, 0.094)	0.814	0.121	0.223
Uganda	4a	Other non-violent crime reported (community)	0.038	0.040	(-0.042, 0.118)	0.350	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Resolution of crime index	-1.186	6.072	(-13.610, 11.238)	0.847	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.007	0.024	(-0.055, 0.041)	0.761	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.063	0.121	(-0.305, 0.178)	0.602	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Resolution of crime index	0.007	0.037	(-0.103, 0.116)	0.870	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.138	0.056	(-0.250, -0.027)	0.016	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Resolution of crime index	-0.007	0.029	(-0.065, 0.051)	0.810	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Burglary resolution	-2.514	13.273	(-29.671, 24.642)	0.851	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.007	0.035	(-0.076, 0.062)	0.837	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Burglary resolution	0.003	0.108	(-0.213, 0.220)	0.977	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Burglary resolution	0.045	0.047	(-0.095, 0.185)	0.401	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.095	0.055	(-0.203, 0.014)	0.087	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Burglary resolution	-0.040	0.038	(-0.116, 0.036)	0.300	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.498	2.364	(-5.335, 4.340)	0.835	0.000	–
Colombia	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.007	0.029	(-0.063, 0.050)	0.816	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.091	0.081	(-0.071, 0.253)	0.266	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.006	0.089	(-0.272, 0.260)	0.949	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	-0.097	0.049	(-0.193, -0.001)	0.049	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Domestic abuse resolution	0.061	0.057	(-0.054, 0.176)	0.290	0.000	–
Brazil	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.459	3.075	(-6.751, 5.832)	0.882	0.000	–
Liberia	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.207	0.115	(-0.436, 0.022)	0.076	0.000	–
Pakistan	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.012	0.061	(-0.193, 0.169)	0.856	0.000	–
Philippines	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.109	0.054	(-0.215, -0.002)	0.045	0.000	–
Uganda	4a	Armed robbery resolution	-0.042	0.027	(-0.096, 0.012)	0.128	0.000	–
Brazil	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.279	3.459	(-7.356, 6.799)	0.936	0.003	0.827

Table SM7: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Colombia	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.062	0.043	(-0.147, 0.024)	0.156	0.000	–
Liberia	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.181	0.173	(-0.526, 0.164)	0.299	0.000	–
Pakistan	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.099	0.042	(-0.225, 0.026)	0.089	0.018	0.308
Philippines	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	-0.060	0.049	(-0.156, 0.037)	0.223	0.008	0.316
Uganda	4b	Contacted police for suspicious activity	0.006	0.039	(-0.072, 0.083)	0.883	0.001	0.990
Brazil	4b	Gave information to police	-2.025	5.423	(-13.586, 9.535)	0.714	0.925	0.838
Colombia	4b	Gave information to police	0.039	0.039	(-0.038, 0.117)	0.317	0.000	–
Liberia	4b	Gave information to police	-0.228	0.215	(-0.657, 0.201)	0.294	0.001	0.902
Pakistan	4b	Gave information to police	-0.084	0.037	(-0.191, 0.024)	0.094	0.017	0.376
Philippines	4b	Gave information to police	-0.059	0.042	(-0.142, 0.025)	0.170	0.013	0.052
Uganda	4b	Gave information to police	-0.014	0.034	(-0.083, 0.054)	0.672	0.000	–
Liberia	4c	Reported drinking on duty	-0.433	0.199	(-0.831, -0.036)	0.033	0.006	0.462
Pakistan	4c	Reported drinking on duty	-0.027	0.123	(-0.385, 0.330)	0.837	0.037	0.240
Philippines	4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.059	0.044	(-0.028, 0.146)	0.180	0.013	0.199
Uganda	4c	Reported drinking on duty	0.023	0.048	(-0.073, 0.119)	0.628	0.003	0.978
Colombia	4c	Reported police beating	0.019	0.039	(-0.058, 0.097)	0.624	0.010	0.919
Liberia	4c	Reported police beating	0.186	0.194	(-0.202, 0.574)	0.342	0.003	0.701
Pakistan	4c	Reported police beating	-0.113	0.092	(-0.384, 0.158)	0.295	0.041	0.364
Philippines	4c	Reported police beating	0.025	0.047	(-0.068, 0.117)	0.599	0.009	0.668
Uganda	4c	Reported police beating	0.042	0.051	(-0.060, 0.145)	0.412	0.002	0.503
Colombia	4c	Reported police abuse	0.018	0.026	(-0.035, 0.070)	0.507	0.000	–
Liberia	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.016	0.012	(-0.039, 0.007)	0.177	0.000	–
Pakistan	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.158	0.045	(-0.293, -0.024)	0.032	0.000	–
Philippines	4c	Reported police abuse	-0.009	0.047	(-0.101, 0.084)	0.856	0.000	–
Uganda	4c	Reported police abuse	0.024	0.047	(-0.071, 0.119)	0.614	0.000	–
Uganda	4c	Victimization reported to police station	0.833	0.408	(0.016, 1.651)	0.046	0.000	–
Brazil	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.618	1.872	(-4.466, 3.230)	0.744	0.150	0.224
Colombia	M1a	Police will investigate	0.066	0.043	(-0.020, 0.152)	0.131	0.019	0.546
Liberia	M1a	Police will investigate	0.330	0.225	(-0.120, 0.780)	0.148	0.016	0.824
Pakistan	M1a	Police will investigate	1.436	0.114	(1.120, 1.752)	0.000	0.017	0.550
Philippines	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.021	0.061	(-0.142, 0.100)	0.733	0.008	0.454
Uganda	M1a	Police will investigate	-0.063	0.048	(-0.158, 0.033)	0.192	0.003	0.279
Brazil	M1a	Police will be fair	-2.298	9.680	(-22.110, 17.513)	0.814	0.043	0.571
Colombia	M1a	Police will be fair	0.086	0.045	(-0.003, 0.175)	0.058	0.032	0.247
Liberia	M1a	Police will be fair	0.114	0.191	(-0.269, 0.497)	0.554	0.019	0.544
Pakistan	M1a	Police will be fair	0.667	0.207	(0.082, 1.253)	0.034	0.024	0.863
Philippines	M1a	Police will be fair	0.001	0.050	(-0.097, 0.099)	0.986	0.023	0.410
Uganda	M1a	Police will be fair	0.017	0.051	(-0.085, 0.119)	0.738	0.003	0.501
Brazil	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.303	3.011	(-6.463, 5.856)	0.920	0.050	0.639
Colombia	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.064	0.042	(-0.148, 0.020)	0.135	0.044	0.046
Liberia	M1a	Police are corrupt	0.408	0.224	(-0.039, 0.856)	0.073	0.085	0.843
Pakistan	M1a	Police are corrupt	0.335	0.131	(-0.054, 0.724)	0.073	0.009	0.998
Philippines	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.059	0.066	(-0.189, 0.070)	0.366	0.070	0.028
Uganda	M1a	Police are corrupt	-0.037	0.032	(-0.101, 0.027)	0.249	0.007	0.282
Brazil	M1a	Police serve equally	-1.703	9.342	(-20.822, 17.416)	0.857	0.022	0.066
Uganda	M1a	Police serve equally	0.032	0.046	(-0.061, 0.125)	0.494	0.002	0.674
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.096	0.038	(-0.171, -0.021)	0.013	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	-0.002	0.317	(-0.637, 0.632)	0.994	0.087	0.970
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (suspect)	0.079	0.040	(-0.000, 0.159)	0.051	0.012	0.728
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.046	0.040	(-0.034, 0.126)	0.253	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	-0.250	0.185	(-0.620, 0.120)	0.182	0.034	0.702
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (lawyer)	0.018	0.035	(-0.051, 0.088)	0.595	0.064	0.765
Colombia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	-0.050	0.047	(-0.144, 0.043)	0.289	0.000	–
Liberia	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	-0.045	0.299	(-0.641, 0.552)	0.882	0.050	0.035
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (fees)	0.107	0.051	(0.004, 0.210)	0.042	0.017	0.556
Uganda	M1b	Legal Knowledge (domestic abuse)	-0.033	0.036	(-0.106, 0.040)	0.369	0.003	0.496
Uganda	M1b	Police Knowledge (followup)	0.063	0.035	(-0.006, 0.132)	0.074	0.021	0.532

Table SM7: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Uganda	M1b	Police Knowledge (where is station)	0.023	0.052	(-0.082, 0.127)	0.666	0.000	–
Colombia	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.080	0.046	(-0.172, 0.012)	0.087	0.046	0.618
Liberia	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.135	0.273	(-0.411, 0.680)	0.624	0.015	0.012
Pakistan	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.074	0.083	(-0.150, 0.299)	0.416	0.022	0.016
Philippines	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	0.022	0.053	(-0.084, 0.127)	0.682	0.016	0.746
Uganda	M1c	Reporting norm (theft)	-0.091	0.053	(-0.197, 0.016)	0.093	0.001	0.558
Colombia	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	-0.022	0.042	(-0.106, 0.063)	0.609	0.023	0.211
Liberia	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.363	0.193	(-0.023, 0.748)	0.065	0.024	0.344
Pakistan	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.197	0.116	(-0.118, 0.513)	0.160	0.010	0.012
Philippines	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.015	0.057	(-0.097, 0.127)	0.789	0.014	0.055
Uganda	M1c	Reporting norm (domestic abuse)	0.020	0.047	(-0.075, 0.115)	0.673	0.002	0.210
Brazil	M1c	Obeys police norm	-0.311	2.232	(-4.878, 4.255)	0.890	0.006	0.733
Colombia	M1c	Obeys police norm	0.063	0.041	(-0.019, 0.145)	0.132	0.016	0.721
Liberia	M1c	Obeys police norm	0.188	0.162	(-0.136, 0.512)	0.251	0.004	0.710
Pakistan	M1c	Obeys police norm	-0.067	0.129	(-0.432, 0.297)	0.630	0.004	0.165
Philippines	M1c	Obeys police norm	-0.014	0.046	(-0.104, 0.077)	0.767	0.012	0.281
Uganda	M1c	Obeys police norm	0.001	0.045	(-0.090, 0.091)	0.989	0.001	0.677
Brazil	M2a	Police timeliness	-4.699	34.471	(-75.238, 65.840)	0.893	0.050	0.901
Colombia	M2a	Police timeliness	0.111	0.042	(0.027, 0.194)	0.010	0.014	0.681
Liberia	M2a	Police timeliness	0.403	0.177	(0.049, 0.757)	0.026	0.015	0.485
Pakistan	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.024	0.099	(-0.320, 0.272)	0.820	0.016	0.399
Philippines	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.001	0.065	(-0.130, 0.129)	0.992	0.018	0.806
Uganda	M2a	Police timeliness	-0.041	0.037	(-0.115, 0.033)	0.276	0.005	0.307
Brazil	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.435	2.648	(-5.856, 4.986)	0.871	0.036	0.511
Colombia	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.100	0.036	(0.027, 0.172)	0.008	0.017	0.103
Liberia	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.173	0.171	(-0.167, 0.514)	0.314	0.014	0.323
Pakistan	M2a	Police investigation capacity	0.099	0.079	(-0.133, 0.332)	0.288	0.019	0.747
Philippines	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.004	0.064	(-0.132, 0.123)	0.949	0.029	0.538
Uganda	M2a	Police investigation capacity	-0.028	0.034	(-0.095, 0.040)	0.414	0.003	0.243
Brazil	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.418	2.872	(-6.296, 5.460)	0.885	0.017	0.094
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.051	0.045	(-0.038, 0.140)	0.257	0.009	0.722
Liberia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.040	0.248	(-0.535, 0.455)	0.872	0.019	0.894
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.027	0.111	(-0.290, 0.343)	0.823	0.025	0.736
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.046	(-0.077, 0.107)	0.746	0.002	0.454
Brazil	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	1.615	6.900	(-12.497, 15.728)	0.817	0.091	0.848
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.065	0.046	(-0.027, 0.157)	0.165	0.013	0.136
Liberia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.186	0.215	(-0.616, 0.243)	0.390	0.025	0.449
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.106	0.101	(-0.181, 0.394)	0.354	0.015	0.623
Philippines	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.005	0.061	(-0.115, 0.125)	0.933	0.014	0.008
Brazil	S2	Community trust	-1.078	8.136	(-17.721, 15.565)	0.896	0.006	0.899
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.070	0.039	(-0.008, 0.147)	0.078	0.019	0.976
Liberia	S2	Community trust	-0.218	0.210	(-0.636, 0.201)	0.303	0.006	0.138
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.031	0.181	(-0.568, 0.506)	0.873	0.005	0.252
Philippines	S2	Community trust	-0.029	0.065	(-0.157, 0.100)	0.659	0.014	0.323
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.019	0.038	(-0.058, 0.095)	0.629	0.000	0.326
Brazil	C	Foot patrol frequency	-6.053	35.124	(-77.902, 65.797)	0.864	0.004	0.269
Colombia	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.003	0.049	(-0.094, 0.101)	0.945	0.071	0.084
Liberia	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.080	0.148	(-0.216, 0.376)	0.593	0.004	0.649
Pakistan	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.298	0.141	(-0.127, 0.722)	0.116	0.026	0.442
Philippines	C	Foot patrol frequency	0.163	0.102	(-0.039, 0.366)	0.113	0.029	0.001
Uganda	C	Foot patrol frequency	-0.039	0.069	(-0.177, 0.099)	0.574	0.001	0.044
Colombia	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.003	0.050	(-0.097, 0.102)	0.960	0.024	0.797
Liberia	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.019	0.146	(-0.271, 0.309)	0.897	0.006	0.855
Pakistan	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.210	0.072	(-0.006, 0.426)	0.054	0.011	0.340
Philippines	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.233	0.127	(-0.018, 0.483)	0.069	0.009	0.520
Uganda	C	Vehicle patrol frequency	0.056	0.061	(-0.067, 0.179)	0.365	0.001	0.058
Brazil	C	Community meeting awareness	0.143	3.216	(-6.442, 6.729)	0.965	0.011	0.396
Colombia	C	Community meeting awareness	0.838	0.092	(0.655, 1.021)	0.000	0.000	–

Table SM7: All components (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Prop. Missing	Differential attrition p-value
Liberia	C	Community meeting awareness	3.639	0.394	(2.854, 4.424)	0.000	0.000	–
Pakistan	C	Community meeting awareness	0.406	0.132	(0.015, 0.797)	0.045	0.023	0.038
Philippines	C	Community meeting awareness	0.107	0.068	(-0.028, 0.242)	0.119	0.002	0.028
Uganda	C	Community meeting awareness	0.311	0.070	(0.171, 0.451)	0.000	0.001	0.627

G.5 Secondary hypotheses by item²⁵

Table SM8: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.562	0.588	(-0.604, 1.729)	0.341
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.059	0.065	(-0.069, 0.186)	0.365
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.082	0.327	(-0.574, 0.738)	0.802
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.169	0.199	(-0.227, 0.566)	0.397
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	-0.008	0.039	(-0.084, 0.069)	0.845
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Crime victimization idx. (administrative data)	0.494	0.112	(0.273, 0.715)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.648	0.717	(-0.773, 2.069)	0.368
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.007	0.081	(-0.153, 0.167)	0.934
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.069	0.336	(-0.605, 0.743)	0.838
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.255	0.247	(-0.236, 0.746)	0.304
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.013	0.078	(-0.167, 0.141)	0.866
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Violent crimes (administrative data)	0.524	0.108	(0.312, 0.737)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.244	-	(-, -)	-
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.362	0.277	(-0.193, 0.917)	0.196
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.022	0.408	(-0.805, 0.849)	0.958
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	-0.036	0.049	(-0.132, 0.06)	0.461
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Armed robbery (administrative data)	0.532	0.182	(0.174, 0.889)	0.004
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	0.648	-	(-, -)	-
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	-0.033	0.239	(-0.513, 0.446)	0.889
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	1.09	0.861	(-0.655, 2.836)	0.213
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	-0.036	0.068	(-0.169, 0.097)	0.59
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Aggravated assault (administrative data)	0.453	0.099	(0.257, 0.649)	0
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Simple assault (administrative data)	-0.024	0.345	(-0.724, 0.675)	0.945
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	1.927	-	(-, -)	-
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.768	0.47	(-0.175, 1.712)	0.108
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	-0.202	0.808	(-1.84, 1.437)	0.804
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	-	-	(-, -)	-
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Sexual assault (administrative data)	0.371	0.138	(0.099, 0.644)	0.008
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	-0.005	0.085	(-0.172, 0.163)	0.957
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.266	0.282	(-0.306, 0.837)	0.352
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Domestic abuse (physical) (administrative data)	0.162	0.099	(-0.032, 0.356)	0.102
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	1.382	1.336	(-1.266, 4.031)	0.303
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.525	0.512	(-0.502, 1.552)	0.31
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.338	0.431	(-0.535, 1.212)	0.437
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.036	0.14	(-0.24, 0.311)	0.798
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Murder (administrative data)	0.636	0.151	(0.339, 0.933)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.996	-	(-, -)	-
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.07	0.082	(-0.091, 0.232)	0.393
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Other violent crimes (administrative data)	0.745	0.183	(0.384, 1.106)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.478	0.528	(-0.569, 1.524)	0.368

²⁵Omitted values in this table are excluded due to insufficient variation in outcomes to estimate effects.

Table SM8: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.086	0.037	(0.013, 0.158)	0.021
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.002	0.269	(-0.538, 0.542)	0.994
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.086	0.15	(-0.212, 0.384)	0.566
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0	0	(0, 0)	0.386
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.387	0.122	(0.147, 0.626)	0.002
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.468	0.582	(-0.686, 1.623)	0.423
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.08	0.037	(0.007, 0.153)	0.032
Liberia	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.002	0.269	(-0.538, 0.542)	0.994
Pakistan	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.343	0.646	(-0.967, 1.653)	0.599
Philippines	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0	0	(0, 0)	0.386
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Burglary (administrative data)	0.636	0.154	(0.334, 0.939)	0
Brazil	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.468	0.72	(-0.959, 1.894)	0.517
Colombia	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	0.059	0.056	(-0.051, 0.168)	0.292
Uganda	1a. (alt. i)	Other non-violent crimes (administrative data)	-0.055	0.156	(-0.362, 0.252)	0.725
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.584	4.55	(-9.894, 8.725)	0.899
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.523	1.55	(-3.618, 2.573)	0.737
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.584	0.526	(-2.095, 0.926)	0.334
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	-0.069	0.047	(-0.163, 0.025)	0.147
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Crime victimization idx. (expanded crimes)	0.417	0.319	(-0.223, 1.057)	0.197
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.001	0.035	(-0.07, 0.069)	0.986
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.026	0.032	(-0.038, 0.09)	0.419
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	1.64	8.883	(-16.531, 19.811)	0.855
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.165	0.47	(-0.775, 1.105)	0.727
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.041	0.052	(-0.112, 0.195)	0.48
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	-0.029	0.027	(-0.083, 0.024)	0.281
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed Robbery (expanded, personal)	0.032	0.025	(-0.019, 0.083)	0.215
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.114	0.513	(-1.145, 0.917)	0.825
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (expanded, personal)	-0.028	0.264	(-0.577, 0.522)	0.918
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	-0.036	0.48	(-0.996, 0.923)	0.94
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (expanded, personal)	0.617	0.457	(-0.394, 1.628)	0.205
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	0.362	1.138	(-1.958, 2.681)	0.753
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (expanded, personal)	-0.574	0.208	(-1.002, -0.146)	0.011
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	-1.459	7.572	(-16.949, 14.031)	0.849
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.745	0.761	(-0.775, 2.264)	0.331
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	-0.091	0.059	(-0.265, 0.083)	0.21
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0.082	0.068	(-0.052, 0.217)	0.229
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (expanded, personal)	0	0.019	(-0.037, 0.037)	0.999
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.096	0.55	(-1.03, 1.221)	0.863
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.39, 0.243)	0.644
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.079	0.056	(-0.086, 0.243)	0.24
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.019	0.033	(-0.047, 0.085)	0.574
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.096, 0.029)	0.288

Table SM8: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.239	0.23	(-0.223, 0.701)	0.305
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.627	4.794	(-10.434, 9.18)	0.897
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	1.854	1.918	(-1.973, 5.682)	0.337
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.047	0.041	(-0.168, 0.075)	0.33
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	-0.033	0.031	(-0.094, 0.029)	0.298
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (expanded, personal)	0.003	0.019	(-0.034, 0.04)	0.868
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	2.542	8.02	(-13.712, 18.796)	0.753
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (expanded, personal)	-0.064	0.115	(-0.296, 0.168)	0.582
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.003	0.022	(-0.068, 0.063)	0.91
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (expanded, personal)	1.881	1.832	(-1.794, 5.557)	0.309
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.067	0	(-0.067, -0.067)	0
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.01	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.85
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (expanded, personal)	-0.028	0.04	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.488
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.027	0.058	(-0.143, 0.088)	0.642
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.01	0.058	(-0.107, 0.127)	0.862
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-7.119	39.761	(-88.456, 74.217)	0.859
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.04	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-0.012	0.242	(-0.496, 0.473)	0.961
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.007	0.09	(-0.255, 0.269)	0.944
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	-0.015	0.041	(-0.095, 0.065)	0.71
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Armed robbery (community, expanded)	0.037	0.047	(-0.057, 0.131)	0.434
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.721	1.236	(-1.753, 3.196)	0.562
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	-5.65	5.213	(-21.121, 9.821)	0.349
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	-0.019	0.041	(-0.099, 0.062)	0.642
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Aggravated assault (community, expanded)	0.016	0.026	(-0.035, 0.068)	0.528
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.091	0.767	(-1.477, 1.66)	0.906
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.012	0.04	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	1.522	1.623	(-1.716, 4.76)	0.352
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.055	0.071	(-0.155, 0.265)	0.489
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	-0.064	0.048	(-0.158, 0.03)	0.18
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Simple assault (community, expanded)	0.025	0.034	(-0.044, 0.094)	0.476
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.067	0.418	(-0.922, 0.788)	0.874
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.15	0.267	(-0.683, 0.384)	0.577
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.001	0.031	(-0.095, 0.093)	0.979
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	-0.001	0.064	(-0.128, 0.125)	0.984
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Sexual assault (community, expanded)	0.021	0.055	(-0.089, 0.131)	0.705
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	12.101	67.854	(-126.713, 150.915)	0.86
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0.022	0.041	(-0.06, 0.104)	0.589
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	1.029	1.749	(-2.461, 4.519)	0.558
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	-0.112	0.234	(-0.808, 0.585)	0.661
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	0	0.04	(-0.079, 0.079)	0.997

Table SM8: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, expanded)	-0.021	0.069	(-0.159, 0.117)	0.766
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	2.478	13.513	(-25.167, 30.122)	0.856
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.135	0.138	(-0.14, 0.41)	0.331
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	-0.033	0.042	(-0.157, 0.09)	0.476
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	0.074	0.111	(-0.147, 0.294)	0.51
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Murder (community, expanded)	-0.042	0.092	(-0.226, 0.141)	0.645
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	0.083	0.296	(-0.51, 0.677)	0.779
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.156	0.579	(-2.263, 1.951)	0.809
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Mob (community, expanded)	-0.018	0.047	(-0.114, 0.078)	0.71
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.023	0.164	(-0.314, 0.359)	0.892
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.325	0.413	(-0.905, 1.554)	0.483
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.21)	0.37
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.013	0.018	(-0.049, 0.024)	0.488
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	-0.097	0.046	(-0.189, -0.006)	0.037
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.743	0.727	(-0.714, 2.2)	0.311
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-1.772	9.474	(-21.154, 17.61)	0.853
Colombia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	0.64	0.795	(-0.951, 2.231)	0.424
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.078	0.059	(-0.244, 0.089)	0.262
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.101	0.047	(-0.193, -0.009)	0.032
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Burglary (community, expanded)	-0.06	0.046	(-0.151, 0.032)	0.195
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Land crimes (community, expanded)	2.875	2.133	(-1.403, 7.154)	0.183
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	0.448	1.344	(-2.271, 3.167)	0.741
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Domestic abuse (verbal) (community, expanded)	-0.082	0.054	(-0.191, 0.026)	0.135
Brazil	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	4.22	22.144	(-41.08, 49.519)	0.85
Liberia	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.59
Pakistan	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.042	0.505	(-1.462, 1.545)	0.939
Philippines	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816
Uganda	1a. (alt. ii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, expanded)	0.058	0.04	(-0.023, 0.139)	0.157
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	1.438	9.281	(-17.551, 20.427)	0.878
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	0.045	0.043	(-0.04, 0.131)	0.292
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.062	0.066	(-0.193, 0.069)	0.346
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.068	0.044	(-0.196, 0.061)	0.208
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.036	0.054	(-0.143, 0.072)	0.511
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Crime victimization idx. (binary survey measures)	-0.013	0.057	(-0.127, 0.101)	0.821
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.006	0.035	(-0.063, 0.076)	0.854
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.008	0.048	(-0.136, 0.151)	0.88
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	-0.008	0.047	(-0.1, 0.085)	0.87
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crime (personal, binary)	0.019	0.034	(-0.049, 0.087)	0.574
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.024	0.042	(-0.108, 0.061)	0.579
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	0.056	0.077	(-0.172, 0.283)	0.517
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	-0.057	0.037	(-0.129, 0.015)	0.121
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed robbery (personal, binary)	0.011	0.035	(-0.06, 0.082)	0.754

Table SM8: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.036	0.034	(-0.032, 0.103)	0.296
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	-0.081	0.051	(-0.233, 0.07)	0.2
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.016	0.046	(-0.076, 0.107)	0.735
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (personal, binary)	0.012	0.027	(-0.043, 0.067)	0.665
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.096	0.55	(-1.03, 1.221)	0.863
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.074	0.158	(-0.39, 0.243)	0.644
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.079	0.056	(-0.086, 0.243)	0.24
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.024	0.037	(-0.096, 0.048)	0.513
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.019	0.033	(-0.047, 0.085)	0.574
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.04	0.047	(-0.18, 0.1)	0.451
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.004	0.052	(-0.098, 0.107)	0.932
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0	0.041	(-0.082, 0.082)	0.997
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.017	0.041	(-0.065, 0.099)	0.687
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	-0.062	0.041	(-0.185, 0.062)	0.223
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.012	0.052	(-0.091, 0.115)	0.817
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (personal, binary)	0.007	0.036	(-0.066, 0.08)	0.855
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.067	0	(-0.067, -0.067)	0
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.295	0.164	(-0.623, 0.032)	0.076
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	0.154	0.194	(-0.423, 0.732)	0.478
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.01	0.051	(-0.111, 0.091)	0.85
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (personal, binary)	-0.028	0.04	(-0.107, 0.052)	0.488
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	0.029	0.037	(-0.044, 0.103)	0.429
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.071	0.078	(-0.301, 0.159)	0.422
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.006	0.073	(-0.15, 0.137)	0.933
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.003	0.063	(-0.13, 0.124)	0.963
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.04	0.041	(-0.042, 0.122)	0.335
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	-0.011	0.103	(-0.315, 0.294)	0.924
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	-0.007	0.044	(-0.093, 0.079)	0.876
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Armed Robbery (community, binary)	0.027	0.051	(-0.075, 0.129)	0.6
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	-0.059	0.053	(-0.217, 0.098)	0.334
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Aggravated assault (community, binary)	0.001	0.051	(-0.099, 0.102)	0.98
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.012	0.04	(-0.092, 0.068)	0.769
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	0.054	0.042	(-0.07, 0.178)	0.279
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Simple assault (community, binary)	-0.08	0.046	(-0.172, 0.012)	0.087
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.011	0.038	(-0.086, 0.065)	0.783
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	-0.048	0.059	(-0.226, 0.129)	0.47
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	0.008	0.082	(-0.153, 0.17)	0.92
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Sexual assault (community, binary)	0.023	0.064	(-0.106, 0.151)	0.723
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.022	0.041	(-0.06, 0.104)	0.589
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	-0.089	0.213	(-0.715, 0.537)	0.7
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	0.029	0.05	(-0.069, 0.128)	0.555
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Domestic abuse (physical) (community, binary)	-0.027	0.061	(-0.149, 0.095)	0.657
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.032	0.046	(-0.059, 0.123)	0.487
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	-0.036	0.061	(-0.215, 0.144)	0.593

Table SM8: Components Table for Secondary Hypotheses (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	0.089	0.135	(-0.178, 0.356)	0.51
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Murder (community, binary)	-0.05	0.088	(-0.226, 0.126)	0.572
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.023	0.164	(-0.314, 0.359)	0.892
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.013	0.048	(-0.083, 0.108)	0.792
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.325	0.413	(-0.905, 1.554)	0.483
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	0.066	0.073	(-0.079, 0.21)	0.37
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.013	0.018	(-0.049, 0.024)	0.488
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.121	0.05	(-0.266, 0.024)	0.08
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.078	0.049	(-0.176, 0.019)	0.114
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Non-violent crimes (community, binary)	-0.031	0.05	(-0.131, 0.069)	0.532
Colombia	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	0.043	0.051	(-0.059, 0.144)	0.405
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.147	0.061	(-0.32, 0.026)	0.077
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.086	0.049	(-0.184, 0.011)	0.083
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Burglary (community, binary)	-0.043	0.051	(-0.145, 0.06)	0.405
Brazil	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	4.22	22.144	(-41.08, 49.519)	0.85
Liberia	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.068	0.126	(-0.183, 0.319)	0.59
Pakistan	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.042	0.505	(-1.462, 1.545)	0.939
Philippines	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.014	0.061	(-0.107, 0.135)	0.816
Uganda	1a. (alt. iii)	Other non-violent crimes (community, binary)	0.058	0.04	(-0.023, 0.139)	0.157

H. Brazil study: First stage results

Table SM9: First stage results by endogenous variable

Group formed var.	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	Conf. Int.	F test statistic	F test p-value
Presence of meeting: June 2018	-0.005	0.128	0.968	(-0.267, 0.257)	0.002	0.968
Presence of meeting: Oct 2018	-0.025	0.139	0.856	(-0.310, 0.259)	0.033	0.855
Share of area under RdV: June 2018	0.015	0.054	0.781	(-0.095, 0.126)	0.079	0.779
Share of area under RdV: Oct 2018	0.043	0.055	0.444	(-0.070, 0.155)	0.603	0.438
Know about RdV	-0.015	0.055	0.793	(-0.127, 0.098)	0.070	0.791

I. Heterogeneous effects

I.1 Test for Heterogeneous effects

We conduct an F-test for equal variances between the treatment and control group (comparing the common treatment group to the control group) following Gerber and Green (*SM6*) (pg. 292-293) in each site for each of the eight primary outcomes. We provide a two-sided p-value for the null of no difference in variances (no effect heterogeneity) using randomization inference. We correct for multiple comparisons following the same Benjamini-Hochberg procedure used in the main results (“Adj. p-value” represents the corrected p-value).

Table SM10: Omnibus Heterogeneity Test (Test for Equal Variances)

Study	Measure	Ratio of variances	p-value	Adj. p-value
Brazil	Crime reporting idx.	1.465	0.253	0.506
Brazil	Crime victimization idx.	0.819	0.635	0.953
Brazil	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.833	1.000	1.000
Brazil	Police abuse idx.	32.527	0.111	0.333
Brazil	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.798	0.994	1.000
Brazil	Crime tips idx.	1.288	0.025	0.150
Colombia	Crime reporting idx.	1.087	0.241	0.581
Colombia	Crime victimization idx.	1.068	0.234	0.581
Colombia	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.977	0.702	0.831
Colombia	Police abuse idx.	0.361	0.824	0.831
Colombia	Police abuse reporting idx.	1.095	0.249	0.581
Colombia	Overall perceptions of police idx.	1.022	0.347	0.607
Colombia	Crime tips idx.	0.884	0.831	0.831
Liberia	Crime reporting idx.	1.144	0.095	0.430
Liberia	Crime victimization idx.	9.833	0.123	0.430
Liberia	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.041	0.251	0.439
Liberia	Police abuse idx.	0.880	0.698	0.814
Liberia	Police abuse reporting idx.	1.065	0.209	0.439
Liberia	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.971	0.657	0.814
Liberia	Crime tips idx.	0.844	0.880	0.880
Pakistan	Crime reporting idx.	0.601	0.914	0.949
Pakistan	Crime victimization idx.	1.230	0.195	0.682
Pakistan	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.144	0.110	0.682
Pakistan	Police abuse idx.	0.828	0.875	0.949
Pakistan	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.932	0.728	0.949
Pakistan	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.953	0.773	0.949
Pakistan	Crime tips idx.	0.758	0.949	0.949
Philippines	Crime reporting idx.	1.370	0.159	0.958
Philippines	Crime victimization idx.	0.698	0.785	0.958
Philippines	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.908	0.867	0.958
Philippines	Police abuse idx.	0.233	0.958	0.958
Philippines	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.891	0.698	0.958

Philippines	Overall perceptions of police idx.	1.010	0.422	0.958
Philippines	Crime tips idx.	0.880	0.729	0.958
Uganda	Crime reporting idx.	1.056	0.339	0.690
Uganda	Crime victimization idx.	1.032	0.436	0.690
Uganda	Perceived future insecurity idx.	1.082	0.137	0.480
Uganda	Police abuse idx.	1.254	0.493	0.690
Uganda	Police abuse reporting idx.	1.686	0.016	0.112
Uganda	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.888	0.995	0.995
Uganda	Crime tips idx.	0.962	0.705	0.823

I.2 Heterogeneous effects by crime victimization index (baseline)

Table SM11: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.084	0.104	(-0.289, 0.120)	0.419	0.864
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.018	0.114	(-0.242, 0.206)	0.875	0.958
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.025	0.100	(-0.171, 0.220)	0.805	0.909
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.136	0.078	(-0.289, 0.018)	0.083	0.579
4a	Crime reporting idx.	-0.110	0.102	(-0.311, 0.091)	0.284	0.864
4b	Crime tips idx.	0.008	0.095	(-0.179, 0.194)	0.935	0.962
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	0.081	0.124	(-0.163, 0.324)	0.516	0.864
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.097	0.100	(-0.292, 0.099)	0.332	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.081	0.368	(-0.641, 0.803)	0.826	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.016	0.095	(-0.170, 0.203)	0.863	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.095	0.075	(-0.052, 0.242)	0.205	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.062	0.113	(-0.284, 0.159)	0.580	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.162	0.175	(-0.180, 0.504)	0.353	
S2	Community trust	-0.063	0.089	(-0.236, 0.111)	0.480	

Table SM12: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.173	0.167	(-0.506, 0.159)	0.302	0.733
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.064	0.181	(-0.537, 0.408)	0.737	0.989
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	0.019	0.200	(-0.404, 0.442)	0.925	0.999
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.001	0.152	(-0.304, 0.305)	0.996	0.996
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.174	0.184	(-0.302, 0.650)	0.387	0.686
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.286	0.208	(-0.727, 0.155)	0.189	0.999
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.027	0.133	(-0.292, 0.238)	0.840	0.966
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.199	0.199	(-0.319, 0.717)	0.365	0.686
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.055	0.231	(-0.544, 0.435)	0.816	0.999
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	-0.202	0.085	(-0.372, -0.032)	0.021	0.291
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.002	0.170	(-0.446, 0.442)	0.989	0.989
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.006	0.217	(-0.454, 0.465)	0.980	0.999
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.272	0.162	(-0.595, 0.052)	0.098	0.549
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	-0.057	0.156	(-0.465, 0.351)	0.730	0.989
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.142	0.250	(-0.388, 0.672)	0.579	0.999
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.122	0.141	(-0.404, 0.161)	0.393	0.733
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	0.160	0.081	(-0.049, 0.369)	0.106	0.634
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.082	0.109	(-0.312, 0.149)	0.465	0.999
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.087	0.134	(-0.354, 0.180)	0.519	0.812
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.299	0.207	(-0.243, 0.840)	0.212	0.659
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.156	0.207	(-0.281, 0.594)	0.460	0.999

Table SM12: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.191	0.149	(-0.490, 0.107)	0.205	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.008	0.191	(-0.498, 0.482)	0.968	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.033	0.189	(-0.433, 0.367)	0.863	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.557	0.447	(-0.600, 1.714)	0.269	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.204	0.234	(-0.700, 0.292)	0.396	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.091	0.108	(-0.307, 0.125)	0.405	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.183	0.158	(-0.229, 0.595)	0.300	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.050	0.207	(-0.388, 0.487)	0.813	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.055	0.123	(-0.191, 0.302)	0.656	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.173	0.128	(-0.163, 0.510)	0.238	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.053	0.139	(-0.242, 0.347)	0.710	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.014	0.159	(-0.332, 0.304)	0.930	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.291	0.305	(-1.076, 0.493)	0.383	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.043	0.188	(-0.442, 0.356)	0.823	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.013	0.171	(-0.353, 0.328)	0.942	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.337	0.170	(-0.106, 0.779)	0.107	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.061	0.131	(-0.323, 0.201)	0.644	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.062	0.257	(-0.724, 0.600)	0.818	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	-0.064	0.136	(-0.352, 0.223)	0.641	

I.3 Heterogeneous effects by trust in police (baseline)

Table SM13: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	0.005	0.018	(-0.031, 0.041)	0.776	0.909
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.014	0.018	(-0.049, 0.021)	0.436	0.864
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	0.019	0.027	(-0.033, 0.071)	0.478	0.864
3b	Police abuse idx.	0.018	0.029	(-0.039, 0.074)	0.543	0.864
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.042	0.023	(-0.002, 0.086)	0.064	0.579
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.018	0.018	(-0.054, 0.017)	0.317	0.864
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.041	0.047	(-0.132, 0.051)	0.383	0.864
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	0.017	0.021	(-0.024, 0.058)	0.420	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	0.007	0.027	(-0.046, 0.060)	0.790	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.007	0.021	(-0.035, 0.048)	0.752	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.013	0.020	(-0.052, 0.026)	0.507	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.013	0.023	(-0.058, 0.032)	0.571	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.051	0.051	(-0.152, 0.049)	0.315	
S2	Community trust	-0.012	0.043	(-0.097, 0.073)	0.782	

Table SM14: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.047	(-0.105, 0.081)	0.802	0.966
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	0.005	0.034	(-0.107, 0.118)	0.887	0.989
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	0.010	0.024	(-0.039, 0.058)	0.691	0.999
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.051	0.054	(-0.159, 0.056)	0.343	0.733
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.052	0.048	(-0.196, 0.092)	0.352	0.686
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.002	0.020	(-0.041, 0.037)	0.933	0.999
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.059	0.044	(-0.030, 0.147)	0.191	0.733
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.044	0.112	(-0.322, 0.411)	0.722	0.989
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.003	0.029	(-0.062, 0.055)	0.912	0.999
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.028	0.070	(-0.110, 0.167)	0.688	0.963
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	0.025	0.084	(-0.251, 0.300)	0.791	0.989
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	0.014	0.034	(-0.054, 0.082)	0.686	0.999
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.026	0.048	(-0.121, 0.069)	0.584	0.86
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.047	0.038	(-0.076, 0.170)	0.303	0.686
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.064	0.026	(0.013, 0.115)	0.015	0.547
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.008	0.048	(-0.104, 0.087)	0.863	0.966
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	0.004	0.037	(-0.119, 0.126)	0.928	0.989
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	-0.029	0.023	(-0.075, 0.017)	0.215	0.999
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.127	0.042	(-0.211, -0.043)	0.003	0.098
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.004	0.068	(-0.218, 0.226)	0.957	0.989
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.007	0.031	(-0.054, 0.069)	0.813	0.999

Table SM14: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.016	0.052	(-0.086, 0.119)	0.751	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.011	0.060	(-0.207, 0.186)	0.871	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.022	0.025	(-0.028, 0.072)	0.383	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.030	0.060	(-0.165, 0.224)	0.656	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.001	0.030	(-0.059, 0.062)	0.962	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.007	0.034	(-0.075, 0.060)	0.828	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.068	0.050	(-0.095, 0.230)	0.270	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.006	0.031	(-0.068, 0.057)	0.855	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.000	0.045	(-0.089, 0.089)	0.996	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.017	0.049	(-0.180, 0.147)	0.759	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.016	0.025	(-0.065, 0.033)	0.516	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.015	0.055	(-0.095, 0.124)	0.788	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.235	0.133	(-0.672, 0.203)	0.181	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.011	0.025	(-0.062, 0.040)	0.676	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.052	0.060	(-0.171, 0.067)	0.387	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	-0.050	0.099	(-0.365, 0.266)	0.649	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.067	0.048	(-0.163, 0.030)	0.173	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	-0.079	0.198	(-0.717, 0.559)	0.717	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.029	0.024	(-0.020, 0.077)	0.245	

I.4 Heterogeneous effects by community trust (baseline)

Table SM15: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.041	0.025	(-0.091, 0.008)	0.099	0.579
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	0.010	0.025	(-0.039, 0.058)	0.689	0.909
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-0.045	0.070	(-0.182, 0.093)	0.526	0.864
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.028	0.029	(-0.085, 0.029)	0.329	0.864
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.045	0.022	(0.001, 0.088)	0.043	0.579
4b	Crime tips idx.	0.001	0.026	(-0.051, 0.053)	0.963	0.963
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.012	0.033	(-0.078, 0.053)	0.712	0.909
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.013	0.029	(-0.070, 0.043)	0.639	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.038	0.068	(-0.172, 0.095)	0.575	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.008	0.021	(-0.033, 0.048)	0.714	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	-0.008	0.030	(-0.066, 0.050)	0.791	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.019	0.028	(-0.036, 0.074)	0.490	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.032	0.023	(-0.013, 0.077)	0.165	
S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.853	

Table SM16: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.039	0.044	(-0.126, 0.048)	0.374	0.733
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.104	0.053	(-0.319, 0.111)	0.181	0.634
Uganda	1a	Crime victimization	-0.012	0.037	(-0.087, 0.063)	0.756	0.999
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.039	0.041	(-0.043, 0.121)	0.349	0.733
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.048	0.042	(-0.212, 0.116)	0.364	0.686
Uganda	1b	Perceived future insecurity	0.028	0.032	(-0.036, 0.093)	0.383	0.999
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.050	0.040	(-0.030, 0.130)	0.219	0.733
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.198	0.065	(-0.460, 0.064)	0.085	0.634
Uganda	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.010	0.036	(-0.083, 0.063)	0.782	0.999
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.003	0.039	(-0.075, 0.081)	0.934	0.975
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.061	0.057	(-0.286, 0.165)	0.392	0.686
Uganda	3b	Police abuse	-0.075	0.066	(-0.206, 0.056)	0.260	0.999
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	0.008	0.044	(-0.080, 0.096)	0.860	0.966
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.066	0.030	(-0.055, 0.187)	0.150	0.634
Uganda	4a	Crime reporting	0.033	0.049	(-0.065, 0.131)	0.506	0.999
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	-0.008	0.043	(-0.094, 0.078)	0.855	0.966
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.014	0.055	(-0.237, 0.210)	0.825	0.989
Uganda	4b	Crime tips	0.018	0.042	(-0.065, 0.102)	0.662	0.999
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.066	0.038	(-0.142, 0.010)	0.088	0.549
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.054	0.067	(-0.207, 0.316)	0.494	0.814
Uganda	4c	Police abuse reporting	0.009	0.039	(-0.067, 0.086)	0.806	0.999

Table SM16: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.005	0.049	(-0.093, 0.102)	0.925	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.071	0.064	(-0.330, 0.188)	0.376	
Uganda	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.002	0.042	(-0.086, 0.083)	0.970	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	0.037	0.068	(-0.220, 0.294)	0.630	
Uganda	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.100	0.052	(-0.203, 0.003)	0.057	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.009	0.029	(-0.066, 0.049)	0.765	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.049	0.038	(-0.099, 0.197)	0.317	
Uganda	M1c	Cooperation norms	-0.011	0.046	(-0.102, 0.080)	0.810	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.021	0.045	(-0.068, 0.111)	0.636	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.021	0.120	(-0.464, 0.507)	0.875	
Uganda	M2a	Perceived police capacity	-0.036	0.042	(-0.119, 0.047)	0.387	
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	-0.001	0.045	(-0.091, 0.089)	0.988	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.040	0.077	(-0.273, 0.354)	0.648	
Uganda	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.029	0.040	(-0.051, 0.109)	0.471	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.013	0.045	(-0.076, 0.103)	0.768	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.039	0.027	(-0.070, 0.147)	0.279	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.854	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.977	
Uganda	S2	Community trust	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.952	

I.5 Heterogeneous effects by perceived state legitimacy baseline)

Table SM17: Results Table for heterogenous effects for meta-estimates

Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
1a	Crime victimization idx.	-0.067	0.045	(-0.156, 0.022)	0.142	0.708
1b	Perceived future insecurity idx.	-0.027	0.033	(-0.091, 0.038)	0.416	0.864
2	Overall perceptions of police idx.	-0.105	0.172	(-0.442, 0.233)	0.543	0.864
3b	Police abuse idx.	-0.027	0.070	(-0.164, 0.111)	0.703	0.909
4a	Crime reporting idx.	0.017	0.067	(-0.115, 0.149)	0.800	0.909
4b	Crime tips idx.	-0.038	0.043	(-0.122, 0.046)	0.374	0.864
4c	Police abuse reporting idx.	-0.042	0.023	(-0.086, 0.003)	0.067	0.579
M1a	Perceived police intentions idx.	-0.004	0.036	(-0.075, 0.067)	0.916	
M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice idx.	-0.029	0.171	(-0.364, 0.306)	0.865	
M1c	Cooperation norms idx.	0.001	0.026	(-0.050, 0.052)	0.974	
M2a	Perceived police capacity idx.	0.042	0.033	(-0.024, 0.107)	0.211	
M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.029	0.039	(-0.047, 0.105)	0.448	
S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.797	
S2	Community trust	-0.007	0.035	(-0.075, 0.062)	0.851	

Table SM18: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	1a	Crime victimization	-0.037	0.037	(-0.111, 0.037)	0.321	0.733
Pakistan	1a	Crime victimization	-0.136	0.073	(-0.382, 0.110)	0.168	0.634
Colombia	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.027	0.033	(-0.093, 0.039)	0.425	0.743
Pakistan	1b	Perceived future insecurity	-0.026	0.181	(-0.619, 0.568)	0.896	0.989
Colombia	2	Overall perceptions of police	0.034	0.033	(-0.032, 0.100)	0.310	0.733
Pakistan	2	Overall perceptions of police	-0.318	0.166	(-0.868, 0.232)	0.157	0.634
Colombia	3b	Police abuse	0.028	0.044	(-0.059, 0.116)	0.522	0.812
Pakistan	3b	Police abuse	-0.116	0.083	(-0.393, 0.161)	0.264	0.686
Colombia	4a	Crime reporting	-0.048	0.038	(-0.123, 0.026)	0.201	0.733
Pakistan	4a	Crime reporting	0.087	0.045	(-0.064, 0.237)	0.157	0.634
Colombia	4b	Crime tips	0.003	0.037	(-0.070, 0.075)	0.940	0.975
Pakistan	4b	Crime tips	-0.083	0.041	(-0.221, 0.054)	0.144	0.634
Colombia	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.052	0.026	(-0.105, 0.000)	0.050	0.471
Pakistan	4c	Police abuse reporting	-0.012	0.044	(-0.156, 0.132)	0.808	0.989
Colombia	M1a	Perceived police intentions	0.004	0.038	(-0.072, 0.080)	0.909	
Pakistan	M1a	Perceived police intentions	-0.074	0.112	(-0.450, 0.303)	0.560	
Pakistan	M1b	Knowledge of criminal justice	-0.029	0.171	(-0.590, 0.532)	0.876	
Colombia	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.000	0.026	(-0.052, 0.052)	0.996	
Pakistan	M1c	Cooperation norms	0.020	0.138	(-0.444, 0.485)	0.893	
Colombia	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.038	0.040	(-0.041, 0.117)	0.345	
Pakistan	M2a	Perceived police capacity	0.050	0.060	(-0.152, 0.252)	0.472	

Table SM18: Results Table for heterogenous effects for study-estimates (*continued*)

Study	Hyp.	Measure	Estimate	S.E.	Conf. Int.	p-value	Adj. p-value
Colombia	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.025	0.039	(-0.053, 0.103)	0.523	
Pakistan	M2b	Perceived police responsiveness	0.135	0.200	(-0.544, 0.813)	0.553	
Colombia	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.782	
Pakistan	S1	Perceived state legitimacy	0.000	0.000	(-0.000, 0.000)	0.987	
Colombia	S2	Community trust	-0.014	0.031	(-0.075, 0.048)	0.657	
Pakistan	S2	Community trust	0.160	0.169	(-0.394, 0.714)	0.418	

J. Measurement instrument

Table SM19: Variable Coding and Survey Questionnaire

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 1: SECURITY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY				
1a. Negative effect on incidence of crime				
armedrob_num ²⁶	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of any ARMED ROBBERY? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ²⁷			
armedrob_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if armedrob_num > 0; 0 if armedrob_num = 0	Citizen survey
burglary_num ²⁸	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ²⁹	Freeform		

²⁶Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

²⁷Blair et al. (2017).

²⁸Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

²⁹Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
burglary_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if burglary_num > 0; 0 if burglary_num = 0	Citizen survey
simpleassault_num ³⁰	In the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITHOUT a weapon? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ³¹	Freeform		Citizen survey
simpleassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if simpleassault_num > 0; 0 if simpleassault_num = 0	Citizen survey
aggassault_num ³²	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITH A WEAPON? (INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey

³⁰Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

³¹Blair et al. (2017).

³²Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
sexual_num ³³	In the past 6 months, have you or any member of your household been a victim of SEXUAL ABUSE OR RAPE? (INCLUDING RAPE) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
domestic_phys_num ³⁴	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, has anyone in your household ever PHYSICALLY ABUSED you? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) (IF YES:) How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
domestic_verbal_nur	Besides any physical abuse, in the past 6 months, has anyone in your household ever VERBALLY ABUSED you? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, THREATS OF ABUSE, ETC.]	Numeric		Citizen survey

³³Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

³⁴Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

³⁵Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.	Freeform		Citizen survey
land_any ³⁶	In the past 6 months, did you or a member of your household have a LAND DISPUTE over your house land or farm land? This include disputes that ended in the past 6 months or disputes that are still ongoing up to now. [IF YES:] Was there any violence or property destruction due to this dispute?	Numeric		Citizen survey
other_any ³⁷	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
	[IF YES:] What was the crime?	Freeform		Citizen survey
other_any_violent	Coded as other_any if other_any is a violent crime	Freeform		Citizen survey
other_any_nonviolent	Coded as other_any if other_any is a non-violent crime	Freeform		Citizen survey
violentcrime_num			Sum of armedrob_num, simpleassault_num, other_any_violent	Citizen survey

³⁶Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

³⁷Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
nonviolentcrime_nur			Sum of burglary_num, other_any_nonviol	Citizen survey
violentcrime_num_e			Sum of armedrob_num, aggassault_num, sexual_num, domestic_phys_num, simpleassault_num, other_any_violent	Citizen survey
nonviolentcrime_nur			Sum of burglary_num, domestic_verbal_n land_any, other_any_nonviol	Citizen survey
violentcrime_bin			Sum of armedrob_bin, simpleassault_bin, other_any_violent	Citizen survey
nonviolentcrime_bir			Sum of burglary_bin, other_any_nonviol	Citizen survey

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	Now I want to ask you some questions about different types of crimes that may have happened to SOMEONE ELSE IN THIS COMMUNITY. This can include your neighbors, friends, relatives, or any other person you know that's living IN THIS COMMUNITY. ³⁸			
carmedrob_num ³⁹	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of ARMED ROBBERY? (ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] As far as you know, how many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			Citizen survey
carmedrob_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if carmedrob_num > 0; 0 if carmedrob_num = 0	Citizen survey

³⁸Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

³⁹Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cburglary_num ⁴⁰	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? (ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON)) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ⁴¹			
cburglary_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if cburglary_num > 0; 0 if cburglary_num = 0	Citizen survey
caggassault_num ⁴²	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITH A WEAPON? (INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ⁴³			

⁴⁰Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

⁴¹Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

⁴²Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

⁴³Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
caggassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if caggassault_num > 0; 0 if caggassault_num = 0	Citizen survey
csimpleassault_num ⁴⁴	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITHOUT a weapon? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ⁴⁵			
csimpleassault_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if csimpleassault_nur > 0; 0 if csimpleassault_nur = 0	Citizen survey
csexual_num ⁴⁶	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community SEXUALLY ABUSED? (INCLUDING RAPE) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			

⁴⁴Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

⁴⁵Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

⁴⁶Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
csexual_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if csexual_num > 0; 0 if csexual_num = 0	Citizen survey
cdomestic_phys_num ⁴⁷	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community PHYSICALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			
cdomestic_phys_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if cdomestic_phys_nur > 0; 0 if cdomestic_phys_nur = 0	Citizen survey
cmurder_num ⁴⁸	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community MURDERED? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times; 97-Do not know		Citizen survey

⁴⁷Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

⁴⁸Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident.			
cmurder_bin		Numeric	Recoded 1 if cmurder_num > 0; 0 if cmurder_num = 0	Citizen survey
cland_any	In the past 6 months, did anyone you know in this community have a LAND DISPUTE over their house land or farm land? This includes disputes that ended in the past 6 months or disputes that are still ongoing up to now.	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
cdomestic_verbal_ar	Besides any physical abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community been VERBALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, THREATS OF ABUSE, ETC.]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
cmob_num ⁴⁹	In the past 6 months, were there any incidents of MOB JUSTICE in this community (i.e. beating of flogging of someone suspected of committing a crime)? [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	1-Once; 2-Two to three times; 3-Four to five times; 4-Six to ten times; 5-More than ten times		Citizen survey

⁴⁹Collected in Colombia as a binary response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cother_any ⁵⁰	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
	[IF YES:] What was the crime?	Freeform	To be added to the relevant dummies and indices, depending on whether the crime is violent or non-violent	Citizen survey
cother_any_violent	Coded as cother_any if cother_any is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			
cother_any_nonviolent	Coded as cother_any if cother_any is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for non-violent crimes)			
cviolentcrime_num			Sum of carmedrob_num, caggassault_num, csimpleassault_nur csexual_num, cdomestic_phys_nur cmurder_num, cother_any_violent	

⁵⁰Only collected at endline in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cnonviolentcrime_num			Sum of cburglary_num, cother_any_nonvioi	
cviolentcrime_num			Sum of carmedrob_num, caggassault_num, csimpleassault_nur csexual_num, cdomestic_phys_nur cmurder_num, cmob_num, cother_any_violent	
cnonviolentcrime_bin			Sum of cburglary_num, cland_any, cdomestic_verbal_r cother_any_nonvioi	
cviolentcrime_bin			Sum of carmedrob_bin, caggassault_bin, csimpleassault_bin csexual_bin, cdomestic_phys_bin cmurder_bin, cother_any_violent	
cnonviolentcrime_bin			Sum of cburglary_bin, cother_any_nonvioi	

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
crime_victim_idx			Index of violentcrime_num, nonviolentcrime_nu cviolentcrime_num, cnonviolentcrime_r	
crime_victim_idx_e			Index of violentcrime_num_e nonviolentcrime_nu cviolentcrime_num_ cnonviolentcrime_r	
crime_victim_idx_bi			Index of violentcrime_bin, nonviolentcrime_b cviolentcrime_bin, cnonviolentcrime_b	
aarmedrob_num	Number of reports of armed robbery in community in past 6 months			Administra- tive
aburglary_num	Number of reports of burglary or theft in community in past 6 months			Administra- tive
aaggassault_num	Number of reports of aggravated assault in community in past 6 months			Administra- tive
asimpleassault_num	Number of reports of simple assault in community in past 6 months			Administra- tive
asexual_num	Number of reports of sexual abuse in community in past 6 months			Administra- tive

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
adomestic_phys_num	Number of reports of domestic violence (physical) in community in past 6 months			Administrative
adomestic_verbal_num	Number of reports of domestic violence (verbal) in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aland_num	Number of reports of land disputes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aland_violent_num	Number of reports of violent land disputes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
amob_num	Number of reports of mob justice in community in past 6 months			Administrative
ariot_num	Number of reports of riots in community in past 6 months			Administrative
amurder_num	Number of reports of murder in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aother_num	Number of reports of other crimes in community in past 6 months			Administrative
aother_num_violent	Coded as aother_num if aother_num is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			Administrative
aother_num_nonviolent	Coded as aother_num if aother_num is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)			Administrative

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
aviolentcrime_num	Sum of aarmedrob_num, aaggassault_num, asimpleassault_num, asexual_num, adomestic_phys_num, amurder_num, aother_num_violent			
anonviolentcrime_num	Sum of aburglary_num, aother_num_nonviolent			
1b. Positive effect on perceptions of safety (personal, land, and possessions)				
fear_violent ⁵¹	How worried are you that you or a member of your household will be the victim of a VIOLENT CRIME in the coming year? [INCLUDING ARMED ROBBERY, ASSAULT WITH A WEAPON, ASSAULT WITHOUT A WEAPON, ETC.]	0-Not at all worried; 1-Somewhat worried; 2-Worried; 3-Very worried		Citizen survey
fear_nonviolent ⁵²	How worried are you that you or a member of your household will be the victim of a NON-VIOLENT CRIME in the coming year? [INCLUDING BURGLARY, THEFT, ETC.]	0-Not at all worried; 1-Somewhat worried; 2-Worried; 3-Very worried		Citizen survey
feared_walk ⁵³	In the past 6 months, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family felt unsafe walking in your neighborhood?	0-Never; 1-Just once or twice; 2-Several times; 3-Many times; 4-Always		Citizen survey

⁵¹Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017)

⁵²Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017); Not collected for Colombia.

⁵³Adapted from Afrobarometer (2016).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
future_insecurity_i			Index of fear_violent, fear_nonviolent, feared_walk	Citizen survey
PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 2: CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF THE POLICE				
2. Positive effect on citizen perceptions of police				
satis_trust ⁵⁴	I generally trust the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
satis_general ⁵⁵	I am satisfied with the service that the police provide. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
satis_idx			Index of satis_trust and satis_general	Citizen survey
PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 3: POLICE PERCEPTIONS OF AND BEHAVIORS TOWARD CITIZENS				
3a. Positive effect on perceptions of police empathy, accountability, and abuse and corruption concerns				
empathy_complaints ⁵	When people complain about the police, they usually have a good reason. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

⁵⁴The question text and responses recorded for Colombia are as follows: "How much do you trust the following institutions or groups? National Police of Colombia." 1-do not trust at all; 2-trust very little; 3-trust somewhat; 4-trust a lot

⁵⁵Not collected for Colombia at baseline.

⁵⁶In Uganda the category "3-Strongly agree" was not measured for some respondents.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
empathy_reports	Most things that people report to the police are worth taking seriously. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
empathy_idx			Index of empathy_complaints; empathy_reports	
account_pol_matter	The police leadership takes citizen complaints about officers seriously. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_punis	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_repor	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer; 99-other		Officer survey
hypothetical2_repor	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

⁵⁷This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical3_punis	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_repoi	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_repoi	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical5_punis	If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WILL follow?	0-None; 1-Verbal reprimand; 2-Written reprimand; 3-Period of suspension without pay; 4-Demotion in rank; 5-Dismissal; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical5_repoi	Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

⁵⁸This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

⁵⁹This was collected in Uganda as a multiple response item.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical5_repor	Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?	0-Definitely not; 1-Probably not; 2-Probably yes; 3-Definitely yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
accountability_idx			Index of account_pol_matter hypothetical2_pun: hypothetical2_repe hypothetical2_repe hypothetical3_pun: hypothetical3_repe hypothetical3_repe hypothetical5_pun: hypothetical5_repe hypothetical5_repe	
hypothetical5_abuse	Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical5_abuse	Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
abuse_idx			Index of hypothetical5_abuse hypothetical5_abuse	
hypothetical2_corrupt	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical2_corrupt	A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him. Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
hypothetical3_corrupt_idx	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. Do you consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
hypothetical3_corrupt_idx	A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation. Do MOST POLICE OFFICERS consider this behavior to be serious misconduct?	0-Not at all serious; 1-Somewhat serious; 2-Serious; 3-Very serious; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Officer survey
corrupt_idx			Index of hypothetical2_corrupt_idx, hypothetical2_corrupt_idx, hypothetical3_corrupt_idx, hypothetical3_corrupt_idx	
officer_attitude_idx			Index of corrupt_idx, abuse_idx, accountability_idx, empathy_idx	
3a. Negative effect reporting of police abuse and bribery				

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policeabuse_phys_ar	In the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers PHYSICALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.]	0-No; 1-Yes; 97- Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
policeabuse_verbal_	Besides any incidents of physical abuse, in the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers VERBALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, ETC.] This includes verbal abuse against you or someone in your family.	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
policeabuse_any			Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_ = 0 and policeabuse_phys_ar = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_ = 1 or policeabuse_phys_ar = 1	

⁶⁰Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

⁶¹Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policeabuse_phys_n	In the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers PHYSICALLY ABUSING people from your community? (INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.) [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ⁶³			
policeabuse_verbal_n	Besides any incidents of physical abuse, in the past 6 months, have you ever witnessed or heard about police officers VERBALLY ABUSING people from your community? [INCLUDING SHOUTING, CUSSING, ETC.] This includes verbal abuse against you or someone in your family. [IF YES:] How many times did this happen in the past 6 months?	Numeric		Citizen survey

⁶²Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in Colombia.

⁶³Blair et al. (2017).

⁶⁴Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in Colombia.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	[IF MORE THAN 1:] I want to ask about the MOST RECENT incident. ⁶⁵			
policeabuse_num			Sum of number of incidents of verbal (policeabuse_verbal) or physical abuse (policeabuse_phys_) by police officers in the past 6 months	
policeabuse_verbal_	To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-No; 1-Community leaders; 2-Police station or police commander; 3-Any other government agency; 4-NGO; 5-Journalist; 6-[OTHER COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VENUES]; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal_ = 0 or policeabuse_verbal_ = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal_ > 0 and policeabuse_verbal_ = 2	Citizen survey
policeabuse_phys_re	To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-No; 1-Community leaders; 2-Police station or police commander; 3-Any other government agency; 4-NGO; 5-Journalist; 6-[OTHER COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VENUES]; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded 0 if policeabuse_phys_1 = 0 or policeabuse_phys_1 = 0; 1 if policeabuse_phys_1 > 0 and policeabuse_phys_1 = 2	Citizen survey

⁶⁵Blair et al. (2017).

⁶⁶Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policeabuse_report			Recoded 0 if policeabuse_verbal = 0 and policeabuse_physic = 0; 1 if policeabuse_verbal > 0 or policeabuse_physic > 0	
bribe_freq ⁶⁷	How many times in the past 6 months have you made an unofficial payment to the police?	1-None; 2-Once; 3-Between 2 and 5 times; 4-More than 5 times; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	Categorical variable for frequency of unofficial payments to the police in the past 6 months	Citizen survey
bribe_amt ⁶⁸	[IF ANY:] The last time you made an unofficial payment to the police, how much was it? ⁶⁹	Numeric	Recoded bribe_amt = 0 if bribe_freq == 0	Citizen survey
police_abuse_idx			Index of policeabuse_any, policeabuse_num, bribe_freq, bribe_amt	

PRIMARY OUTCOME FAMILY 4: BEHAVIORAL COOPERATION OF CITIZENS WITH THE POLICE

4a. Positive effect on reporting of crime victimization

⁶⁷Adapted from Cheema et al. (2017); Not collected for Colombia at baseline.

⁶⁸Not collected for Colombia at baseline. For the variable bribe_amt, we replace to 0 for any observations where bribe_freq = 0. We mistakenly did not include this rule in the PAP as we did for other similar

⁶⁹We standardize the amount for bribes to be in USD for exchange rates at November 1st, 2019.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
acrime_hline	Total number of reports of crimes to hotline			Administrative
aviolent_hline	Number of reports of violent crimes to hotline			Administrative
anonviolent_hline	Number of reports of non-violent crimes to hotline			Administrative
acrime_station	Total number of reports of crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
aviolent_station	Number of reports of violent crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
anonviolent_station	Number of reports of non-violent crimes to nearest police station			Administrative
aburglary_hline	Number of reports of burglary to hotline			Administrative
aarmedrob_hline	Number of reports of armed robbery to hotline			Administrative
arape_hline	Number of reports of rape to hotline			Administrative
amurder_hline	Number of reports of murder to hotline			Administrative
asimpleassault_hline	Number of reports of simple assault to hotline			Administrative
aaggassault_hline	Number of reports of aggravated assault to hotline			Administrative
atheft_hline	Number of reports of theft to hotline			Administrative

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
aburglary_station	Number of reports of burglary to nearest police station			Administrative
aarmedrob_station	Number of reports of armed robbery to nearest police station			Administrative
arape_station	Number of reports of rape to nearest police station			Administrative
amurder_station	Number of reports of murder to nearest police station			Administrative
asimpleassault_stat	Number of reports of simple assault to nearest police station			Administrative
aaggassault_station	Number of reports of aggravated assault to nearest police station			Administrative
atheft_station	Number of reports of theft to nearest police station			Administrative
<i>Actual crime (survey)</i>				
armedrob_report ⁷⁰	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of any ARMED ROBBERY? (ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.) Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other; 98-Refuse to Answer	Recoded 0 if armedrob_num = 0 or armedrob_report = 0; 1 if armedrob_num > 0 and armedrob_report = 1	Citizen survey

⁷⁰Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
burglary_report ⁷¹	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household the victim of BURGLARY or THEFT? [ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON]. Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if burglary_num = 0 or burglary_report = 0; 1 if burglary_num > 0 and burglary_report = 1	Citizen survey
simpleassault_report ⁷²	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, has anyone attacked you or any member of your household WITH A WEAPON? [INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if simpleassault_num = 0 or simpleassault_report = 0; 1 if simpleassault_num > 0 and simpleassault_report = 1	Citizen survey
other_report ⁷³	In the past 6 months, were you or any member of your household a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already? Where did you report this case? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if other_num = 0 or other_report = 0; 1 if other_num > 0 and other_report = 1	Citizen survey

⁷¹Blair et al. (2017).

⁷²Blair et al. (2017).

⁷³Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
other_report_violent			Coded as other_report if other_any is a violent crime	
other_report_nonviolent			Coded as other_report if other_any is a non-violent crime	
violentcrime_report			Sum of armedrob_report, simpleassault_report, other_report_violent	
nonviolentcrime_report			Sum of burglary_report, other_report_nonviolent	
carmedrob_report ⁷⁴	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of ARMED ROBBERY and [ROBBERY WITH ANY KIND OF WEAPON, INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if carmedrob_num = 0 or carmedrob_report = 0; 1 if carmedrob_num > 0 and carmedrob_report = 1	Citizen survey

⁷⁴Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cburglary_report ⁷⁵	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of BURGLARY or THEFT and [ROBBERY WITHOUT WEAPON] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cburglary_num = 0 or cburglary_report = 0; 1 if cburglary_num > 0 and cburglary_report = 1	Citizen survey
caggassault_report ⁷⁶	Besides any armed robbery, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITH A WEAPON and [INCLUDING GUNS, CUTLASSES, STICKS, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if caggassault_num = 0 or caggassault_report = 0; 1 if caggassault_num > 0 and caggassault_report = 1	Citizen survey
csimpleassault_report ⁷⁷	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community attacked WITHOUT a weapon and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if csimpleassault_num = 0 or csimpleassault_report = 0; 1 if csimpleassault_num > 0 and csimpleassault_report = 1	Citizen survey

⁷⁵Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

⁷⁶Adapted from Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

⁷⁷Adapted from Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
csexual_report	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community SEXUALLY ABUSED? [INCLUDING RAPE] and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if csexual_num = 0 or csexual_report = 0; 1 if csexual_num > 0 and csexual_report = 1	Citizen survey
cdomestic_phys_report	Besides any sexual abuse, in the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community PHYSICALLY ABUSED by someone in their own household and [INCLUDING PUSHING, SLAPPING, PUNCHING, KICKING, CHOKING, ETC.] to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cdomestic_phys_num = 0 or cdomestic_phys_report = 0; 1 if cdomestic_phys_num > 0 and cdomestic_phys_report = 1	Citizen survey
cmurder_report ⁷⁸	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community MURDERED and to the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cmurder_num = 0 or cmurder_report = 0; 1 if cmurder_num > 0 and cmurder_report = 1	Citizen survey

⁷⁸Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
cother_report ⁷⁹	In the past 6 months, was anyone you know in this community a victim of any OTHER CRIME that we haven't mentioned already? To the best of your knowledge, was this incident reported to anyone? [SELECT ALL THAT APPLY]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 88-Other	Recoded 0 if cother_num = 0 or cother_report = 0; 1 if cother_num > 0 and cother_report = 1	Citizen survey
cother_report_violent	Coded as cother_report if cother_any is a violent crime (see general coding rule for violent crimes)		Recoded such that a zero represents either that the person responded that the community did not experience any other violent crimes or they did not report the crime. E.g., 0 if cother_num_violent = 0 or cother_report_violent = 0; 1 if cother_num_violent > 0 and cother_report_violent = 1	

⁷⁹Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	Question text	Response options	Variable construction	Data Source
cother_report_nonv	Coded as cother_report if cother_any is a non-violent crime (see general coding rule for non-violent crimes)		Recoded such that a zero represents either that the person responded that the community did not experience any other non-violent crimes or they did not report the crime. E.g., 0 if cother_num_nonvio: = 0 or cother_report_nonv = 0; 1 if cother_num_nonvio: > 0 and cother_report_nonv = 1	
cviolentcrime_repor			Sum of carmedrob_report, caggassault_report, csimpleassault_re, csexual_report, cdomestic_phys_re, cmurder_report, cother_report_vio:	
cnonviolentcrime_re			Sum of cburglary_report, cother_report_nonv	
Hypothetical crime (survey)				

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
	There are many places you can go to solve your crime here in [COUNTRY]. We got the POLICE, community leaders, [COUNTRY SPECIFIC FORUM 1], and [COUNTRY SPECIFIC FORUM 2]. Now I want to ask about what you think should happen for different types of crime that might happen in your community.⁸⁰			
burglaryres ⁸¹	If there's a BURGLARY in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-[Town chief or elders]; 4-[Community watch group]; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that burglaryres = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; burglaryres = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey

⁸⁰Blair et al. (2017).

⁸¹Blair et al. (2017); Only collected at endline in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
dviolres ⁸²	If a MAN BEAT HIS WOMAN in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that dviolres = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; dviolres = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey
armedrobres ⁸³	If there's an ARMED ROBBERY in your community, who you would most like to resolve the situation? [DO NOT READ OPTIONS]	0-Nowhere; 1-Police; 2-Court; 3-Town chief or elders; 4-Community watch group; 5-Settled directly with the perpetrator; 6-Other country specific forum1; 7-Other country-specific forum2; 8-Other country specific forum3; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer	Recoded such that armedrobres = 1 if respondent prefers the police or courts to resolve the situation; armedrobres = 0 if otherwise.	Citizen survey
crimeres_idx			Index of burglaryres, dviolres, and armedrobres	Citizen survey

⁸²Blair et al. (2017).

⁸³Blair et al. (2017); Not collected in the Colombia study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
crime_reporting_idx			Index of violentcrime_repor nonviolentcrime_re cviolentcrime_repor cnonviolentcrime_ crimeres_idx	Citizen survey
4b. Positive effect on reporting of crime prevention tips⁸⁴				
atips_hline ⁸⁵	Number of crime prevention tips reported via hotline (if available in both T and C locations)		Number of crime prevention tips reported	Administra- tive
atips_box ⁸⁶	ADMIN: Number of crime prevention tips reported via comment boxes (if available in both T and C locations)		Number of crime prevention tips reported	Administra- tive
contact_pol_susp_ac	In the past 6 months, have you ever contacted the police to alert them to suspicious or criminal activity in your community?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
give_info_pol_inves	In the past 6 months, have you ever given information to the police to assist with an investigation?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
crime_tips_idx			Index of contact_pol_susp_ac and give_info_pol_inves	

⁸⁴Not collected for Philippines.

⁸⁵Not collected in Liberia.

⁸⁶Not collected in Liberia or the Philippines.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
tips_idx			Index of atips_hline, atips_box, crime_tips_idx	
4c. Positive effect on reporting of victimization by the police				
apolvtm_hline	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported via hotline (if available in both T and C locations)			Administrative
apolvtm_cmtbox ⁸⁷	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported via comment boxes (if available in both T and C locations)			Administrative
apolvtm_station ⁸⁸	Number of incidents of victimization by the police reported to nearest station			Administrative
	See Section 3a.i. Incidence of victimization by police on reporting of police abuse.			Administrative
<i>Reporting of victimization by the police (hypothetical)</i>				
dutydrink_report ⁸⁹	Suppose you see a uniformed police officer drinking alcohol in your community. How likely would you be to report that situation?	1-Very unlikely; 2-Unlikely; 3-Likely; 4-Very likely; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

⁸⁷Not collected in Liberia or the Philippines.

⁸⁸Only collected for Uganda.

⁸⁹Not collected in Colombia, because officers often wear uniforms off-duty so distinguishing on-duty drinking is difficult.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
policebeating_report	Suppose you see a group of officers unjustifiably beating someone in your community. How likely would you be to report that situation?	1-Very unlikely; 2-Unlikely; 3-Likely; 4-Very likely; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
police_abuse_report			Index of dutydrink_report, policebeating_report, policeabuse_report, apolvtm_hline, apolvtm_cmtbox, apolvtm_station	
MECHANISM FAMILY 1: PERCEIVED COST TO CITIZENS COOPERATING WITH THE POLICE				
M1a. Positive effect on beliefs about police intentions				
<i>Perceptions of police intentions (case management)</i>				
	Imagine someone is a VICTIM of an armed robbery in your community and they take the case to the POLICE. I want to ask you what you think will happen.			
polcaseserious ⁹⁰	The police will take the case seriously and investigate. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

⁹⁰Responses in Pakistan followed a different coding scheme.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
polcasefair ⁹¹	The police will be fair to both complainant and defendant in the investigation. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
<i>Perceptions of police intentions (general)</i>				
	Ok, now I want to ask you about what you think about the police in general.			
polint_corrupt ⁹²	The police are corrupt. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen belief about police intentions.	Citizen survey
polint_quality ⁹³	The police provide the same quality of service to all citizens. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
polint_idx			Index of polint_corrupt and polint_quality	

⁹¹Responses in Pakistan followed a different coding scheme; Not collected in Colombia at baseline.

⁹²Adapted from Sunshine and Tyler (2003).

⁹³Sunshine and Tyler (2003).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
intentions_idx			Index of polcaseserious, polcasefair, polint_idx	
M1b. Positive effect on knowledge of criminal justice system				
know_law_suspect ⁹⁴	If you see a dead body lying in the street and you report it to the police, [COUNTRY] law says the police must hold you as a suspect. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_lawyer ⁹⁵	If you take your case to court and you don't have money to pay a lawyer, [COUNTRY] law says the government must provide a lawyer for you. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_feesOnly collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.	If you take a case to the police, [COUNTRY] law says the police can charge a fee to register the case. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

⁹⁴Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.

⁹⁵Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study.

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
know_law_vawOnly collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Liberia and Philippines study.	According to [COUNTRY] law, it is a crime to beat on one's wife. True or false?	0-False; 1-True; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
know_law_idx			Index of know_law_suspect, know_law_lawyer, know_law_fees, and know_law_vaw	
know_report_followu collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Pakistan, Liberia and Philippines study.	If a crime is reported to the police using the hotline, an officer must follow up with the complainant in person in order for the crime to be recorded by the police. True or False? [ENUMERATOR: IS RESPONDENT CORRECT?]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
know_report_statio collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Pakistan, Liberia and Philippines study.	Do you know where the nearest police station is? [ENUMERATOR: IS RESPONDENT CORRECT?]	0-No; 1-Yes		Citizen survey
know_report_idx			Index of know_report_follow know_report_statio	

⁹⁶Blair et al. (2017). Only collected at endline in the Colombia study; Not collected in the Philippines study

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
know_idx			Index of know_law_idx, know_report_idx	
M1c. Positive effect on norms of citizens cooperation with police				
reportnorm_theft ⁹⁷	If there is a BURGLARY in your community, people can get angry if you take it to the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperation with police.	Citizen survey
reportnorm_abuse ⁹⁸	If a MAN BEATS HIS WIFE in your community, people can get angry if you take it to the police. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperation with police.	Citizen survey

⁹⁷Blair et al. (2017). Different response options collected in Colombia

⁹⁸Blair et al. (2017).

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
obeynorm ⁹⁹	You should do what the police tell you to do even when you do not understand the reasons for their decisions. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order for the responses to ensure that a higher value indicates a positive effect on norms of citizen cooperation with police.	Citizen survey
norm_idx			Index of reportnorm_theft, reportnorm_abuse, obeynorm	
MECHANISM FAMILY 2: PERCEIVED RETURNS TO CITIZENS COOPERATING WITH THE POLICE				
M2a. Positive effect on beliefs about police capacity				
polcap_timely	The police have the capacity to respond to incidents of crime in a timely manner. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
polcap_investigate	The police have the capacity to investigate crimes and gather evidence effectively. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey

⁹⁹Sunshine and Tyler (2003). Not collected in the Colombia study.

Variable name	Question text	Response options	Variable construction	Data Source
police_capacity_id			Index of polcap_timely, polcap_investigat	
M2b. Positive effect on perceptions of responsiveness to citizen feedback				
responsive_act	The police act upon citizen comments and complaints about security in my community. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Neither agree nor disagree; 3-Agree; 4-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
SECONDARY OUTCOME FAMILY 1: INCREASE IN TRUST IN THE STATE				
S1. Positive effect on trust in the state				
legit_trust ¹⁰⁰	How much do you trust the government of [COUNTRY]?	1-Not at all; 2-Just a little; 3-Somewhat; 4-A lot; 97-Don't know; 98-Refuse to answer		
SECONDARY OUTCOME FAMILY 2: INCREASE IN COMMUNAL TRUST				
S2. Positive effect on communal trust				
trust_community ¹⁰¹	Most people in my community can be trusted. Agree or disagree?	0-Strongly disagree; 1-Disagree; 2-Agree; 3-Strongly agree; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
COMPLIANCE WITH TREATMENT: CITIZEN INTERACTIONS WITH POLICE				
C. Positive effect on rate of citizen interactions with police				
ameeting_count ¹⁰²	Attendance sheets at community meetings	Percentage Attendance		Administrative

¹⁰⁰Different question text in Pakistan; Different response options collected in Philippines; Not collected in Uganda.

¹⁰¹Different question text and options for Uganda. Different response options for Pakistan and Philippines.

¹⁰²Not collected for Philippines since community meetings were not part of the CEP intervention

<i>Variable name</i>	<i>Question text</i>	<i>Response options</i>	<i>Variable construction</i>	<i>Data Source</i>
compliance_patrol ¹⁰³	About how often do you see police officers patrolling your area on FOOT?	1-Daily; 2-Weekly; 3-Monthly; 4-Seasonally; 5-Less than seasonally; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable such that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen interactions with the police.	Citizen survey
compliance_freq ¹⁰⁴	About how often do you see police officers patrolling your area while in a vehicle or on a motorbike?	1-Daily; 2-Weekly; 3-Monthly; 4-Seasonally; 5-Less than seasonally; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer	In our construction of this variable we reverse the order of this variable such that a higher value indicates a positive effect on citizen interactions with the police.	Citizen survey
compliance_meeting	In the past 6 months, have you HEARD ABOUT, SEEN, OR ATTENDED community meetings with police officers taking place in your area?	0-No; 1-Yes; 97-Do not know; 98-Refuse to answer		Citizen survey
compliance_idx			Index of compliance_patrol, compliance_freq, compliance_meeting	

¹⁰³Additional response option i.e. "Never" also elicited in Pakistan and Uganda.

¹⁰⁴Additional response option i.e. "Never" also elicited in Pakistan and Uganda.